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MODELS FOR USE OF MEDIATION IN  
E-DISCOVERY 
By: Steven C. Bennett*

 
Many commentators and courts suggest that 
cooperative approaches to e-discovery planning hold the 
key to lower-cost, higher-quality e-discovery processes.
1
  
Yet, admonitions to cooperate hardly suffice to motivate 
self-interested parties.
2
  Some system to foster cooperation 
                                                 
*The author is a partner at Park Jensen Bennett LLP in New York. The 
views expressed are solely those of the author, and should not be 
attributed to the author’s firm or its clients. 
1
 See JAY E. GRENIG & JEFFREY S. KINSLER, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL 
CIVIL DISCLOSURE: E-DISCOVERY AND RECORDS § 4.19 (3d. ed. 2013) 
(noting that cooperative approaches represent a “significant attempt to 
do something about the rapidly escalating costs of civil litigation”); 
CAROLE BASRI & MARY MACK, EDISCOVERY FOR CORPORATE 
COUNSEL, Foreword (2013) (noting “paradigm shift” in e-discovery 
process, toward cooperation); Daniel B. Garrie & Edwin A. Machuca, 
E-Discovery Mediation And The Art Of Keyword Search, 13 CARDOZO 
J. CONFLICT RESOL. 467, 472 (2012) (effective e-discovery requires 
that “attorneys share their understanding of the case and the technology 
with opposing counsel”); See also The Sedona Conference Cooperation 
Proclamation, 10 SEDONA CONF. J. 331 (2009); The Sedona 
Conference, The Case for Cooperation, 10 SEDONA CONF. J. 339, 361 
(2009) (prisoner’s dilemma may break down where “actors involved 
must repeatedly face the same or similar decisions” and each side 
“must evaluate the risk of the other side responding with similar 
conduct during a subsequent ‘round’”).   
2
 See Hon. David J. Waxse, Cooperation—What Is It and Why Do It?, 
18 RICH J.L. & TECH. 8, 15 (2012) (despite Sedona Cooperation 
Proclamation and “numerous [judicial] opinions,” it appears that 
“cooperation is not being used enough”); Hon. Nora Barry Fischer & 
Richard N. Lettieri, Creating the Criteria and the Process for Selection 
of E-Discovery Special Masters in Federal Court, 58:2 THE FED. 
LAWYER 36, 37 (2011) (where not addressed early, ESI issues “often 
9
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beyond the parties themselves appears essential.
3
  One 
system proposed as a means to promote e-discovery 
cooperation involves the use of mediation.
4
  This Article 
outlines an array of mediation techniques that could be 









  In general, mediation is meant 
                                                                                                 
come up later in the proceedings, causing unnecessary delays and 
expensive e-discovery motions”); Kathleen P. Browe, A Critique of the 
Civility Movement: Why Rambo Will Not Go Away, 77 MARQ. L. REV. 
751, 756 (1994) (lack of cooperation “backs up already overloaded trial 
dockets,” affecting the “efficiency of the entire judicial process,” and 
leading to “a decline in public respect for the legal profession”).   
3
 See generally Hon. Frank H. Easterbrook, Discovery as Abuse, 69 
B.U. L. REV. 635, 638 (1989) (judges can do little about discovery 
abuse when parties control the discovery process themselves); John 
Setear, The Barrister and the Bomb: The Dynamics Of Cooperation, 
Nuclear Deterrence And Discovery Abuse, 69 B.U. L. REV. 569 (1989). 
4
 See generally Steven C. Bennett, Mediation As A Means To 
Improve E-Discovery Cooperation, 23:2 ALB. L. J. OF SCI. & TECH. 
(forthcoming 2014). 
5
 See Kyle Beardsley, Using The Right Tool For the Job: Mediator 
Leverage And Conflict Resolution, 2 PENN STATE J. L. & INT’L AFF. 
57, 57-58 (2013) (noting that mediation may include functions such as 
“mere hosting of talks, substantive participation in the negotiations, 
shuttle diplomacy, or heavy-handed involvement;” mediators must 
“tailor the level of leverage” applied to “needs of the situation”). See 
also Thomas Stipanowich & J. Ryan Lamare, Living With ADR: 
Evolving Perceptions and Use of Mediation, Arbitration and Conflict 
Management in Fortune 1,000 Corporations, Pepperdine Law Paper 
No. 2013/16, www.ssrn.com (2013) (noting “diverse array” of dispute 
resolution options, including mediation, mini-trial, fact-finding, court-
annexed non-binding arbitration, and early neutral evaluation); Peter 
Salem, The Emergence of Triage in Family Court Services: The 
Beginning of the End for Mandatory Mediation?, 47 FAM. CT. REV. 
371 (2009) (noting “dozens” of dispute resolution processes, including 
psycho-educational programs, collaborative law, mediation, judicially 
10
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to facilitate communication, promote party-created 
solutions, and help clarify issues—all with the assistance of 
a neutral third party.
7
  Mediation as a set of tools may serve 
a variety of goals and adapt to a variety of circumstances.
8
  
What follows is a sampling of mediation-related 
techniques, generally arrayed from least intrusive (and least 
expensive), to more formal (and thus more resource and 
                                                                                                 
moderated settlement conferences, and high conflict interventions); 
Stephanie Smith & Janet Martinez, An Analytic Framework for Dispute 
Systems Design, 14 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 123, 128 (2009) (suggesting 
use of multiple processes for dispute resolution, with ability of parties 
to “loop” back or forward, as necessary, to different systems).   
6
 See Susan Nauss Exon, The Effects That Mediator Styles Impose On 
Neutrality And Impartiality Requirements Of Mediation, 42 U.S.F. L. 
REV. 577, 578 (2008) (most agree that mediation involves “a neutral 
and impartial third party who assists others in resolving a dispute,” but 
mediation involves “varying styles, techniques, and orientations”); 
Kyle C. Beardsley, David M. Quinn, Bidisha Biswas & Jonathan 
Wilkenfeld, Mediation Style And Crisis Outcomes, 50 J. CONFLICT 
RESOL. 58, 69 (2006) (noting facilitation, formulation and manipulation 
as among alternative “styles” of mediator activity). 
7
 See ABA, Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators, Preamble, 
AMERICANBAR.ORG (2005), available at 
www.americanbar,org/content/dam/aba/migrated/2011_build/dispute_r
esolution/model_standards_conduct_april2007.authcheckdam.pdf. 
(mediation is “a process in which an impartial third party facilitates 
communication and negotiation and promotes voluntary decision-
making by the parties;” mediation “serves various purposes, including 
providing the opportunity for parties to define and clarify issues, 
understand different perspectives, identify interests, explore and assess 
possible solutions, and reach mutually satisfactory agreements”).   
8
 See Stephanie Smith & Janet Martinez, An Analytic Framework For 
Dispute Systems Design, 14 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 123, 129-30 (2009) 
(design of system depends on “goals,” which may include efficiency, 
fairness, satisfaction and other factors); CATHY A. CONSTANTINO & 
CHRISTINA SICKLES-MERCHANT, DESIGNING CONFLICT MANAGEMENT 
SYSTEMS, 41 (1996) (system design requires consideration of whether 
ADR is appropriate, choice of process appropriate to particular 
problem, and making sure participants have necessary knowledge and 
skill to use ADR system).   
11
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  These techniques may also be arrayed on 




(1) Education: Despite the long period in which 
the Internet, e-mail and other technologies have become 
integrated into daily life, ignorance of best practices in e-
discovery remains a problem for the legal profession.
11
  
Technology savvy mediators can provide an education 
function for counsel and parties, even without becoming 
                                                 
9
 This is not to suggest that the spectrum of processes necessarily must 
flow from “easiest” to “hardest” cases.  Simple dispute resolution 
techniques often work well in some of the most complicated disputes; 
and the reverse is also true.  See William Ury, Getting Disputes 
Resolved: Designing Systems To Cut The Costs Of Conflict (1988) 
(ease of dispute resolution depends on focus on interests, or rights, or 
power—in ascending order—to determine degree of difficulty in 
resolving dispute).    
10
 See Dwight Golann, Variations In Mediation: How—And Why—
Legal Mediators Change Styles In The Course Of A Case, 2000 J. OF 
DISP. RESOL. 41, 44 (2000) (presenting “grid” of mediation practices, 
from facilitative to evaluative). See also Leonard L. Riskin, 
Decisionmaking In Mediation: The New Old Grid And The New New 
Grid System, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 5 (2003) (noting various types 
of mediation, including evaluative, facilitative and transformative 
systems); Leonard L. Riskin, Understanding Mediators’ Orientations, 
Strategies, and Techniques: A Grid for the Perplexed, 1 HARV. NEGOT. 
L. REV. 7 (1996).   
11
 See Mikki Tomlinson, Attacking eDiscovery Ignorance In 2013, 
(Nov. 29, 2012), available at 
www.somansatech.com/2013/company/eng_news_view.php?idx. 
(suggesting that poor cooperation efforts in e-discovery “oftentimes 
boils down to eDiscovery ignorance”); John M. Barkett, The 7th 
Circuit E-Discovery Pilot Project: What We Might Learn and Why It 
Matters to Every Litigant in America, ABA SECTION OF LITIGATION 
NEWS (Dec. 2011), available at 
www.apps.americanbar.org/litigation/litigationnews/mobile/docs/barket
t.december11.pdf (“Without better education, e-discovery may not be 
managed fairly or frugally, and certainly not quickly.”).  
12
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deeply involved in a matter.
12
 For example, a court might 
establish a “hot-line” system with trained court staff or 
volunteer mediators who are available to answer basic 
questions about the court’s rules and expectations regarding 
e-discovery and technology.  The system might also 
provide information about essential forms, such as 
“clawback” agreements and confidentiality orders,
13
 and 
                                                 
12
 See PATRICIA KUTZA, NEW SAN FRANCISCO FORUM PROMOTES E-
DISCOVERY MEDIATION (Oct. 23, 2013), available at 
www.lawtechnologynews.com/id=1202624724121?slreturn=20140224
132046 (mediators can serve as “an antidote for the lack of e-discovery 
training in law schools”); DANIEL B. GARRIE & SALVATORE SCIBETTA, 
WE NEED MEDIATION IN E-DISCOVERY (June 5, 2013), available at 
www.law360.com/articles/445869/we-need-mediation-in-e-discovery 
(mediator serves as “listener and translator;” to “translate the technical 
underpinnings of each party’s systems into actionable discovery efforts 
that both parties can comprehend”); Daniel B. Garrie & Edwin A. 
Machuca, E-Discovery Mediation And The Art Of Keyword Search, 13 
CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 467, 469-70 (2012) (“technically 
proficient” neutral may be required where parties and courts are 
unfamiliar with “latest methods” of searching for and processing 
electronic information); David Cohen & Claire Covington, E-
Discovery: Liaisons Are Key to Discovery Success, INSIDE  COUNSEL 
(Aug. 7, 2012), www.insidecounsel.com/2012.com/2012/08/07/e-
discovery-liasons-are-key-to-discovery-success (subject matter experts 
necessary “given that most lawyers and judges have little training in the 
technical issues surrounding ESI”); Hon. Nora Barry Fischer & Richard 
N. Lettieri, Creating the Criteria and the Process for Selection of E-
Discovery Special Masters in Federal Court, 58:2 THE FED. LAW. 36 
(2011) (Rule 26(f) conferences have “generally remained ineffective 
where counsel “lack the technical skill and experience necessary to 
facilitate effective resolution” of ESI issues). See also Richard N. 
Lettieri, WHAT IS E-MEDIATION, AND WHY MIGHT I WANT TO 
RECOMMEND IT TO MY CLIENT?, (2010), available at 
www.lettierilaw.com/documents/emediationseptember-2010-
Newsletter.pdf. (counsel “unfamiliar with ESI” may benefit from use of 
mediator).   
13
 See Robert B. Yegge, Divorce Litigants Without Lawyers, 28:3 FAM. 
L.Q. 407, 415 (Fall 1994) (telephone hotline system can be used on 
“on-demand” basis to provide information not available from 
workshops and other public education).  Similar systems are often set 
13
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information regarding court-connected mediation 
services.
14




                                                                                                 
up as ethics hotlines.  See Bruce A. Green, Bar Association Ethics 
Committees: Are They Broken?, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 731, 737 (2002) 
(noting bar ethics committees that “field questions over the telephone, 
including, in some cases, via an ‘ethics hotline’”). See also Kimberlee 
K. Kovach, New Wine Requires New Wineskins: Transforming Lawyer 
Ethics for Effective Representation In A Non-Adversarial Approach To 
Problem-Solving, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 935, 950 (2001) (noting that 
“nearly every bar association has a committee or program focused on 
the civility of lawyers”).  
14
 See Jacqueline Nolan-Haley, Lawyers, Clients And Mediation, 73 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1369, 1373 (1998) (“Many lawyers simply lack a 
basic understanding of the mediation process, the premises and values 
which drive it, and the creative outcomes which are possible.”).   
15
 Traditionally in European systems, ombudsman programs have 
focused on government agencies, rather than courts.  See Diana Douse, 
MEDIATION AND OTHER ALTERNATIVES TO COURT, 
www.parliament.uk (June 6, 2013) (noting use of ombudsman as 
“independent and impartial means of resolving certain disputes outside 
the courts;” the ombudsman may deal with “complaints” regarding 
“public bodies and private sector services”); Stephanie Smith & Janet 
Martinez, An Analytic Framework For Dispute Systems Design, 14 
HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1401, 1447 (2009) (ombudsman system 
involves “[a] third party within an organization who deals with 
conflicts on a confidential basis and gives disputants information on 
how to resolve the problem at issue”).  Courts in the U.S., however, 
have begun to experiment with such programs.  See Michele Bertran, 
Judiciary Ombudsman: Solving Problems In The Courts, 29 FORDHAM 
URBAN L.J. 2099, 2108 (2002) (New Jersey program offers public 
information, including “educational literature, videos and a website,” 
and citizen assistance, including “investigation and resolution of 
complaints”); Robert B. Yegge, Divorce Litigants Without Lawyers, 
JUDGES JNL. 8, 10 (Spr. 1994) (noting use of courthouse ombudsmen, 
who “distribute self-help form packets,” and conduct workshops to give 
instruction to groups of litigants).  The mediation functions described 
here generally fit the concept of an ombudsman.  See Martin A. Frey, 
Alternative Methods Of Dispute Resolution 5, 12 (2003) (“third party” 
assistance in dispute resolution may include “ombuds” system; such a 
system can help parties take “corrective action” before problems 
become “much more difficult to address”); KARL SLAIKEU & RALPH 
14
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(2) Needs Assessment: Cases vary, and so do e-
discovery problems; the capacity of parties and counsel to 
resolve such problems varies as well.  A system of 
assessment—not of the merits of the dispute, or even of the 
relative positions of the parties regarding e-discovery 
matters—aimed at determining whether the parties are well 
prepared to cooperate in the case,
16
 and identifying the 
kinds of resources that would best serve the needs of the 
parties, might be offered as a form of “triage.”
17
  A 
                                                                                                 
HASSON, CONTROLLING THE COSTS OF CONFLICT: HOW TO DESIGN A 
SYSTEM FOR YOUR ORGANIZATION 94 (1998) (ombudsman provides a 
“neutral, confidential, readily available resource (usually available in 
person, by telephone, email, or some other direct means) to assist 
parties in self-help, troubleshooting (via coaching), informal shuttle 
diplomacy, and sometimes convening of the parties to help them select 
from options such as informal mediation or other higher resources”); 
Shirley A. Wiegand, A Just And Lasting Peace: Supplanting Mediation 
With The Ombuds Model, 12 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 95 (1996) 
(ombudsman system embodies mediation, with additional capabilities).  
As a neutral third party, moreover, an ombudsman could help reinforce 
a culture of civility within the e-discovery process.  Cf. Michele 
Bertran, Judiciary Ombudsman: Solving Problems In The Courts, 29 
FORDHAM URBAN L.J. 2099, 2103 (2002) (ombudsman investigations 
may include questions of “discourteous behavior or incivility”).   
16
 See John M. Lande, The Movement Toward Early Case Handling In 
Courts And Private Dispute Resolution, 24 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 
81, 82 (2008) (“parties may not feel ready to settle, or even work 
together, right away”); Phillip M. Armstrong, Why We Still Litigate, 8 
PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 379, 380-81 (2008) (noting that culture, ego, 
emotion and other barriers may prevent parties from settling disputes 
outside court proceedings); Craig A. McEwen, Employing The Law To 
Increase The Use Of Mediation And To Encourage Direct And Early 
Negotiations, 13 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 831, 838 (1998) 
(reviewing factors that may inhibit parties from using mediation early 
in litigation process); Robert A. Baruch Bush, What Do We Need a 
Mediator for?  Mediation’s “Value-Added” for Negotiators, 12 OHIO 
ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 1, 7-12 (1996) (noting barriers to negotiation 
that mediation can help manage).  
17
 See Salem, supra note 5, at 372 (suggesting the use of “triage,” 
where the “most appropriate” form of ADR service can be identified 
15
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mediator, for example, could help identify gaps in 
knowledge that, if corrected, could lead to enhanced 
cooperation
18
 and creative solutions.
19
  Such a system 
might require interviews or could be conducted through a 
written questionnaire, perhaps even an on-line service.
20
  
The system might also focus on helping parties identify 
reasonable timetables for discovery
21
 and help identify 
cases with specific forms of e-discovery related case 
management problems.
22
  The neutral might determine that 
                                                                                                 
“on the front end” of a case, to reduce burden, provide more effective 
services, and more efficiently use scarce court resources).   
18
 See Ralph C. Losey, Lawyers Behaving Badly: Understanding 
Unprofessional Conduct in E-Discovery, 60 MERCER L. REV. 983, 1002 
(2008) (that stating discovery abuses often happen because “attorneys 
do not understand the complex technologies involved,” and “acting out 
of ignorance and fear, they do not cooperate”).  
19
 Garrie & Machuca, supra note 1, at 474 (neutral may assist where 
parties have failed to “secur[e] legal counsel with the requisite 
technological acumen”); See Mike Hamilton, E-Discovery Court Pilot 
Programs: E-Discovery Templates That Legal Teams Should Utilize, E. 
DISCOVERY BEAT (Feb. 23, 2012), http://www.exterro.com/e-
discovery-beat/2012/02/23/e-discovery-court-pilot-programs-e-
discovery-templates-tht-legal-teams-should-utilize/ (stating that neutral 
can “provide the necessary skill and expertise to help expedite the e-
discovery process by quickly identifying practical and fair solutions”). 
20
 Bruce L. Mann, Smoothing Some Wrinkles In Online Dispute 
Resolution, 17 Int’l J. of Law & Info. Tech., no. 1 at 83 (2009) 
(introducing concept of “expert-peer online assessment” of disputes as 
means to resolve conflicts). See Salem, supra note 5, at 380 (stating that 
triage system would involve initial screening or interviews by neutral 
who could help identify the service that will “best meet the needs” of 
the parties).  
21
 See Stephen F. Gates, Ten Essential Elements Of An Effective 
Dispute Resolution Program, 8 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 397, 398 (2008) 
(“Much of the cost of litigation is a function of cycle time from case 
inception to final resolution, and all steps in the management process 
should be focused on reducing this cycle time.”).   
22
 See Lande, supra note 16, at 91 (noting use of systems for “early 
screening of cases” to provide “early warning of potential case 
management problems, even before developing a scheduling order”) 
(quotation omitted).  Such a system might also operate through a 
16
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no form of mediation would assist the parties in the case 
and direct the parties to the normal court processes.
23
  As in 





(3) Facilitating Discussion:  A mediator who 
concentrates on facilitating discussion between parties,
25
 as 
opposed to evaluating a matter or helping parties structure a 
                                                                                                 
“differential” case management system, helping to designate cases as 
“expedited, standard, [or] complex,” for example, id. at 94. See also 
Frank E. Sander & Lukasz Rozdeiczer, Matching Cases And Dispute 
Resolution Procedures: Detailed Analysis Leading To A Mediation-
Centered Approach, 11 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1 (2006) (proposing 
framework for matching cases to ADR processes); Frank E.A. Sander 
& Stephen B. Goldberg, Fitting The Forum To The Fuss: A User-
Friendly Guide To Selecting An ADR Procedure, 10 NEGOT. J. 49 
(1994).     
23
 See William J. McLean, Beware Masters In E-Discovery, LAW.COM 
(Aug. 21, 2008) 
http://www.alm.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1202423953864 (noting 
potential circumstances where “no amount of cajoling could stop the 
tactical flood of discovery motions”). See also FAQ: How Do I Know 
When To Use E-Mediation Versus A Special Master?, ACESIN.COM 
(2011) http://www.acezin.com/index.php?q=node/115 (“if there is such 
[a] breakdown in communication that the parties cannot even agree that 
the sky is blue, then more likely the parties need a special master to act 
as referee and ‘make the calls’”). 
24
 See Nancy A. Welsh, The Thinning Vision Of Self-Determination In 
Court-Connected Mediation: The Inevitable Price Of 
Institutionalization?, 6 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1, 16 (2001) (noting 
importance of “self-determination” as central element of mediation). 
25
 See Exon, supra note 6, at 591 (explaining that facilitator 
“encourages party attendance, facilitates communication, poses 
questions to uncover the parties’ underlying needs and interests, helps 
educate the parties by assisting them to understand the other’s needs 
and interests, and otherwise attempts to provide a comfortable forum in 
which the parties can develop their own creative solutions to a 
problem”). 
17
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resolution, can serve an important purpose.
26
  In the 
discovery context, merely ensuring that parties 
communicate about essential issues in a courteous manner 
can aid the process.
27
  For example, a mediator whose role 
in a conference consists of helping with scheduling the 
conference and ensuring a professional tone in the 
discussion might require very little preparation regarding 
the substance of the dispute.
 28
  A mediator might also 
encourage parties to bring together their technical 
                                                 
26
 See Fischer, supra note 2, at 37 (suggesting use of “facilitator” to 
lead discussions on ESI issues, where attorneys are unable or unwilling 
to proceed with e-discovery conference). 
27
 See Daniel B. Garrie, Redefining The Discovery Terrain: The Need 
For Mediation In E-Discovery, Part III, L & FORENSICS (Nov. 28, 
2013) http://www.lawandforensics.com/redefining-discovery-terrain-
need-mediation-e-discovery-3/ (function of mediator to “facilitate 
cooperation” and “open” dialogue); Kutza, supra note 12 (stating that 
mediators can “primarily work on getting the dialogue going,” versus 
“shuttle diplomacy” of conventional settlement negotiations) (quoting 
Michael Carbone).   
28
 See Ron Kilgard, Discovery Masters: When They Help—And When 
They Don’t, ARIZ. ATT., Apr. 2004, at 30, 34 (Apr. 2004) (“the mere 
fact of having to discuss these issues in person with the master present, 
and not in angry faxes and e-mails written late at night, has a taming 
effect on the lawyers”); Allison O. Skinner, The Role Of Mediation For 
ESI Disputes, THE ALA. LAW, Nov. 20, at 425, 426, (Nov. 2009) 
(“Often, discovery battles can result in an exchange of potentially 
inflammatory correspondence that may be used as an exhibit to [a] 
motion to compel or motion for protective order. . . . Mediating the e-
discovery dispute allows the litigants to make proposals 
confidentially.”). See also Angela Garcia, Dispute Resolution Without 
Disputing: How The Interactional Organization Of Mediation 
Hearings Minimizes Argument, 56 SOC. REV. 818 (1991) (noting that 
mediation “constrains the presentation of accusations and denials” in 
negotiation); Lande, supra note 16, at 92 (facilitator may help with 
“reduction of partisan psychology; prevention of conflict escalation; 
and creation of a mandatory event that overcomes logistical barriers to 
negotiation”). 
18
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personnel to address creative solutions to e-discovery 




(4) Structuring Negotiations: A mediator may 
aid parties by bringing an agenda for discussion to the 
process.
30
  In the e-discovery context, at the outset of a 
                                                 
29
 See Kenneth J. Withers, E-Discovery In Commercial Litigation: 
Finding A Way Out Of Purgatory, 2 J. CT. INNOV. 13, 22 (2009) 
(suggesting that, “if you can get the IT people from both parties 
together in a room, they will often solve problems that the lawyers 
thought were insurmountable”); Mary Mack, Litigation Prenups, E-
Discovery ADR And The Campaign For Proportionality, 
METROPOLITAN CORP. COUNS. (May 3, 2010) 
http://www.metrocorpcounsel.com/weticles/12510/mary-mack-
litigation-prenups-e-discovery-adr-and-campaign-proport+ionality  
(“There is a great advantage in having the ‘meet and confer’ take place 
under the cloak of mediation.  It keeps the discussion and the written 
offers to compromise confidential.  Mediation also provides a cloak of 
confidentiality for the IT people.  This makes it possible for the IT 
people to talk more openly because they are not on the record.”); Peter 
S. Vogel, E-Neutrals, E-Mediation And Special Masters: An 
Introductory Guide, LEXOLOGY.COM (July 2, 2012), 
http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=e5fcfc29-8666-40df-
92c0-9ef088102ecc (suggesting that mediator require parties to indicate 
who will attend mediation sessions to provide “technical support” 
concerning ESI issues).  The mediator may also remind parties that all 
mediation discussions are confidential; Allison Skinner & Peter Vogel, 
E-Mediation Can Simplify E-Discovery Disputes, AM. LAW. (Sept. 23, 
2013) http://www.americanlawter,com/id=1202620012101/E-
Mediation-Can-Simplify-E-Discovery-
Disputes?slreturn=201401214201708 (stating that mediators may work 
with IT personnel to educate them about their role in the e-discovery 
process, and use “confidential caucus” to communicate ideas, without 
an inquiry being “misinterpreted as a weakness”).   
30
 See Allison O. Skinner, How To Prepare An E-Mediation Statement 
For Resolving E-Discovery Disputes, (2009) http://smu-
ecommerce.gardere.com/allison%soskinner%20preparing%20for%20e-
mediation%20discovery.prf (using pre-mediation submissions, 
mediator can identify “areas of mutuality” that can be “readily disposed 
of,” so that parties may thereafter focus on solutions to “more 
challenging issues”). One very simple task for a mediator would consist 
19
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case, many basic issues (preservation of evidence, search 
techniques, and privilege protection, to name a few) 
constitute essential elements for negotiation.
31
  Yet, one 
common phenomenon is the “drive by” Rule 26(f) 
conference, where counsel “meet and confer” in name 
only.
32
  A mediator might insist on discussion of all 
essential topics
33
 with the aim of creating a comprehensive 
                                                                                                 
of identifying immediate areas of agreement between the parties.  
Indeed, online systems have been developed to facilitate these kinds of 
basic agreements.  See Noam Ebner, Bryan Hanson & Arthur 
Pearlstein, ODR In North America, ONLINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: 
THEORY AND PRACTICE: A TREATISE ON TECHNOLOGY AND DISPUTE 
RESOLUTION 431, 447 (Mohamed S. Adbel Wahab, Ethan Katsh & 
Daniel Rainey eds. 2012) (describing online system where parties 
“inform the platform of their real preferences and priorities, beyond 
what they are willing to share with the opposite party,” where software 
can “conduct an analysis of the agreement to see if it maximizes each 
party’s gains” and one can imagine adaptation of such processes to the 
e-discovery field.) 
31
 See Robert A. Cole, E-Discovery Increases Possibility Of Mediated 
Resolutions, DAILY BUS. REV. (Oct. 3, 2012) http://www.uww-
adr.com/zgraph-content/uploads/2012/10/Bob-Cole.pdf (explaining that 
outlining an agenda for conducting e-discovery mediation may include 
crafting agreements on preservation and collection protocols, including 
sampling and search techniques). 
32
 See Craig Ball, Musings On Meet And Confer, CRAIG D. BALL, P.C. 
(2007) http://www.craigball.com/Musings_on_Meet_and_Confer.pdf 
(noting phenomenon of “drive-by event with no substantive exchange 
of information”); Michael Collyard, E-Discovery: Avoiding Drive By 
“Meet & Confers,” INSIDE COUNSEL (Sept. 13, 2011) 
http://www.insidecounsel.com/2011/09/13/e-discovery-avoiding-drive-
by-meet-confers? See also Emery G. Lee III & Thomas E. Willging, 
FED. JUDICIAL CTR., NATIONAL CASE-BASED CIVIL RULES SURVEY: 
PRELIMINARY REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ADVISORY 
COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULEs 15 (2009) (FJC study indicates that only 
half of attorney respondents included discussion of ESI in Rule 26(f) 
conferences, and only one in five court-ordered discovery plans 
included provisions relating to ESI). 
33
 See Peter S. Vogel, The Role Of e-Mediation In Resolving ESI 
Disputes, (Oct. 29, 2012) http://www.disputingblog.com/guest-post-
the-role-of-e-mediation-in-resolving-esi-disputes-in-federal-court-
20
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e-discovery plan for the case.
34
  Where the parties have 
otherwise agreed on the e-discovery schedule and plan, the 
mediator might focus on more difficult issues, such as 
creating a search term protocol.
35
  Parties might also agree 




(5) Screening Motions: Litigants are generally 
must certify that they have “met and conferred” in good 
                                                                                                 
interview-with-allison-skinner/ (noting that “most meet and confers are 
ineffective;” mediator may act with “court sanctioned checklist” of 
issues to discuss); Ronald J. Hedges, The Sedona Conference Points 
The Way Toward Control Of The Costs And Burden Of E-Discovery, 59 
FED. LAW. 46, 47 (2012) (suggesting use of mediators and court-
appointed experts to assist in “good faith” process of “meet and 
confer”); Zachary Parkins, Electronic Discovery: Why The 
Appointment Of Special Masters In All Large Electronic Discovery 
Disputes Is Vital To The Process Of American Civil Justice, AM. J. 
MEIDATION 97, 104 (2011) (suggesting role for mediator where parties 
do not prepare for Rule 26(f) conference “in an effective way”).  
34
 See Allison O. Skinner, Alternative Dispute Resolution Expands Into 
Pre-Trial Practice: An Introduction To The Role Of E-Neutrals, 13 
CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 113, 125 (2011) (arguing goal of 
mediation to created a mediated e-discovery plan). See also, Skinner & 
Peter Vogel, supra note 29 (typically, litigants would agree to e-
mediation at the outset of a case, to develop a discovery plan; with the 
mediator thereafter available to help “break any impasse that may 
arise”); Robert Hilson, Neutrals May Ease Anxiety Over Florida’s New 
E-Discovery Rules, ACEDS.ORG (Apr. 26, 2012) (neutrals can help 
“shape discovery plans”) (quoting Lawrence Kolin, mediator); Peter S. 
Vogel, Use E-Mediation And Special Masters In E-Discovery Matters, 
LAW.COM (July 5, 2010) (“E-mediation is most effective when initiated 
at the beginning of litigation, at the outset of discovery. . . . [I]f the 
parties can agree to the initial [mediated e-discovery plan], this will 
reduce the number of disputes presented to the trial court.”). 
35
 See Daniel B. Garrie & Siddartha Rao, Using Technology Experts 
For Electronic Discovery, 38 LITIG. 13 (2012) (mediator can 
“expedite” agreement on search terms, and avoid potential that parties 
might later “complain” about terms used) 
36
 See Cole, supra note 31 at 10 (parties may “[c]reate a method for 
resolving any disputes that may arise over the mediated plan”). 
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faith before bringing discovery related motions.
37
  The 
“meet and confer” obligation, however, may be as subject 
to abuse as any other element of the e-discovery process.
38
  
Thus, a mediator might help confirm that parties truly have 
met their obligations to confer in good faith before seeking 
court assistance.
39
  On more complicated, longer-lasting 
matters, a more permanent system of referral to mediation 
(akin to dispute resolution boards in construction matters)
40
 
                                                 
37
 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(1) (requiring party moving for protective 
order to certify “good faith” effort to confer “in an effort to resolve the 
dispute without court action”); FED. R. CIV P. 37(a) (requiring party 
moving to compel to certify “good faith” effort to confer “in an effort 
to obtain [disclosure] without court action.”).  
38
 See Nicola Faith Sharpe, Corporate Cooperation Through Cost-
Sharing, 16 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 109, 134-35 (2009) 
(suggesting that “meet-and-confer requirements will simply play out as 
the rest of the game does,” unless “rules that support cooperation as a 
favorable strategy” include “penalties” that counter a “strategy of 
abuse”). 
39
 See Skinner, supra note 34, at 128. (“[A]n e-mediation conducted in 
good faith demonstrates [that] the parties have met their Rule 26 
obligations.”); Vogel, supra note 34 (mediator could “certify to the 
court that the parties met and conferred in good faith on the enumerated 
ESI issues”). See also Mack, supra note 29 (suggesting that court could 
“direct all e-discovery disputes to e-mediation before involving the 
judge,” which would permit a party to “explain in a setting without the 
judge why the issue arose in the first place and what was being done to 
rectify it”). 
40
 A dispute review board (which could be a single individual) would 
aim to identify e-discovery problems as they arise and resolve them 
before they escalate.  See Peter Vogel, Use eMediation To Save Time 
And Money, TEX. LAW. (Sept. 2, 2013) (suggesting that use of 
mediation “as early in the case as possible” permits mediator to 
“address eDiscovery matters when they first arise”).  Construction-
related dispute review boards serve similar purposes.  See Ming-Lee 
Chong & Heap-Yih Chong, Dispute Review Board: Concept And 
Introduction To Developing Countries, 2 INTERSCI. MGMT. REV. 6, 6-7 
(2010) (dispute resolution boards, first conceived in the 1950s, have 
been implemented in virtually all construction areas); id. at 7 (board 
typically created at outset of project, with periodic status meetings and 
site visits; if conflicts arise, the board can provide “informal” opinions 
22
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  Discussions with a mediator may 
help sharpen the focus of the parties for presentation to the 




(6) Neutral Evaluation:  Traditionally, the 
concept of mediation has not involved evaluation of 
disputes, but rather facilitation of discussion to resolve 
disputes.
43
  Increasingly, however, the notion of non-
                                                                                                 
to help resolve disputes); Smith, supra note 5, at 167 (dispute 
resolution board generally formed at start of construction project, and 
“meets regularly to follow work progress and to provide guidance to 
the parties on differences before they become disputes”).  The purpose 
of a dispute review board is to “[create] an atmosphere of trust and 
cooperation,” James Denning, More Than An Underground Success, 63 
CIV. ENG. 42 (1993), with the aim of preventing disputes from 
escalating.  See Colleen A. Libbey, Working Together While “Waltzing 
In A Mine”: Successful Government Construction Contract Dispute 
Resolution With Partnering And Dispute Review Boards, 15 OHIO ST. J. 
ON DISP. RESOL. 825 (2000). See also Kathleen M.J. Harmon, 
Effectiveness Of Dispute Review Boards, 129 J. OF CONSTRUCTION 
ENG. & MGMT. 674, 676 (2003) (statistics suggesting high levels of 
success with dispute review boards, resolving disputes before project 
completion).  
41
 See Skinner, supra note 34, at 127 (parties may use mediator on 
“issue-by-issue” basis, “as needed,” where mediator is “familiar with 
pre-trial activities” in the case and able to address specific issues as 
they arise).  
42
 See Losey, supra note 18, at 997 (cooperation means “refinement of 
disputes and avoidance when possible;” some discovery disputes “may 
still arise,” but “the issues presented for adjudication will be much 
more focused and refined”); Hon. W. Royal Furgeson, Jr., Karl Bayer 
& Elizabeth L. Graham, E-Discovery And The Use Of Special Masters, 
DISPUTING BLOG (2011) (even if not all disputes are resolved, 
mediation process “provides parties with a better understanding of the 
key disputes which must be presented to the court”);  Skinner, supra 
note 28, at 425 (even if not all conflicts are resolved, mediation permits 
parties to “illuminate the key disputes to be presented to the court,” 
without “inflammatory” communications).  
43
 See Kimberlee K. Kovach & Lela P. Love, “Evaluative” Mediation 
Is An Oxymoron, 14 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 31 (1996); 
Lela P. Love, The Top Ten Reasons Why Mediators Should Not 
23
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binding evaluations as a part of mediation
44
 has taken 
hold.
45
  The neutral evaluation process generally involves 
each side in litigation presenting a summary of its position, 
with the neutral evaluator offering an evaluation of the 
strengths and weaknesses of each party’s case.
46
  Such an 
                                                                                                 
Evaluate, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 937 (1997) (analyzing why 
evaluations do not comport with mediator’s essential role). 
44
 Some commentators suggest that some degree of evaluation is 
inherent in the mediation process.  See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Identifying 
Real Dichotomies Underlying The False Dichotomy: Twenty-First 
Century Mediation In An Eclectic Regime, 2000 J. DISP. RESOL. 371, 
377 (2000) (noting “continuum,” from facilitative to evaluative, for 
forms of mediation, based on “key determinants” of the needs of the 
parties, based on their past and current relations, and other factors.); 
Ellen A. Waldman, The Evaluative-Facilitative Debate In Mediation: 
Applying The Lens Of Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 82 MARQ. L. REV. 
155, 157 (1998) (“much of what goes by the name of mediation today 
involves some evaluative activity by the mediator; to construct a 
definition that excludes most of what the practitioner and lay 
communities understand to be mediation would spawn needless 
confusion”).  
45
 See Robert B. Moberly, Mediator Gag Rules: Is It Ethical For 
Mediators To Evaluate Or Advise?, 38 S. TEX. L. REV. 669, 675 (1997) 
(suggesting that “mediator evaluation can assist the parties in their self-
determination efforts”); Benjamin F. Tennille, Lee Applebaum & Anne 
Tucker Nees, Getting To Yes In Specialized Courts: The Unique Role 
Of ADR In Business Court Cases, 11 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 35, 48 
(2010) (mediation may combine “evaluative and facilitative practices to 
get the best results”); Stipanowich & Lamare, supra note 5, at 44 
(noting that, in “lawyered” cases, a mode of mediation where “sooner 
or later, there is some kind of evaluation by a mediator with [a] 
background as a legal advocate or judge—predominates”). 
46
 See Daniel B. Garrie, supra note 27, part II (mediator may help 
“educate each party about the reality of their demands”); Smith & 
Martinez, supra note 5, at 166 (neutral case evaluation generally 
involves a lawyer who “provides an advisory opinion to the parties as 
to their respective case strengths, weaknesses, and value”); Brian 
Jarren, The Future Of Mediation: A Sociological Perspective, 2009 J. 
OF DISPUTE RESOL. 49, 50 (2009) (mediator can serve as “agent of 
reality” when parties reach impasse); Frey, supra note 15, at 12 (neutral 
evaluation “provides the parties and their attorneys with the opportunity 
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evaluation may lead to resolution of the conflict or may 
simply assist with case planning
47
 (helping the parties 




(7) Mediator Facilitated Search: In some 
instances,
49
 parties and counsel might agree to permit a 
mediator with substantial technology skills to conduct or 
supervise a search for responsive records.
50
  The mediator’s 
recommendations regarding production of materials to 
opposing parties, however, would not bind the producing 
                                                                                                 
to visualize the case from a third party’s perspective;” by having 
“preview of what might happen,” parties achieve a “clearer 
understanding” of settlement issues).  
47
 See Gates, supra note 21, at 400 (evaluator may be “very helpful in 
eliminating the ‘emotional attachment’ that a party may develop in its 
case and lead to serious negotiations”); Julie Macfarlane, Culture 
Change? A Tale Of Two Cities And Mandatory Court-Connected 
Mediation, 2002 J. DISP. RESOL. 241, 266 (2002) (mediator may 
provide parties with “reality check,” useful in negotiation). See also 
Lande, supra note 16, at 99 The Wayne D. Brazil, Early Neutral 
Evaluation Or Mediation?  When Might ENE Deliver More Value?, 14 
DISP. RESOL. MAG. 10 (2007).   
48
 See Riskin & Welsh, supra note 15, at 892 n. 44 (noting that, in some 
forms of mediation, it is “common” to have a separate stage [where] the 
mediator conducts a ‘conflict analysis,’ and “reports to the parties 
‘what the conflict is’”) (quoting Interview with mediator Howard 
Bellman, in Dedham, Mass. (June 18, 2006)).  
49
 See Garrie & Rao, supra note 35 (suggesting that, in some cases, 
“[c]ooperative efforts and the expeditious selection of keywords are 
hampered” by “adversarial zeal” of attorneys). 
50
 See Garrie & Rao, supra note 35 (mediator may conduct search, or 
may simply “ensure that appropriate documents are produced at a 
reasonable price respective to the underlying issue”); Marian Riedy, 
Suman Beros & Kim Sperduto, Mediated Investigative E-Discovery, 
2010 FED. CTS. L. REV. 79, 79-81 (2010) (outlining process for neutral 
with skills of “trained digital investigator” to “search and retrieve 
relevant information,” in a manner similar to an “in-house expert,” but 
with both parties sharing the expense).   
25
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  In essence, the mediator would simply come to 
learn more about the circumstances of the parties’ data 
systems and records, which could improve the mediator’s 
ability to make competent recommendations.
52
  Whether 
this relatively intrusive process constitutes “mediation” is 
debatable.
53
  Certainly, a specific agreed-upon protocol for 
the endeavor would be essential.
54
 
   
Conclusion 
 
Mediation constitutes a generally accepted 
mechanism for dispute resolution.
55
  Mediation processes 
are regularly incorporated into court-annexed ADR 
systems
56
 and are often chosen by parties as a means for 
                                                 
51
 See Marian Riedy, Suman Beros & Sperduto, supra note 50, at 98-99 
(system proposed would prevent mediator from producing information 
if party does not agree to produce).   
52
 See Marian Riedy, Suman Beros  Sperduto, supra note 50, at 97 
(suggesting that the “standard” mediation process does not suffice, 
“because the mediator is only aware of the information the parties 
voluntarily disclose”). 
53
 See Skinner, supra note 34, at 128 n. 69 (rejecting notion that 
“mediated investigative e-discovery” is actual mediation, given that 
mediator may lack neutrality after conducting investigation).   
54
 See Nolan-Haley, supra note 14, at 1371 (“[Mediation] is an informal 
process based on principles of individual sovereignty and self-
determination.”).    
55
 See Stipanowich & Lamare, supra note 5 (noting that in survey, 87% 
of respondents report some use of mediation); Jennifer Reynolds, The 
Lawyer With The ADR Tattoo, 14 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 395, 
397 (2013) (“even the most traditional lawyers use ADR techniques 
and processes all the time, from client counseling to negotiation to 
mediation to arbitration”); Richard S. Weil, Mediation In A Litigation 
Culture: The Surprising Growth Of Mediation In New York, 17 DISP. 
RESOL. MAG. 8, 8 (2011) (in survey of litigators, 90% expressed a 
positive view of mediation).   
56
 See Roselle L. Wissler, Court-Connected Settlement Procedures: 
Mediation And Judicial Settlement Conferences, 26 OHIO ST. J. ON 
DISPUTE RESOL. 271, 272 (2011) (noting that judicial settlement 
conferences and court-connected mediation have become 
26
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  The mediation process is 
flexible, meant to adapt to the needs of the parties and the 
circumstances of the case.
58
   
Courts continue to experiment with mediation 
forms,
59
 however, and evidence on the relative 
effectiveness of various systems remains difficult to 
assess.
60
  Cutting-edge systems of dispute resolution, such 
as online mediation,
61
 offer interesting possibilities, but 
                                                                                                 
“commonplace” parts of court systems); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, 
Ethics In ADR: The Many “Cs” Of Professional Responsibility And 
Dispute Resolution, 28 FORDHAM URBAN L.J. 979, 990 (2001) 
(“Virtually every state and federal court requires some form of ADR at 
least to be considered by the lawyers in a litigation matter, and, 
increasingly, transactions and contracts contain ADR clauses.”).   
57
 See Stipanowich & Lamare, supra note 5, at 30 (noting extensive use 
of mediation in commercial, employment and personal injury disputes); 
Thomas J. Stipanowich, ADR And The “Vanishing Trial”: The Growth 
And Impact Of “Alternative Dispute Resolution,” 1 J. OF EMPIRICAL 
LEG. STUDIES 843, 848-49 (2004) (“By far the predominant process 
choice [in ADR] is mediation, with its much-touted potential benefits 
of flexibility, party control, confidentiality, relatively low cost, and 
minor risk.”). 
58
 See Simeon H. Baum, Mediation And Discovery, in DISPUTE 
RESOLUTION AND E-DISCOVERY § 3.1 at 51 (Daniel B. Garrie & Yoav 
M. Griver eds. 2012) (unique features of mediation include “freedom 
and creativity that infuses” the process).   
59
 See Brian Jarren, supra note 46, at 64 (courts still “experimenting” 
with mediation as an aspect of case management).   
60
  See Michael Heise, Why ADR Programs Aren’t More Appealing: 
An Empirical Perspective, SCHOLARSHIP@CORNELLLAW: A DIGITAL 
DEPOSITORY (2008) www.scholawship.law.cornell.edu (noting 
“mixed” evidence on effectiveness of ADR programs). See also Baum, 
supra note 58, at 72 (“Mediation is no panacea.”).     
61
 See Mann, supra note 20, at 89 (suggesting that online dispute 
resolution processes “can play various roles in consensus building”); 
Ethan supra note 30, (describing online system that allows software to 
“clarify and highlight both the parties’ disagreements and their desired 
solutions;” suggesting that system can help by “assisting the parties to 
identify common interests”); Joseph W. Goodman, The Pros And Cons 
Of Online Dispute Resolution: An Assessment Of Cyber-Mediation 
Websites, 2003 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 4 (2003) (noting potential for 
27
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have not yet received attention from court administrators.
62
  
The systems outlined in this Article, although grounded in 
well-recognized mediation techniques, certainly cannot be 
considered “tried and tested” in the e-discovery sphere.
63
  
The mediation process, moreover, can be abused in some 
instances.
64
   
Nonetheless, judicial administrators and dispute 
resolution system designers must start somewhere.
65
  The 
notion of multiple “doors” to dispute resolution is firmly 
embedded in our legal culture.
66
  Courts can and should 
consider ways to open doors to expand the use of 
mediation-related techniques into the e-discovery process.  
Court-connected pilot projects and study programs, already 
                                                                                                 
use of “traditional” dispute resolution mechanisms, supplemented by 
online technologies, which may include “fully automated” systems or 
systems that include a human neutral).   
62
 See Ebner, Hanson & Pearlstein, supra note 30 (no court-annexed 
online dispute resolution systems currently). See also Julio Cesar 
Betancourt & Elina Zlatanska, Online Dispute Resolution (ODR): What 
Is It, And Is It The Way Forward?, 79 ARBITRATION 256, 263 (2013) 
(“still too early to predict” future of online dispute resolution).  
63
 One of the earliest references to mediation of e-discovery disputes is 
less than five years old.  See Skinner, supra note 28, at 425. 
64
 See John Lande, Using Dispute System Design Methods To Promote 
Good-Faith Participation In Court-Connected Mediation Programs, 50 
UCLA L. REV. 69, 71 (2002) (noting that “some lawyers use mediation 
to make misleading statements, ‘smoke the other side out,’ gain 
leverage for later negotiations, drag out litigation, increase opponents’ 
costs, and generally wear down the opposition”). See also Kimberlee K. 
Kovach, The Vanishing Trial: Land Mine On The Mediation Landscape 
Or Opportunity For Evolution: Ruminations On The Future Of 
Mediation Practice, 7 CARDOZO J. OF CONFLICT. RESOL. 27, 29 (2005) 
(noting that mediation can become a “curse” of “hoops to jump 
through” in litigation, rather than a “process expansion” leading to 
dispute resolution).  
65
 See generally Slaikeu & Hasson, supra note 15.  
66
 See Thomas J. Stipanowich, The Multi-Door Contract And Other 
Possibilities, 13 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 303 (1998); Judith Resnik, 
Many Doors?  Closing Doors?  Alternative Dispute Resolution And 
Adjudication, 10 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 211 (1995).  
28
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underway in many jurisdictions,
67



























                                                 
67
 See Hamilton, supra note 19. See also Daniel Garrie Instructs 7th 
Circuit’s Pilot e-Mediation Program, E-DISCOVERY BEAT (May 14, 
2013) www.lawandforensics.com/e-discovery-beat/2012/02/23/e-
discovery/court/pilot/programs-e-discovery-templates-that-legal-teams-
should-utlize (“first of its kind” program to train mediators, who 
“agreed to volunteer their time for cases with heavy discovery loads, 
but comparatively small monetary returns”); Principles Relating To 
The Discovery Of Electronically Stored Information, 
www.ediscoverypilot.com (Aug. 1, 2010).   
68
 See Wissler, supra note 56 at 274 (lawyers tend to view mediation 
with court staff mediators “more favorably than mediation with 
volunteer mediators”).   
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A CHRISTIAN VISION OF FREEDOM AND 
DEMOCRACY: NEUTRALITY AS AN OBSTACLE 
TO FREEDOM  
 




This article presents the underlying vision for the 
argument that principles of liberal neutrality pose a genuine 
obstacle to freedom in democratic society.  There is a 
growing concern that liberty and justice are unattainable in 
modern democratic societies that are grounded in 
neutrality, including the United States.  Experience has 
demonstrated significant shortcomings of the modern 
freedom movements grounded in political theories, 
which—along with the theory of neutrality—reject the need 
for core substantive values to guide law and policy.  The 
underlying basis of such theories is a particular modern 
conception of freedom.  But a well-grounded and reasoned 
alternative vision of human freedom exists: a distinctively 
Christian vision of human freedom as understood in light of 
the philosophical and theological study of God’s revelation 
to man.  A comprehensive treatment of the Christian vision 
of human freedom can be gleaned from the scholarly work 
of Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger, currently Pope Emeritus 
Benedict XVI.  From this alternative perspective, freedom 
is promoted and safeguarded only when core substantive 
values and moral insights are respected as the point of 
reference for law and justice in society, a condition which 
posits a role for the State in prudently fostering respect for 
those values and insights.  Because this alternative vision is 
often misunderstood, the purpose of this article is to present 
a concise but in-depth synthesis of the writings of 
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Ratzinger bearing on human freedom and democracy and to 
thereby encourage dialogue leading to a more moderate use 
of neutrality principles.   
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A Christian Vision of Freedom and Democracy: 
Neutrality as an Obstacle to Freedom 
 
“A confused ideology of liberty leads to a dogmatism 




Freedom has been a defining mark of modern and 
postmodern thought.  In the areas of science and 
technology, as well as the arenas of politics and sociology, 
freedom has been the objective.  But what is freedom?  
What is the best way to think about freedom?  In the 
modern era, the goals of science and technology have been 
to dominate nature, and the political goals have been to 
eliminate oppressive governing regimes and to end 
injustice and unjust discrimination based on differences in 
race, class, and other categorizations.   Undoubtedly, many 
good things have resulted from these goals.  But overall, 
the modern freedom movements have proved 
unsatisfactory.  In European societies, Marxist-based 
political and social theories led to tyranny and human 
devastation.  In the United States, the “unitedness” 
promised and envisioned has dissipated. And to many, 
liberty and justice are no longer perceived as possible 
because lawmaking and policy-making have been reduced 
to rule by the strongest.  The general direction of the 
modern quest for freedom surely must be right.  An 
                                                 
1
 JOSEPH RATZINGER, CHRISTIANITY AND THE CRISIS OF CULTURES 36 
(2006).  In this book, Ratzinger emphasizes that the main divide in 
contemporary society rests on the question of the existence of God. Id. 
at 40-45.  On the one side lies the great historical and religious cultures 
of humanity; on the other side lies a perspective reflecting humanity’s 
emancipation from God.  In its conclusion, this article affirms that this 
divide lies at the heart of the controversy regarding use of the neutrality 
principle.  The underlying premise of neutrality is a vision of freedom 
that, in essence, views family, morality, and God as antitheses to 
freedom.  These ideas will be discussed in Part I & Part IV(A) of this 
paper.        
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important question is why the modern approaches to 
freedom have gone awry.  
To many, the crux of the problem is society’s 
reliance on the idea of neutrality, a doctrine central to legal 
and political philosophy in the United States today.
2
  
Modern ideas of liberal neutrality rest on the premise that 
the state should not express preferences regarding 
substantive values or competing conceptions of good or, 
more specifically, the end toward which citizens should 
strive.
 3
  This is because, in the liberal tradition, judgments 
                                                 
2
 See, e.g., JAMES KALB, THE TYRANNY OF LIBERALISM: 
UNDERSTANDING AND OVERCOMING ADMINISTERED FREEDOM, 
INQUISITORIAL TOLERANCE, AND EQUALITY BY COMMAND (2d ed. 
2008); ROBERT H. DIERKER JR, THE TYRANNY OF TOLERANCE: A 
SITTING JUDGE BREAKS THE CODE OF SILENCE TO EXPOSE THE LIBERAL 
JUDICIAL ASSAULT (2006). See also CATHOLICISM, LIBERALISM, AND 
COMMUNITARIANISM (Kenneth L. Grasso, Gerard V. Bradley & Robert 
P. Hunt eds. 1995).  
3
 See, e.g., John M. Breen, Neutrality in Liberal Legal Theory and 
Catholic Social Thought, 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 513, 513-97 
(2009) (providing a comparative analysis of neutrality and Catholic 
social teaching).   Breen explains that neutrality is widely considered a 
defining feature and virtue of that strand of American political 
philosophy referred to as liberalism; and that liberalism has provided 
the intellectual foundation for much of the American legal system. Id. 
at 514-15 & 517 (citing and quoting a number of influential works). See 
also WILLIAM A. GALSTON, LIBERAL PURPOSES: GOODS, VIRTUES, AND 
DIVERSITY IN THE LIBERAL STATE (1991).  In America, the neutrality 
approach is perhaps most properly attributable to John Rawls.  Rawls 
rejected the idea that a “general moral conception” can provide the 
basis for a “public conception of justice” in a democratic society.  He 
advocated instead for an approach that rests on the “overlapping 
consensus” of a particular culture. See John Rawls, Justice as Fairness: 
Political not Metaphysical, 14 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 223, 225 (1985), 
available at 
http://philosophyfaculty.ucsd.edu/faculty/rarneson/Courses/RawlsJustic
e.pdf  In his mind, this was because “we – we modern inheritors of the 
traditions of religious tolerance and constitutional government – put 
liberty ahead of perfection.”  See generally JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF 
JUSTICE (1971).   
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concerning what is good, the ends in life worthy of pursuit, 
are subjective; no conception of what is good exists that 
would warrant attempts to coerce dissenters.
4
  Being 
neutral means that all values and viewpoints are regarded 
as equal.
5
  Scholars have pointed out deficiencies 
associated with the principle of neutrality.  For example, 
they say that it is unworkable and illusory to the point of 
being deceptive.
6
  But this creates a new question: if 
society needs substantive values to guide policy-making, 
what values should be selected?  This is the stumbling 
block for many people.   
In the United States, significant support exists for 
the idea that core Christian values should provide the 
foundation for law and justice.  Indeed, for much of the 
history of the United States, Christian values were the 
foundation for society.  It is only because of the neutrality 
principle—especially as imposed by the United States 
Supreme Court in the arena of Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence
7
—that the idea has been increasingly 
quashed.  In a recent Establishment Clause case, Justice 
                                                 
4
 Breen, supra note 3, at 525-26 (drawing on ANDREW ALTMAN, 
CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES: A LIBERAL CRITIQUE (1990)).  Breen notes 
that “because the nature of the good is unsettled, contested, and always 
open to dispute, liberalism holds that it is never appropriate to use the 
coercive power of the state to mandate a particular theory of the good.”  
Id. at 526.    
5
 See Steven D. Smith, The Restoration of Tolerance, 78 CALIF. L. REV. 
305, 311-12 (1990) (explaining neutrality as advocated in Bruce 
Ackerman’s theory of liberal justice and Ronald Dworkin’s theory of 
rights).  
6
 See, e.g., id.  As explained by Dean Steven Smith, neutrality is 
illusory and impotent.  It cannot guide public policy; cannot garner 
respect of citizens; and, in fact, operates in a way that is deceptive to 
the public. Id. at 313-29. Cf. Galston, supra note 3, at 3-21.  The 
citations in footnote 2 above also address this idea. 
7
 See, e.g., Everson v. Bd. of Educ. of Ewing, 330 U.S. 1 (1947) 
(landmark case in which the Supreme Court adopted the neutrality 
principle in the context of the Establishment Clause). 
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O’Connor, an advocate of the view that it is impermissible 
for state action to give rise to even a subtle feeling of 
exclusion (i.e., to make a person aware that his or her 
religious views might be out of sync with more mainstream 
religious views), suggested that reconsidering use of the 
neutrality principle was unthinkable.  After noting the 
existence of strong religious sentiments in the United 
States, which she attributes to judicial enforcement of the 
form of neutrality that cabins religious views to the private 
realm, Justice O’Connor essentially stated: “Why would we 
want any other approach?”
8
   
Importantly, however, if the principle of neutrality 
itself is misguided—if “unitedness” has been lost and 
democratic government has been reduced to rule by the 
strongest—the idea that core Christian values should 
provide a foundation for law and justice should be rejected 
only for sound substantive reasons.  A key purpose of this 
article is to explain why acceptance of core Christian 
values as guideposts can better safeguard liberty and 
justice.  A sound argument exists that liberty and justice in 
society depend on state recognition of, and prudent use of, 
core Christian values in policy-making.
9
  In response to 
                                                 
8
 See McCreary Cnty. v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 545 U.S. 844, 882 
(2005) (O’Connor, J., concurring).  Justice O’Connor had pointed to 
violence in other areas of the world resulting from “assumption of 
religious authority by government.”  She then states: “Those who 
would renegotiate the boundaries between church and state must 
therefore answer a difficult question: Why would we trade a system 
that has served us so well for one that has served others so poorly?”  Id.  
Her line of reasoning suggests a failure to appreciate that moving away 
from neutrality does not mean “assumption of religious authority by 
government.”  Rather, it would entail government respect for a source 
of moral authority beyond the state, which means that it would be 
beyond the majority vote.  
9
 This would not necessarily mean a return to state practices struck 
down by the Court due to Establishment Clause concerns.  Past reliance 
on Christian values in fashioning laws may not always have been 
“prudent” and may have involved values beyond the realm 
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Justice O’Connor’s question, society should want another 
approach because, in the quest for freedom, how humans 
live does matter.   
Notably, the case for a more tempered use of 
neutrality has been persuasively presented in the work of 
Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger, currently Pope Emeritus 
Benedict XVI.
10
  In addressing freedom and democracy, 
Ratzinger’s focus has mainly been on the situation in 
Europe.
11
  But his message is relevant to any society 
hoping to maintain a pluralistic democracy where liberty 
and justice are possible.  The crux of Ratzinger’s message 
is that freedom is promoted and safeguarded only when 
core Christian moral insights are respected as the 
foundation and point of reference for law and justice.  
Regarding the interaction between Christianity and political 
authority in a pluralistic democracy, Ratzinger’s 
philosophy perhaps is best captured by the statement that 
democracy must be lived “on the basis of Christianity and 
Christianity on the basis of the free democratic state.”
12
  
                                                                                                 
appropriately considered “core values.”  Cf. JOSEPH RATZINGER, 
VALUES IN A TIME OF UPHEAVAL 21-22 (2006) (noting that Christians 
have at times in the past expected too much from the “earthly city”).  
10
 Because the bulk of the writings considered in this article were 
written by Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger before he was elected Pope, this 
paper uses the name Ratzinger in both the text of the paper and in 
citations.  
11
See, e.g., JOSEPH RATZINGER, EUROPE TODAY AND TOMORROW: 
ADDRESSING THE FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES (Michael J. Miller trans., 
Ignatius Press 2d ed. 2007) (2004). See also JOSEPH RATZINGER AND 
MARCELLO PERA, WITHOUT ROOTS: THE WEST, RELATIVISM, 
CHRISTIANITY, ISLAM (2007); JOSEPH RATZINGER, A TURNING POINT 
FOR EUROPE? THE CHURCH IN THE MODERN WORLD: ASSESSMENT AND 
FORECAST (Brian McNeil trans., Ignatius Press, 2d ed. 1994) (1991) 
[hereinafter Ratzinger, A Turning Point].  
12
 JOSEPH RATZINGER, A Christian Orientation in a Pluralistic 
Democracy?: The Indispensability of Christianity in the Modern Age, 
in CHURCH, ECUMENISM & POLITICS: NEW ESSAYS IN ECCLESIOLOGY 
204, 215 (Robert Nowell trans., Crossroad Pub. Co. 1st Am. Ed.1988) 
(1987) [hereinafter Ratzinger, A Christian Orientation].  
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The first half of this statement of course meets strong 
resistance in today’s culture.  Nonetheless, Ratzinger has 
been adamant that, although the distinct spheres of Church 
and State must be respected,
13
 a society electing a 
democratic government must recognize as inviolable a 
certain basic set of values and those values having a 
Christian foundation.
14
  To Ratzinger, the existence of these 
values was a precondition for democracy, and adherence to 
these values is necessary for the survival of democracy.
15
  
                                                 
13
 See, e.g., JOSEPH RATZINGER, Theology and the Church’s Political 
Stance, in CHURCH, ECUMENISM & POLITICS: NEW ESSAYS IN 
ECCLESIOLOGY, supra note 12, at 152, 161-62 [hereinafter Ratzinger, 
Political Stance] (noting that where the Church itself becomes the state, 
freedom becomes lost; but, also, that freedom is lost when the Church 
is precluded from being a public and publically relevant authority).  
Ratzinger has also acknowledged that, in the past, the Church has at 
times overstepped its bounds.  The Church at times has expected too 
much from civil society in terms of the Christian norms it expected to 
be recognized by the state and, at times, has over-asserted its claim to 
public legal status.  See, e.g., Ratzinger, A Christian Orientation, supra 
note 12, at 212-13.  
14
 Ratzinger explains that Christianity provides the rational foundation 
for ethics; ethics remains rational only when reason is purified by faith; 
and a Christian foundation “is imperative precisely if [the state] is to 
remain the state and pluralist.”  Ratzinger, A Christian Orientation, 
supra note 12, at 216-18.  The necessary purification of reason by faith 
(and vice versa) occurs within the context of Christianity and the 
Church. See Ratzinger, Political Stance, supra note 13, at 158-60.  As 
explained below, truth exists in the world because it is a product of the 
Eternal Reason that is Love, also known as God.  Humans have access 
to the truth, but only with the assistance of revelation from God.  The 
Church, understood in its fullness, is the “place where [Truth] is 
perceived.”  Id. at 160.  
15
 “The state must recognize that a basic framework of values with a 
Christian foundation is the precondition for its existence.  It must in 
this sense as it were simply recognize its historical place, the ground 
from which it cannot completely free itself without collapsing.  It must 
learn that there is a continued existence of truth which is not subject to 
consensus but which precedes it and makes it possible.”  Ratzinger, A 
Christian Orientation, supra note 12, at 219.  Ratzinger also stresses 
that democracy was formulated precisely to preserve inviolable values 
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Because it is largely a matter of historical fact that 
Christian values were a precondition for democracy,
16
 the 
more controversial assertion is the claim that moral insights 
from the Christian tradition are necessary for the survival 
of democracy.  Indeed, this perspective may be 
incomprehensible to persons influenced by the pervasively 
secular culture present in contemporary society.  But the 
perspective is challenging to understand even for Christians 
and others who would be open to the idea. 
For that reason, in this article I strive to help make 
this perspective of freedom and democracy comprehensible 
and, in particular, to do so largely using the work of 
Cardinal Ratzinger.
17
   It is useful and appropriate to focus 
on Ratzinger’s scholarly writings for a number of reasons.  
Ratzinger is recognized for his strong intellectual 
capabilities and his ability to communicate his ideas clearly 
and succinctly.
18
  His writings also reveal a genuine attempt 
                                                                                                 
and rights.  See JOSEPH RATZINGER, What is Truth, in VALUES IN A 
TIME OF UPHEAVAL 55 (2006). 
16
 Ratzinger, A Christian Orientation, supra note 12, at 215 n. 11 
(While democracy is a product of the fusion of Greek and Christian 
heritage, it was, more specifically, “formed under the particular 
conditions of the American Congregationalist pattern;” it is not a 
product of the so-called Enlightenment era, nor of the European 
Reformation movement).    
17
 Ratzinger’s ideas and teaching on human freedom and democratic 
society are fully consistent with Catholic teaching generally, especially 
as presented in important papal encyclicals and instructions addressing 
Catholic social doctrine.  See, e.g., J. BRIAN BENESTAD, CHURCH, 
STATE, AND SOCIETY: AN INTRODUCTION TO CATHOLIC SOCIAL 
DOCTRINE (2011) (presenting Catholic social doctrine, but also usefully 
integrating the particular contributions of various popes, including Pope 
Benedict XVI).  See generally MODERN CATHOLIC SOCIAL TEACHING: 
COMMENTARIES & INTERPRETATIONS, (Kenneth R. Himes et al. eds., 
2005).  
18
 See, e.g., D. VINCENT TWOMEY, THE ESSENTIAL POPE BENEDICT 
XVI: HIS CENTRAL WRITINGS AND SPEECHES xvii-xix (John F. 
Thornton & Susan B. Varenne eds.,HarperOne reprint ed. 2008) 
(commenting on the “breathtaking scope” of Ratzinger’s corpus of 
39
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to understand and address opposing positions.
19
  
Additionally, Ratzinger addressed issues bearing on the 
foundations of political and social order in a somewhat 
systematic way throughout his career.  Because his work 
represents an impressive integration and synthesis of 
theology, philosophy and politics, he has gained respect as 
a profound political thinker whose ideas are rich and 
coherent.
20
   
Accordingly, this article first frames the issue as 
one of properly understanding human freedom and then 
presents the basic Christian vision.  Next, the article 
presents a synthesis of Ratzinger’s writings bearing on 
human freedom to help flesh out the deeper philosophical 
and theological foundation for the Christian vision; namely, 
its grounding in the existence of a personal God and the 
perceptions and conceptions arising from deep reflection on 
the Trinity and the Incarnation.  Such study reveals 
intelligibility in creation that must be respected. 
Specifically, it reveals that within each human being there 
exists an existential capacity designed to reach beyond the 
self and toward God and others, a capacity fulfilled by re-
union with God and others.  Freedom, then, is living one’s 
life in a manner that helps one to achieve that union, and 
Christian values—which are consistent with the 
intelligibility in creation—thereby promote human 
freedom.  Ratzinger’s work presents a strong argument that 
                                                                                                 
intellectual work, on its originality, creativity, and consistency, and on 
Ratzinger’s attention to the ideas of “the great thinkers of humanity, 
theologians and otherwise”).   
19
 Id. at xix (noting that all of Ratzinger’s writings reveal his “courage 
to face any question or objection because of the confidence he has in 
the Truth revealed in Jesus Christ and handed on by the church’s 
apostolic tradition”). 
20
 See, e.g., THOMAS R. ROURKE, THE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL 
THOUGHT OF BENEDICT XVI 3-4 (2011), 3-4 (explaining that 
Benedict’s social thought merits considerably more attention than it has 
received). 
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foundational judgments concerning the ends in life worthy 
of pursuit are not solely subjective.  Rather, freedom is an 
integral aspect of the human person, and thus, how freedom 
is used matters—and matters beyond the personal or 
private, subjective sphere.    
Furthermore, because survival of democracy hinges 
on sufficient unity among the citizens regarding the values 
deemed inviolable,
21
 Ratzinger advocates that the state has 
a role in prudently fostering respect for those values, 
including expecting reverence and respect for God and holy 
things, and encouraging serious study of questions such as 
the existence of and nature of God.
22
  Again, this 
                                                 
21
 See JOSEPH RATZINGER, Freedom and Constraint in the Church, in 
CHURCH, ECUMENISM & POLITICS: NEW ESSAYS IN ECCLESIOLOGY, 
supra note 12, at 183, 188 [hereinafter Ratzinger, Freedom and 
Constraint] (“Ultimately, the democratic system can function only if 
certain fundamental values . . . are recognized as valid by everyone.” 
“[T]here must be an ethos which is jointly accepted and maintained 
even if its rational basis cannot be established absolutely and 
conclusively.”). See also Ratzinger, A Christian Orientation, supra note 
12, at 205 (“Pluralist democracy, in itself, does not “unite[] its citizens 
in a fundamental assent to the state. . . .For its foundations, it depends 
on other powers and forces outside of itself.”); JOSEPH RATZINGER, 
Luther and the Unity of the Churches, in CHURCH, ECUMENISM & 
POLITICS: NEW ESSAYS IN ECCLESIOLOGY, supra note 12, at 99, 131 
[hereinafter Ratzinger, Luther] (noting that “[a] formal unity without 
clear content is fundamentally no unity at all.”  Unity based on 
common skepticism and not knowledge is, in essence, based on 
capitulation). 
22
 See, e.g., Ratzinger, A Christian Orientation, supra note 12, at 218-
20.   Ratzinger is clear, however, in placing the primary responsibility 
for cultivating the spiritual foundation of society on the Church and 
Christians.  Id. See also JOSEPH RATZINGER, Freedom, Law, and the 
Good, in VALUES IN A TIME OF UPHEAVAL 52 (2006) (emphasizing the 
public task of Christian churches:  they must be free to “address the 
freedom of all human beings so that the moral forces of history may 
remain forces in the present”); JOSEPH RATZINGER, Biblical Aspects of 
the Question of Faith and Politics, in CHURCH, ECUMENISM & 
POLITICS: NEW ESSAYS IN ECCLESIOLOGY, supra note 12, at 147, 151 
(explaining that the core responsible political activity is to nurture 
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perspective is at odds with the neutrality principle imposed 
by the American judiciary, at least since the 1950s.
23
  Thus, 
this article also clarifies how Ratzinger’s vision of human 
freedom renders his approach to Church-State issues fully 
consistent with vigorous respect for religious freedom or 
freedom of conscience.  The bottom-line is that personal 
choices about how to live matter, and it is permissible for 
the state to foster a culture in which persons can more 
readily live in a genuinely human way—not through heavy-
handed or unnecessary measures, but through prudent 
adherence to a limited number of core values.   
 
V. The Overarching Issue: Properly Understanding 
Human Freedom 
 
In discussing democracy’s need for grounding itself 
in Christian moral insights and values, Ratzinger generally 
supports his message with a two-pronged approach.  Under 
the first prong, he points to and explains why prevalent 
political theories of the modern era have failed.  Under the 
second prong, he presents, in a variety of ways, his vision 
for safeguarding genuine human freedom.  This article 
focuses primarily on the second prong of his argument, but 
this section also briefly introduces Ratzinger’s perspective 
on the failures of modern political philosophies.  
In his writings, Ratzinger has demonstrated that 
political theories following the trajectory initiated by 
Rousseau-type thinkers are grounded in a radical 
philosophy of freedom and what he has labeled as the 
“secular trinity of ideas;” the three ideas are progress, 
absolutism of scientific technology, and political 
                                                                                                 
public acceptance of the validity of morality and God’s 
commandments). 
23
 In Everson v. Board of Education of Ewing, 330 U.S. 1 (1947), the 
Supreme Court adopted the neutrality principle in the context of the 
Establishment Clause. 
42
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  Ratzinger characterizes the radical 
philosophy of freedom as encompassing the individualistic 
ideology that was a component of all Enlightenment 
thought, the anarchic tendencies flowing from Rousseau’s 
vision of human nature and the social contract where no 
right order exists and human will is the sole norm of human 
action,
25
 and the Marxist tendency to rely on structures and 
                                                 
24
 Ratzinger discusses two good examples of failures of modern 
philosophies. See Ratzinger, A Turning Point, supra note 11, at 25-133; 
JOSEPH RATZINGER, Freedom and Liberation: The Anthropological 
Vision of the 1986 Instruction Libertatis Conscientia, in CHURCH, 
ECUMENISM & POLITICS, supra note 12, at 255, 256-265 [hereinafter 
Ratzinger, Freedom and Liberation]. 
25
 Rousseau’s essay on the social contract was written in 1762.  See 
JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT OR: PRINCIPLES OF 
POLITICAL RIGHT, (1762), available at 
http://www.constitution.org/jjr/socon.htm [hereinafter Rousseau, Social 
Contract].  To Rousseau, the “sacred right” of the social order is built 
upon conventions, see id., Bk. I, ch. I., conventions that flow from 
Rousseau’s view of human nature.  See id. at Bk. I, ch. II.  To 
Rousseau, human beings differ from animals in only two respects: they 
can rise above instincts by an act of freedom or free will, and they have 
a faculty of self-preservation that develops all other faculties.  See 
JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, DISCOURSE ON THE ORIGIN OF INEQUALITY 
25 (Donald A. Cress trans., Hackett Pub. Co. 1992) (1755)). 
Rousseau’s notion of the social compact reflects these dual 
and limited aspects of human nature.  In his theory of the social 
contract, because humans cannot know what justice is, nothing exists to 
delimit the majority vote. See Rousseau, Social Contract, supra, at Bk 
II, ch. VI.  His concept of the “general will” is, in the end, the only 
limit on government, and persons are entitled to reclaim their natural 
rights and liberties when law and government fail to reflect the general 
will.  But Rousseau does not see the general will as being subject to any 
absolute measure.   
Rousseau’s philosophy stands in stark contrast to that of John 
Locke.  See JOHN LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING THE TRUE 
ORIGINAL, EXTENT AND END OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT (1690), available 
at http://jim.com/2ndtreat.htm (also known as Locke’s Second Treatise 
on Government).  The second essay on civil government was drafted 
between 1685–1688.  See JOHN LOCKE, TREATISE OF CIVIL 
GOVERNMENT AND LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION, (Sterling P. 
43
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systems to bring about justice.
26
  From this perspective, 
freedom generally is understood as:  
 
the possibility of doing 
everything one wants to do 
and of doing only what one 
would like to do oneself.  
Freedom understood in this 
way is a matter of doing what 
                                                                                                 
Lamprecht ed. 1937) [hereinafter Locke, Second Treatise].  Locke’s 
theory of the social contract rests solidly on an absolute measure that 
operates as a genuine limit on the “one will” that gives rise to political 
laws and acts of government.  To Locke, the nature of the social 
compact is inescapably tied to limits on human action existing in the 
state of nature before societies have consented to be governed: the law 
of God and the law of nature.  To Locke, this law stands as “an eternal 
rule to all men, legislators as well as others.”  See Locke, Second 
Treatise, id. at #135.  
Both Locke and Rousseau recognized consent of the people as 
the source of authority in civil society, namely, the consent arising 
upon agreement to be part of the society.  Both also propose that 
legitimate laws made within society will be grounded in the consent of 
the body politic, as determined by majority vote, and delimited by the 
notion of the common good of the community.  The key difference 
between Locke and Rousseau lies in the operation of and limits upon 
that “one will.”  Whereas in Rousseau’s theory the legislative power 
becomes, in essence, the source of the laws governing society, in 
Locke’s theory the legislative power serves a higher law, by making the 
law of God and the law of nature better known and fostering a more 
effective operation of the law for the general good of all.  Further, the 
majority vote in Locke’s theory serves only as a means to ensure that 
laws reflect the consent of society.  The majority vote remains 
subordinate to the law of God and the law of nature.  A majority vote 
inconsistent with the Eternal law would constitute a sign that the 
agreement has been breached, thereby legitimizing resort to the natural 
liberty to form a new society.  
26
 JOSEPH RATZINGER, Truth and Freedom, in THE ESSENTIAL POPE 
BENEDICT XVI: HIS CENTRAL WRITINGS & SPEECHES 336, 343 (New 
York: HarperOne, 2007) (John F. Thornton & Susan B. Varenne eds., 
HarperOne reprint ed. 2008)  [hereinafter Ratzinger, Truth and 
Freedom]. 
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one likes, of arbitrary whim. . 
. .  From this point of view 
liberation consists in throwing 
off constraints and 
obligations.  Every obligation 
appears as a shackle that 
restricts freedom; every 
obligation that is thrown off 
becomes a step forward on the 
road to freedom.  It is clear 
that from this kind of point of 
view the family, the Church, 
morality, and God must 
appear antitheses to freedom.  
God obliges men and women; 
morality is a basic form in 
which this obligation to him is 
expressed. . . .  Even the state, 
declared to be the ruler of man 





Ratzinger has noted that this perspective is grounded in a 
definite understanding of human nature, an understanding 
expressed most completely in the philosophy of Sarte:  
 
For Sarte man is pure 
existence without essence.  
There is no certainty about 
what he or she is or how he or 
she should be.  One must 
discover anew what it is to be 
human from the nothingness 
of an empty freedom. The idea 
                                                 
27
 Ratzinger, Freedom and Liberation, supra note 24, at 259-60.  
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of freedom is here pushed to 
its ultimate radical position, 
no longer merely 
emancipation from tradition 
and authority but 
emancipation from his or her 
own nature and essence, a 
state of complete 
indeterminacy which is open 
to anything.
28
    
 
To Ratzinger, history has shown that in reality these 
perspectives lead to the opposite of freedom and to human 
dissatisfaction.  The dissolution of traditional links and 
obligations, the dependence on large anonymous systems, 
and the alienation resulting when societal practices break 
down traditional structures such as family and Church 
have, in fact, “turned out more and more to be the pre-
condition for total dictatorship and totalitarian enforcement 
of conformity.”
29
     
Similar negative results flow from the interplay of 
the secular trinity of ideas of progress, absolutism of 
scientific technology, and political messianism.  Ratzinger 
has explained that the union of these ideas was most 
consistently developed in Marxism, emerging as a 
“political myth of almost irresistible power.”  But the union 
of these ideas also exists today, albeit in weaker forms, in 
Western society.
30
  These ideas also represent the exclusion 
                                                 
28
 Ratzinger, Freedom and Constraint, supra note 21, at 191.  The 
perspective is also thoroughly theological: “Behind all this there stands 
a programme which must ultimately be labeled theological: God is no 
longer recognized as a reality standing over against man, but instead 
man may himself or herself become what he or she imagines a divinity 
would be if it existed. . . .”  Ratzinger, Freedom and Liberation, supra 
note 24, at 260.  
29
 Ratzinger, Freedom and Liberation, supra note 24, at 262.    
30
 See Ratzinger, A Turning Point, supra note 11, at 129-30.   
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of God from the shaping of history and human life.
31
  Ideas 
of progress and absolutism of scientific technology are 
grounded in a self-limitation of reason: a narrowing down 
of reason to the perception of what is quantitative and, thus, 
omits the insights common to almost the whole of mankind 
before the modern period.  In particular, this omits the 
conviction that morality is not created by man on the basis 
of calculation of expediency.  But, rather, man “finds it 
already present in the essence of things.”
32
  Without 
substantive values for guidance, “progress” becomes any 
new approach and any new technology necessarily is a 
good.
33
  Messianic approaches to governance place reliance 
on systems and structures and political and economic 
activity, rather than on ethical efforts of citizens.  These 
ideas reflect materialism and its program.
34
  As explained 
by Ratzinger, this brand of liberation depends on abdication 
of ethical principles and behavior and, therefore, abdication 
of responsibility and ultimately of conscience.
35
  And 
destruction or loss of conscience is “the precondition for 
totalitarian obedience and totalitarian domination.”
36
  The 
ultimate result of adhering to these political theories thus is 
not freedom but, rather, a type of slavery.
37
   
                                                 
31
 Id. at 130 (noting that, in essence, this trinity of ideas replaces and 
thus excludes the concept of God). 
32
 See id., 34. See also JOSEPH RATZINGER, CHRISTIANITY AND THE 
CRISIS OF CULTURES, 39-45 (2006). 
33
 See JOSEPH RATZINGER, CHRISTIANITY AND THE CRISIS OF CULTURES 
41-42 (2006) (“[T]he guiding principle is that man’s capability 
determines what he does.  If you know how to do something, then you 
are also permitted to do it. . . . But man knows how to do many things, 
and this knowledge increases all the time.  If this knowledge does not 
find its criterion in a moral norm, it becomes a power for destruction. . . 
.”).  
34
 See Ratzinger, A Christian Orientation, supra note 12, at 205-08. 
35
 Id.   
36
 Id. See also Ratzinger, Political Stance, supra note 13, at 165. 
37
 See Ratzinger, A Christian Orientation, supra note 12, at 205-11 
(emphasizing also the break down of the rule of law and a loss of the 
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Ratzinger’s attention to and analysis of these 
shortcomings and failures is crucial.  If political 
philosophies divorced from substantive values or divorced 
from core Christian values were producing good results, his 
message would be moot.  But modern societies keep 
stumbling.  Even in the United States the situation seems 
precarious.  A prevalent sentiment exists that government, 
particularly at the federal level, is not working.  In each 
branch of government, law and policy is being made on the 
basis of power.  Even citizens unfamiliar with political 
philosophies generally, or the doctrine of neutrality in 
particular, likely would agree that a key problem is the 
much divided nature of the electorate—a dividedness 
arising in large part because of the absence of societal 
consensus on core values.
38
  
After highlighting modern governments’ failures to 
achieve freedom, the second prong in Ratzinger’s approach 
explains that genuine human freedom is safeguarded only 
when democratic government and the majority vote are 
limited by inviolable moral standards and, more 
specifically, standards grounded in core Christian values.  
                                                                                                 
sense of transcendence that causes people to search for ways to escape 
society). See also CONGREGATION FOR THE DOCTRINE OF THE FAITH, 
INSTRUCTION ON CHRISTIAN FREEDOM (March 22, 1986),  
http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc
_con_cfaith_doc_19860322_freedom-liberation_en.html, at #10-19 
(noting, inter alia, the new forms of oppression arising from 
unrestrained use of technology, modern acts of terrorism, and 
collectivist approaches that quash human aspirations for the 
transcendent). 
38
 From Ratzinger’s perspective, the increasing dividedness in society 
is due in large measure to the overarching clash between those 
believing in dependence on God and those seeking emancipation from 
God: “The real antagonism typical of today’s world is not that between 
diverse religious cultures; rather, it is the antagonism between the 
radical emancipation of man from God, from the roots of life, on the 
one hand, and the great religious cultures, on the other.”  JOSEPH 
RATZINGER, CHRISTIANITY AND THE CRISIS OF CULTURES 44 (2006).  
48
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The importance of democratic government and the majority 
vote being delimited by inviolable moral standards should 
be fairly obvious.  As Ratzinger has emphasized, the 
history of the twentieth century has readily demonstrated 
that the majority can err—and err seriously.
39
  Those 
adhering to the neutrality principle tend to believe that the 
gross abuses that have occurred elsewhere will not happen 
in the United States.
40
  Frankly, that belief has no logical 
basis.  Nonetheless, another valid reason exists for holding 
the view that inviolable moral standards must exist to 
delimit the majority.  The idea of inviolable rights and 
standards was a key premise of the founding generation.  
The premise was part and parcel of the prevailing 
philosophies of the founding era and is spelled out in the 
                                                 
39
 The multiple instances of state sanctioned genocide is a prime 
example.  See, e.g., JOSEPH RATZINGER, Freedom, Law, and the Good, 
in VALUES IN A TIME OF UPHEAVAL 45-52 (2006) (pointing to the 
twentieth century totalitarian states).  Ratzinger also has often 
explained that failure to identify values to limit and guide the majority 
vote leads to radical relativism.  See, e.g., id. at 47, 56 (discussing 
Richard Rorty’s “utopia of banality” wherein a freedom without 
substance dissolves into meaninglessness). See also Ratzinger, Luther, 
supra note 21, at  131 (noting that authority based on skepticism 
becomes arbitrary).  The basic idea is simply that, without inviolable 
standards to delimit majority vote, law becomes nothing other than a 
mirror of whatever happens to be the predominant views or opinions of 
the moment—however egregious those may be. 
40
 See, e.g., RICHARD RORTY, TRUTH AND PROGRESS: PHILOSOPHICAL 
PAPERS (1998); RICHARD RORTY, OBJECTIVITY, RELATIVISM, AND 
TRUTH: PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS (1991).  Rorty adheres to the view that 
a certain “intuition” provides sufficient safeguards against egregious 
government acts.  Ratzinger compares Rorty’s views to certain 
seventeenth century ideas; namely the idea that there was a single, 
universal morality which was a true and clear light that could be 
perceived by all humans if they would but open their eyes.  Ratzinger 
explains that reliance on mere intuition is unworkable in contemporary 
society because the “evidential character” of moral principles no longer 
exists.  See JOSEPH RATZINGER, Freedom, Law, and the Good, in 
VALUES IN A TIME OF UPHEAVAL 50-51 (2006).   
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founding documents of the United States.
41
  Therefore, the 
more challenging position for many is why the inviolable 




To that question, Ratzinger spells out a rationale 
that is more sophisticated than the one typically provided 
by advocates for Christian values.  The answer gleaned 
from the corpus of Ratzinger’s writings is that Christian 
values have their origin from the transcendent and, more 
specifically, from the Creator of humanity and the world.  
Therefore, these values necessarily are consistent with the 
meaning or intelligibility in creation and will thereby 
promote genuine human freedom.  This answer is grounded 
in a certain understanding of human freedom: an 
understanding of freedom that is readily distinguishable 
from the radical philosophy of freedom described at the 
outset of this section.  Whether to reconsider use of the 
                                                 
41
 See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, para. 2 (U.S. 1776).  
Ratzinger notes that de Tocqueville recognized that democracy in 
America was made possible by the precondition of a basic moral 
conviction.  See JOSEPH RATZINGER, Freedom, Law, and the Good, in 
VALUES IN A TIME OF UPHEAVAL 51 (2006).  Indeed, basic social 
contract doctrine is premised on the idea that the society consenting to 
government agrees on basic ideas about rights and liberties: otherwise, 
joining together and consenting to be governed and to be bound by 
laws of the society makes little sense.      
42
 For example, although Professor Steven Smith presents persuasive 
reasons why the modern concept of liberal neutrality is illusory and 
ineffective (indeed, deceptive), and, in-turn, argues for the need for a 
set of substantive beliefs and values upon which public decisions can 
be based (and also for a return to a proper understanding of toleration).  
He suggests that the content of the substantive values does not matter: 
“Legislatures and courts must make decisions, and decisions require 
choices among beliefs and values. . . . Thus, every regime must have its 
orthodoxy.  The orthodoxy might not constitute a cohesive ideology or 
theology, it might not be read into the official constitution, and it might 
vary from year to year or even, to some degree, from locale to locale.  
But a set of substantive beliefs and values . . . must exist.”  Smith, 
supra note 5, at 332 (emphasis added).    
50
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neutrality principle, then, ultimately rests on the extent to 
which this alternative view of freedom is deemed credible.   
As explained, a primary goal of this article is to 
provide a comprehensive yet comprehensible explanation 
of this alternate vision of human freedom through a 
synthesis of Ratzinger’s writings.
43
  Ratzinger’s work 
makes clear that this is a well-reasoned alternative view.  It 
grounds freedom in a vision of humanity; its history and 
destiny as understood in light of philosophical and 
theological scrutiny; and the development of God’s 
revelation to man.  It is a vision intimately bound up with 
belief in God.  But it is no more theologically based than 
neutrality itself and the radical philosophies of freedom, 
which are bound up with denial of the existence of God.   
   
II. A Christian View of Human Freedom 
 
Ratzinger’s comprehensive vision of human 
freedom can be understood only by studying a number of 
sources.  These sources include two documents issued by 
the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith: Instruction 
on Certain Aspects of the “Theology of Liberation,” issued 
August 6, 1984 (“ICATL”), and Instruction on Christian 
Freedom and Liberation, issued March 22, 1986 
(“ICFL”).
44
  It is useful to begin with an analysis of these 
                                                 
43
 Although this vision of freedom is absolutely central to 
understanding how to live out Christian faith, this author was unable to 
identify a good source providing a comprehensive and comprehensible 
explanation.  
44
 Ratzinger served as prefect of the Congregation for the Doctrine of 
Faith from 1981 until he was elected pope in 2005.  The 
CONGREGATION FOR THE DOCTRINE OF FAITH, INSTRUCTION ON 
CHRISTIAN FREEDOM AND LIBERATION (Mar. 22, 1986), 
http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc
_con_cfaith_doc_19860322_freedom-liberation_en.html [hereinafter 
ICFL] is the more comprehensive of the two documents.  But the 
CONGREGATION FOR THE DOCTRINE OF FAITH, INSTRUCTION ON 
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documents because they present the basic outline of the 
alternative vision of freedom—namely, the Christian 
understanding of freedom as liberation from sin and 
freedom to follow the commandments of God.  
In presenting this vision of human freedom, the two 
Instructions rely predominantly on the biblical witness to 
God’s historical encounters with humanity.
45
  The ICFL 
makes clear its reliance on revelation—and its approach to 
interpreting revelation—by noting at the outset that it is 
through the “mystery of the Incarnate Word and Redeemer 
of the world” that the Church “possesses the truth regarding 
the Father and his love for us, and also the truth concerning 
man and his freedom.”
46
  That is, it is only by revelation 
interpreted in light of Jesus Christ as the fullness of 
revelation that a proper conception of human freedom can 
be grasped.   
The ICFL points out that the yearning for freedom 
central to the modern era has its source in the Christian 
heritage, as captured by the witness of Holy Scripture in 
both the Old and New Testaments.
47
  The key liberating 
event testified to in the Old Testament is the Exodus: God’s 
                                                                                                 
CERTAIN ASPECTS OF THE “THEOLOGY OF LIBERATION” (Aug. 6, 1984), 
http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc
_con_cfaith_doc_19840806_theology-liberation_en.html [hereinafter 
ICATL] makes certain key points more directly and clearly.    
45
 Again, this is likely due to the Congregation for the Doctrine of 
Faith’s (“CDF”) primary concern with addressing liberation theologies, 
which tended to reverse the relationship between the Old and New 
Testaments.  See Ratzinger, Freedom and Liberation, supra note 24, at 
265 (noting that, in liberation theology, “baptism is [] understood on 
the basis of the exodus,” and “it is the symbol of a political process of 
liberation to which” the oppressed are called; and “Jesus is interpreted 
by reference back to Moses, while Moses is interpreted in anticipation 
by reference to Marx.”).  As explained by Ratzinger, the Instructions 
take the traditional path of seeking the internal logic of the basic pattern 
of biblical testimony to understand God, the world and man. Id. at 266.  
46
 ICFL, supra note 44, at #3.   
47
 Id. at #5. 
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action in rescuing his People from their bondage in Egypt, 
an event preceded by—and later re-enacted through—the 
paschal sacrifice and meal.
48
  The ICFL recognizes the 
Exodus as providing a model for freedom and liberation.  
The event, however, must be properly understood.  The 
ICFL thus explains that, in this event, freedom from 
economic, political and cultural slavery is attained, but it is 
attained part and parcel with God’s action in entering into a 
covenant with Israel.  Liberty is thus linked to communion 
or a relationship with God.
49
  
Further, as part of the covenant, God provides to 
Israel its Law, which included both the moral precepts of 
the Decalogue and religious and civil norms to govern the 
life of the people chosen by God to be his witness among 
the nations.
50
  Because the core of this collection of laws is 
love of God above all things and of neighbor as oneself, the 
pattern reflected by the Exodus event is freedom to live in a 
society “centered upon worship of the Lord and based upon 
justice and law inspired by love.”
51
  The ICFL also explains 
                                                 
48
 As clarified by Ratzinger in Freedom and Liberation, the fact of the 
exodus was possible “through a religious event, the sacrifice of the 
pasch, which is an anticipated core-element of the Torah.”  See 
Ratzinger, Freedom and Liberation, supra note 24, at 268. 
49
 ICFL, supra note 44, at #44. 
50
 Id. at #45. 
51
 Id. As explained by Ratzinger in Freedom and Liberation, the goal of 
exodus includes discovery of a law that “provides justice and thus 
builds up the right relationships of men and women between each other 
and with the whole of creation.” See Ratzinger, Freedom and 
Liberation, supra note 24, at 267.  “These relationships . . . depend 
however on the covenant, indeed they are the covenant; they cannot be 
devised and shaped by men and women alone, they depend on the 
fundamental relationship with regulates all other relationships, the 
relationship with God.” Id. at 267.  Indeed, “the really liberating 
element in the exodus is represented by the inauguration of the 
covenant between God and man, the covenant which is made actual in 
the Torah, that is in regulations of justice that are the shape of 
freedom.”  Id. at 268.   
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that the Psalms and the testimony of the Prophets suggest 
that injustice within this society occurs from transgressions 
of the law caused by “hardened hearts,” and that those 
suffering from injustice (the poor and the needy) learn to 
place their trust in the Lord: “the ‘poor of Yahweh’ know 
that communion with him is the most precious treasure and 
the one in which man finds his true freedom.”
52
   
Thus, as stated perhaps more directly in the 
previously issued ICATL, the Old Testament portrays 
salvation and healing from injustice as essentially a 
religious experience.  For example, whatever form 
suffering may take on the part of those who are faithful to 
the God of the Covenant (poverty, political oppression, 
hostility of enemies, injustice, failure, or death), it is from 
God alone that one can expect salvation and healing.
53
  
Further, freedom is linked to covenant with God and bound 
up with law and norms addressing relationships with God 
and others.  
  The witness provided by the New Testament 
clarifies this pattern of freedom.  As expressed in the ICFL: 
“The Exodus, the Covenant, the Law, the voices of the 
Prophets and the spirituality of the ‘poor of Yahweh’ only 
achieve their full significance in Christ.”
54
  It is by the 
power of the Paschal Mystery of Jesus Christ that humanity 
has been set free: “Through his perfect obedience on the 
Cross and through the glory of his Resurrection, the Lamb 
of God has taken away the sin of the world and opened for 
us the way to definitive liberation.”
55
   
More specifically, the ICFL explains that the 
Paschal Mystery enabled an outpouring of grace.  The heart 
of Christian freedom therefore lies in the action of grace, 
received through faith and the Church’s sacraments.  Grace 
                                                 
52
 ICFL, supra note 44, at #46-47. 
53
 ICATL, supra note 44, at ch. IV, #5.  
54
 ICFL, supra note 44, at #49. 
55
 Id. at #51. 
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frees humanity from sin and places humanity in 
communion with God.
56
  That is, through Christ’s Death 
and Resurrection, humanity is offered the opportunity to be 
reconciled with God, and the human experience of 
reconciliation is possible through the action of the Holy 
Spirit.
57
  The essence of the freedom attributable to grace 
and the work of the Holy Spirit is a capacity which sin had 
impaired—a capacity inherent within human beings to love 
God above all things and to remain in communion with 
him—a capacity that is constantly challenged or affected by 
the mystery of iniquity still at work in the world.
58
  As a 
consequence, Christian life is one of perseverance: human 
existence is a “spiritual struggle to live according to the 
Gospel and is waged with the weapons of God.”
59
   
Grace, thus, is the source of true freedom.
60
  And 
freedom itself is an enhancement or magnification of the 
capacity to love.  It is moving away from sin and being 
brought into a closer union with God.  It is the breaking 
down of barriers separating humanity from God.
61
  Again, 
the ICATL perhaps is more clear and direct: “Freedom is a 
new life in love.”
62
   
The Instructions therefore make clear that the Old 
and New Testaments are consistent in revealing that true 
                                                 
56
 Id. at #52. 
57
 Id.  
58
 Id. at #53. 
59
 Id. at #53 (citing Eph 6, 11-17). 
60
 Id. at #54. 
61
 Cf. id. at #52 (“In Christ, we can conquer sin, and death no longer 
separates us from God”); Id. at #53 (“For freedom Christ has set us 
free” (Gal 5:1).); Id. at #58 (“[P]ossessing the pledge of the Spirit, the 
People of God is led towards the fullness of freedom.  The new 
Jerusalem which we fervently await is rightly called the city of freedom 
in the highest sense.”); Id. at #63 (“Through the word of God and the 
Sacraments, man is freed in the first place from the power of sin and 
the power of the Evil One which oppress him; and he is brought into a 
communion of love with God”).   
62
 ICATL, supra note 44, at ch. IV, #2. 
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liberation depends on God’s action in helping humanity to 
avoid hardness of heart, to avoid transgression and sin, and 
thus to more fully conform with God’s law or command of 
love.
63
  God calls man to freedom,
64
 and genuine freedom 
is freedom from sin and being with God.  Communion with 
God is made possible through grace, and communion with 
God is linked in some way with how one lives.  Living in 
accordance with the Gospel brings man and society closer 
to God.  Rejecting God’s gift of grace results in pursing the 
inherent human need for the transcendent—the infinite—in 
finite things.  Worship of created things—rather than 
God—disrupts relationships and causes disorders that affect 
the sphere of family and society.
65
  Thus, liberation from 
sin is what will alleviate the evils, oppressions, and 
suffering in the world.   
 
V. The Deeper Philosophical & Theological 
Foundation for Human Freedom 
 
As noted, the ICFL explains that the Church 
possesses the truth concerning man and his freedom 
through the Mystery of Jesus Christ.  “From him, who is 
‘the way, the truth, and the life’ (Jn 14:6), the Church 
receives all that she has to offer mankind.”
66
  The ICATL 
similarly emphasizes that authentic human progress and 
liberation rests on three “indispensable pillars” of truth: the 
                                                 
63
 Notably, in light of revelation in Jesus Christ, the law of the Old 
Testament has been transformed: love is now a “response to the gift of 
love with which God draws near to us.”  Letter from Benedict XVI, 
Supreme Pontiff, to the Bishops, Priests, and Deacons; Men and 
Women Religious; and all the Lay Faithful on Christian Love,  (Dec. 
25, 2005) (on file with author), available at 
http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/benedict_xvi/encyclicals/documents
/hf_ben-xvi_enc_20051225_deus-caritas-est_en.html, at #1. 
64
 ICFL, supra note 44, at #37. 
65
 Id. at #39. 
66
 Id. at #3. 
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truth about Jesus, the Savior from human sin; the truth 
about the Church; and the truth about man and his 
dignity.
67
  The documents explore most deeply the truth 
that genuine human liberation is salvific: it is freedom from 
sin.  
Yet, the overarching theme of the Instructions is 
that truth and freedom are inseparably linked, and that 
understanding human freedom also hinges on coming to 
understand the truth about man.  The ICFL states that, by 
revealing to man “his condition as a free person called to 
enter into communion with God,” the Gospel of Jesus 
Christ prompted an awareness of “hitherto unsuspected 
depths of human freedom.”
68
  Similarly, the ICATL notes 
that the radical philosophies of freedom which aim to 
create a new man through social control and social 
structures “leads to the denial of the meaning of the person 
and his transcendence” and, at the same time, destroys the 
foundation of ethics, namely, the absolute character of the 
distinction between good and evil.
69
  In both instances, the 
CDF is emphasizing the importance of properly 
understanding the meaning of the human person.  
Understanding the truth about man and the human person 
clarifies what sin is, which in turn clarifies what constitutes 
liberation.  
The Instructions, however, do not explore in any 
depth the concept of the human person or the truth about 
man.  The ICFL rejects the modern concept of the subject 
of freedom as “an individual who is fully self-sufficient and 
whose finality is the satisfaction of his own interests in the 
enjoyment of earthly goods.”
70
  It states that “every 
individual is oriented toward other people” and that 
genuine freedom exists only where “reciprocal bonds, 
                                                 
67
 ICATL, supra note 44, at ch. XI, #5. 
68
 ICFL, supra note 44, at #5. 
69
 ICATL, supra note 44, ch. IV, #15. 
70
 ICFL, supra note 44, at #13. 
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governed by truth and justice, link people to one another.”
71
  
It also states that “God did not create man as a ‘solitary 
being’ but wished him to be a ‘social being,’” and, thus, 
man “can only grow and realize his vocation in relation 
with others.”
72
  Sin, breaking away from God in acts of 
total autonomy and self-sufficiency, constitutes a denial of 
self.
73
  The freedom possible with the assistance of grace is 
a restored capacity to love God and remain in communion 
with him.
74
  Love of God, Christian love, takes the form of 
fraternal love.
75
  And, as stated in the ICATL, “[t]he 
recognition of the true relationship of human beings to God 
constitutes the foundation of justice to the extent that it 
rules the relationships between people.”
76
 
But what is the basis for these propositions?  In 
what way does the truth about man and his destiny or about 
the true relationship of human beings to God undermine 
ideas of autonomy and self-sufficiency or, on the contrary, 
support the idea that human aspirations for freedom hinge 
on relationships between people?  Again, it is by careful 
reflection on Jesus Christ as the fullness of revelation that 
truth emerges.  In other writings, Cardinal Ratzinger has 
tried to flesh out the truth about man emerging from 
philosophical and theological reflection on Jesus Christ.  
                                                 
71
 Id. at #26. 
72
 Id. at #32. 
73
 Id. at ##37-38. See also ICATL, supra note 44, at ch. IV, #12 (stating 
that sin “strikes man in the heart of his personality”). Sin, breaking 
away from God, disturbs man’s internal order and balance and the 
order and balance in society.  Sin also disrupts man’s aspiration to the 
infinite, and distorted attachment to finite created things leaves him 
“always searching for an impossible peace.”  ICFL, supra note 44, at 
#40. 
74
 ICFL, supra note 44, at #53. 
75
 Id. at ##56-57.  Fraternal love encompasses the “direct and 
imperative requirement of respect for all human beings in their rights to 
life and to dignity.”  Id.   
76
 ICATL, supra note 44, at ch. XI, #6. See also ICFL, supra note 44, at 
#60. 
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The short answer is that the Christian perspective of human 
freedom is fully supported when it is understood that man 
is made in God’s image precisely insofar as being “from,” 
“with,” and “for” constitutes the fundamental 
anthropological pattern.  It is this pattern that constitutes 
the essence of the human person.  Moreover, human 
freedom is a collective endeavor and attaining freedom 
depends on following the way opened up by Jesus Christ.  
The cornerstone supporting these basic principles is the 
idea of a personal God. 
 
A.  Freedom Grounded in a Logos that is Love 
 
A comprehensive vision of Christian freedom is 
more understandable and compelling when viewed within 
the bigger picture of the existence of “being” in the world.   
Explaining how Christianity in general fits into the larger 
philosophical realm was part of Ratzinger’s objective in his 
book Introduction to Christianity.  In this book, Ratzinger 
was not addressing freedom specifically, but, nonetheless, 
made many points in the book that are relevant to 
understanding the Christian vision of human freedom.  
Ratzinger explains that, when considering the existence of 
being in the world, the overarching question is: “In all the 
variety of individual things, what is, so to speak, the 
common stuff of being – what is the one being behind the 
many ‘things’, which nevertheless all ‘exist.’”
77
    He notes 
that the endless variety of philosophies attempting to think 
out “being” can, broadly speaking, be reduced to two basic 
possibilities: the materialist solution or the idealistic 
solution.  He then explains Christianity’s tie to the idealistic 
solution.   
                                                 
77
 JOSEPH RATZINGER, INTRODUCTION TO CHRISTIANITY 156 (J.R. 
Foster trans., Ignatius Press 2d ed. 2004) (1968) [hereinafter Ratzinger, 
Introduction]. 
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The materialistic solution sees everything 
encountered in the world as mere matter.  Matter is the only 
thing that “always remains as demonstrable reality and, 
consequently, represents the real being of all that exists.”
78
   
Matter is the raw tangible stuff that constitutes or 
comprises things and beings in the world.  From a 
philosophical perspective, matter is a being that does not 
comprehend being in that it “‘is’ but does not understand 
itself.”
79
  Thus, if matter is the being of all that exists, the 
logical implication is that any capacity to “understand 
being” that may exist in the cosmos arises only as a 
secondary, chance product during the course of 
development.
80
  Therefore, the fact that human beings can 
understand things, or find meaning in things, is a mere 




Christianity rejects the materialist solution in favor 
of a modified idealistic solution.
82
  The idealistic solution 
                                                 
78




 Id.  
81
 Ratzinger had highlighted this important point in a number of 
writings.  See, e.g., JOSEPH RATZINGER, CHRISTIANITY AND THE CRISIS 
OF CULTURES 49 (2006) (noting that whether the world comes from an 
irrational source is a fundamental issue: “A reason that has its origin in 
the irrational and is itself ultimately irrational does not offer a solution 
to our problems.  Only that creative reason which has manifested itself 
as love in the crucified God can truly show us what life is.”).   
82
 Ratzinger has explained that all great cultures have recognized the 
idealistic solution, namely, the doctrine of objective values expressed in 
the Being of the world, and the conviction that man’s Being contains an 
imperative; he does not invent morality on the basis of expediency but 
rather finds it already present in the essence of things.  He notes that 
this common insight presents itself as the primal evidential character of 
human life, and that modern thinkers drew the “simple conclusion” that 
moralities of mankind constitute but human constructions.  To 
Ratzinger, “this diagnosis is extremely superficial. . . .”  See JOSEPH 
RATZINGER, Faith’s Answer to the Crisis of Values, IN A TURNING 
POINT FOR EUROPE: THE CHURCH IN THE MODERN WORLD: 
60
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posits that the scrutiny of things in the cosmos shows that 
things and beings are “being-thought.”   That is, all being is 
a product of thought.  Thinking is prior to matter, and, 
specifically, thinking by a subjective mind.
83
  In non-
Christian versions of idealism, all being is the being-
thought of one single consciousness, and all being is 
unified in the identity of the one consciousness.  Any 
appearance of independence proves to be mere 
appearance.
84
  The Christian understanding is different 
because the thinking being whose thought produces is not 
just thought or Eternal Reason but, rather, the being is also 
Love.   
The person of Jesus brought this point to light in a 
powerful way.  But there was an understanding that existed 
before Christ as a result of God’s encounters with Israel 
that revealed him as a personal God.  As Ratzinger 
explains, the shema of Israel—“Hear, O Israel. He is our 
God.  He is One.”—is the real core of the believer’s 
                                                                                                 
ASSESSMENT AND FORECAST, supra note 11, at 35-36.  Ratzinger has 
also explained that belief in Creation is reasonable, and, further, that 
“even from the perspective of the data of the natural sciences it is the 
‘better hypothesis,’ offering a fuller and better explanation than any of 
the other theories.”  See Joseph Ratzinger, God the Creator, in IN THE 
BEGINNING. . .: A CATHOLIC UNDERSTANDING OF THE STORY OF THE 
CREATION AND THE FALL 17 (Boniface Ramsey trans., Wm. B. 
Eerdmans Pub. Co. 1995) (1986) [hereinafter Ratzinger, God the 
Creator].  In the second homily Ratzinger explains that the scientific-
based theories hinge on the entire ensemble of nature arising out of 
errors and dissonances and that some scientists acknowledge the 
absurdness of the theories, but, nonetheless, cannot break out of the 
scientific mindset because “the scientific method demands that a 
question not be permitted to which the answer would have to be God.”  
JOSEPH RATZINGER, The Meaning of the Biblical Creation Accounts, in 
IN THE BEGINNING. . .: A CATHOLIC UNDERSTANDING OF THE STORY OF 
THE CREATION AND THE FALL, supra, at 22-25 [hereinafter Ratzinger, 
The Meaning]. 
83
 Ratzinger, Introduction, supra note 77, at 156-57. 
84
 Id. at 157. 
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identity and is grounded in the fact that God loves and 
wants a relationship with his creation. 
 
The believing Jew dies 
reciting this profession; the 
Jewish martyrs breathed their 
last declaring it and gave their 
lives for it. . . .  The fact that 
this God now shows us his 
face in Jesus Christ (Jn 14:9) – 
a face that Moses was not 
allowed to see (Ex 33:20) – 
does not alter this profession 
in the least and changes 
nothing essential in this 
identity.  Of course, the fact 
that God is personal is not 
mentioned in the Bible using 
that term, but it is apparent 
nevertheless, inasmuch as 
there is a name of God.  A 
name implies the ability to be 
called on, to speak, to hear, to 
answer.  This is essential for 
the biblical God, and if this is 
taken away, the faith of the 
Bible has been abandoned. . . .  
But what is actually meant, 
then, by God’s name, by his 
being personal?  Precisely 
this: Not only can we 
experience him, beyond all 
[earthly] experience, but also 
62
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he can express and 
communicate himself.
85
   
 
God has revealed to humanity that he wants to 
communicate with humans.  He has communicated himself 
to humanity in history because he desires a relationship 
with humanity.  And he has welcomed prayer from 
humans.
86
  God’s desire and the nature of the relationship is 
revealed most fully through Jesus Christ, but Scripture 
reveals that God has been in relationship with humanity 
since the dawn of creation.  The first step in understanding 
human freedom as communal with God—involving a 
reality internal to the human being, or a capacity to be in 
union with God, involves considering the issue from the 
perspective of Christian idealism—namely, the 
understanding of God as Reason and Love. 
Ratzinger has stressed in many forums the 
importance of the decision by the early Christians to 
explicitly recognize that the God of the philosophers—the 
Logos, the divine presence that can be perceived by the 
rational analysis of reality—is one and the same as the 
                                                 
85
 Id. at 22-23 (preface to the 2000 edition). 
86
 In Spe Salvi, Pope Benedict XVI explains that outside Christianity, a 
God to whom one could pray did not exist, and that the idea of a 
personal God radically changed the prevailing world-view that, in a 
different way, is prominent today.  “It is not the elemental spirits of the 
universe, the laws of matter, which ultimately govern the world and 
mankind, but a personal God governs the stars, that is, the universe; it 
is not the laws of matter and of evolution that have the final say, but 
reason, will, love – a Person.  And if we know this Person and he 
knows us, then truly the inexorable power of material elements no 
longer has the last word; we are not slaves of the universe and its laws, 
we are free.”  Letter from Benedict XVI, Supreme Pontiff, to Bishops, 
Priests, and Deacons; Men and Women Religious; and all the Lay 
Faithful on Christian Love (Nov., 30 2007) (on file with author), 
available at 
http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/benedict_xvi/encyclicals/documents
/hf_ben-xvi_enc_20071130_spe-salvi_en.html, at #5.   
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personal God who has entered history.
87
  To Christians, the 
Logos is not just Eternal Reason.  It is not an anonymous, 
neutral consciousness.  The Christian God is not simply a 
“first cause.”  Rather, in Christianity the Logos loves.  The 
Logos is Love.
88
   
A Logos that is Love fundamentally alters idealism.  
The consciousness that is the ultimate being is not a mere 
craftsman, but rather, is creative mind.
89
  Indeed, Eternal 
Reason is creative because it is Love.  Freedom is also a 
consequence of Love.  In creating or thinking, the Logos 
that is Love gives freedom to its creation.  As explained by 
Ratzinger, the creative consciousness that is Love releases 
what has been thought into the freedom of its own, 
independent existence.  Being-thought of the Logos that is 
Love has more than a mere appearance of being: being-
thought is true being itself.
90
    
In Introduction to Christianity, Ratzinger 
highlighted several key implications flowing from this 
understanding of Logos as creating and loving that are 
relevant to understanding freedom.  First, each human 
being is not merely an individual “reproduction” or 
secondary thing—the result of idea being diffused into 
matter.  Rather, each human being is a definite being, a true 
being, unique and unrepeatable.  “The highest is not the 
                                                 
87
 Ratzinger, Introduction, supra note 77, at 138. 
88
 Ratzinger gives an extensive treatment to the concept that God is 
Love. See Letter from Benedict XVI, Supreme Pontiff, to the Bishops, 
Priests, and Deacons; Men and Women Religious; and all the Lay 
Faithful on Christian Love,  (Dec. 25, 2005) (on file with author), 
available at 
http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/benedict_xvi/encyclicals/documents
/hf_ben-xvi_enc_20051225_deus-caritas-est_en.html, at #1.. 
89
 Ratzinger, Introduction, supra note 77, at 157.  Ratzinger has noted 
that the revelation that existence is Creation was itself a decisive 
moment of Enlightenment.  See Ratzinger, God the Creator, supra note 
82, at 14.    
90
 Ratzinger, Introduction, supra note 77, at 157. 
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most universal but, precisely, the particular, and the 
Christian faith is thus above all also the option for man as 
the irreducible, infinity-oriented being.”
91
  Each human 
being exists because of being thought by God and, thus, is 
known by and loved by God. 
Second, the existence of any being created by the 
Logos that is Love is, essentially, freedom.  Therefore, 
freedom is the structural form of all being.
92
  Stated another 
way, it can be said that life itself is freedom.  This has 
positive and negative aspects.  Because freedom is the 
structure of creation, incomprehensibility is part and parcel 
of the cosmos.  The world cannot be reduced to 
mathematics, and the mystery of the demonic exists: “As 
the arena of love [the world] is also the playground of 
freedom and also incurs the risk of evil.”  But the mystery 
of darkness can be seen as an acceptable tradeoff for the 
greater positives of freedom and love.
93
  Each human being 
is a distinct being set free by God because of God’s love. 
Third, all being is intelligible and meaningful 
because pure intellect made it and He made it by thinking 
it.  The intelligibility in things, in being-thought that is true 
being, is the expression of creative pre-mediation.  Human 
thinking, then, is “re-thinking,” and it is right or true when 
it is in conformity with the thought of the Creator.
94
  As 
explained by Ratzinger:  “Man can rethink the logos, the 
meaning of being, because his own logos, his own reason, 
is logos of the one logos, thought of the original thought, of 
the creative spirit that permeates and governs his being.”
95
   
This means that the conception of man and the way man 
                                                 
91
 Id. at 158.  The Supreme Being can care for humans precisely 
because His consciousness does not have limits – He can embrace the 
whole.  Id. at 146.  From this perspective, love is higher than thought.  
Id. at 147.  
92
 Id. at 157.     
93
 Id. at 159-60.   
94
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should live is correct and true when in conformity with 
God’s idea of man.  Knowing what it means to be human 
means coming to know the “Idea” of the Creative being.   
If Eternal Reason and Creative Love are one and the 
same, the measure of human action is Truth.  This was the 
message of Jesus:  "The truth will make you free" (Jn 8:32).  
But humanity can only know the Truth with God’s help and 
Truth that comes from God has its center in Jesus Christ.
96
  
This is the real essence of Christian faith.  Faith is the 
encounter with Jesus.  Faith is the Word coming from the 
transcendent.  Faith is reception of what cannot be thought 
out.
97
  In God’s encounters with mankind throughout 
history, God is seeking a relationship that hinges on 
mankind understanding God’s Idea for humanity.  Creation 
and Covenant go hand in hand.
98
  Jesus Christ is the key to 
understanding God’s Idea for humanity.  Jesus Christ is 
essential to human freedom because he brought knowledge 
and understanding—the fullness of revelation—to assist 
human reasoning.  But this is not all.  It is his presence and 
                                                 
96
 ICFL, supra note 44, at #3. 
97
 See JOSEPH RATZINGER, The Ecclesiology of the Second Vatican 
Council, in CHURCH, ECUMENISM & POLITICS: NEW ESSAYS IN 
ECCLESIOLOGY, supra note 12, at 3, 10 (“Faith is the encounter with 
what I cannot think up myself or bring about by my own efforts but 
what must come to encounter me”); Ratzinger, Luther, supra note 21, 
at 126-27 (Christian faith is sharing in knowledge with Jesus Christ). 
98
 To Ratzinger, this point is crucial.  Materialism, as it shows up in its 
many philosophical forms, rejects creation because it implies a 
dependence that deprives the world its power and that ultimately is 
perceived as the real barrier to freedom; it will not entrust itself to a 
world already created, but only to world still to be created.  The 
Christian option is the opposite.  Human beings are dependent.  But it 
is a dependence that takes the form of love and, thus, does not involve 
diminishment of self, but, rather, leads to freedom.  See JOSEPH 
RATZINGER, The Consequences of Faith in Creation, in “In the 
Beginning. . .: A CATHOLIC UNDERSTANDING OF THE STORY OF 
CREATION AND THE FALL, supra note 82, at 98-100. 
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the presence of the Holy Spirit that enable human union 
with God.   
 
B.  Trinitarian Insights into Freedom  
 
The Christian vision of freedom as explained by 
Ratzinger partially rests on the principle that “man is God’s 
image precisely insofar as being ‘from,’ ‘with,’ and ‘for’ 
constitute the fundamental anthropological pattern.”
99
  It is 
this pattern that constitutes the essence of the human 
person.   Ratzinger’s understanding of this pattern rests on 
the concept of the human person as revealed by Jesus 
Christ and, more specifically, by knowledge of God as “one 
being in three persons” and knowledge of Jesus Christ as 
having “two natures and one person.”  Therefore, it is a 
concept with meaning because of the Christian doctrine of 
the Trinity.   
 
1)  The Concept of Person 
  
The concept of person that emerged from the 
development of the doctrine of the Trinity, and the process 
of developing the concept, were explored by Ratzinger in 
Retrieving the Tradition: Concerning the Notion of Person 
in Theology, published in 1990.
100
  In this article, Ratzinger 
points out that early Christian philosophers latched onto a 
philosophically insignificant concept—the literary use of 
dialogue or roles, persona, to depict the action occurring in 
dramatic events—and transformed the concept in a radical 
way.  “The ‘role’ truly exists; it is . . . the face, the person 
                                                 
99
 Ratzinger highlighted this point.  See Ratzinger, Truth and Freedom, 
supra note 26, at 346-47.   
100
 Joseph Ratzinger, Retrieving the Tradition: Concerning the Notion 
of Person in Theology, 17 COMMUNIO 439 (1990) [hereinafter 
Ratzinger, Retrieving the Tradition]. 
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  Jesus’s words and actions support the 
concept of the Trinity, but what helps make the concept of 
the Trinity comprehensible?  The early Christian 
philosophers used the transformed concept of persona to 
help explain the reality of the intra-divine dialogue found 
throughout Scripture and the ontological reality of being 
emphasized by St. John in writing his Gospel. 
Foremost, the concept of “person” was understood 
as a dialogical reality whose essence is action.  But what is 
the nature of this reality?
102
  To the early Christian 
philosophers, the nature of reality fell into one of two 
categories: substance (the sustaining form or real essence of 
a thing) or matter with its accidents (the chance 
circumstances of being).  God is wholly spirit with no 
accidents.  The crux of the question, then, was whether the 
persons of God were substance.  The philosophers knew 
this could not be the case since the essence of God’s being 
                                                 
101
 Id. at 439, 442.  In interpreting poems or narratives, ancient literary 
scholars would uncover the prosopon or persona used by the author.  In 
studying Scripture, Christian philosophers noticed a similar use of 
dialogue in that God speaks to himself and God speaks through the 
Prophets.  The philosophers spoke in terms of the “sacred writers” 
introducing “different prosopa, different roles,” but the Christian 
philosophers recognized a radical difference: “The roles introduced by 
the sacred writer are realities, they are dialogical realities.” Id. at 441. 
102
 The question whether the three persons were in fact realities was, 
itself, a challenging philosophical and theological question.  Therefore, 
does the “triplicity” genuinely inform humanity about what God is like 
in himself or only about how man can relate to God or the mode in 
which God relates to man?  The Church settled on the understanding 
that “God is as he shows himself; God does not show himself in a way 
in which he is not.”  Ratzinger, Introduction, supra note 77, at 165 
(emphasis in original).  Or, as explained by Ratzinger, “[a]lthough it is 
true that we only know God as he is reflected in human thought, the 
Christian faith held firmly to the view that in this reflection it is him 
that we know.  Even if we are not capable of breaking out of the narrow 
bounds of our consciousness, God can nevertheless break into this 
consciousness and show himself in it.” Id. at 167 (emphasis in 
original). 
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is oneness.  Scripture also made clear the idea of “relation” 
between the persons of God: the Father and the Son.  
Philosophy traditionally considered “relation” an aspect of 
accidents, or a characteristic of matter (a thing is between, 
beside, above, etc.), as opposed to form.  The logical 
solution was thus to conceive of relation differently: as a 
reality within being and distinct from substance and 
accident.  Person is relation.  Relation is the person, and the 
person exists only as relation.  Father, Son, and the Holy 
Spirit are real existing relations, and nothing besides.
103
  
Further, they are pure act.  The idea that the Father begets 
the Son means that the Father is self-donation: pure reality 
of act, pure act-being.
104
  In Ratzinger’s words, “[i]n God, 
person is the pure relativity of being turned toward the 
other; . . . [it lies] on the level of dialogical reality, of 
relativity toward other.”
105
   
Ratzinger recognizes the interplay between 
philosophy and theology that led to this original concept of 
person as pure relativity toward others.  But he also 
emphasizes that Scripture confirms and deepens this 
understanding.   He explains that statements such as “The 
Son cannot do anything of himself” (John 5:19) or “I and 
the Father are one” (John 10:30) mean that Jesus “has 
nothing of himself alone,” that he “does not place himself 
as a delimited substance next to the Father;” and that Jesus 
“constitutes nothing but relativity toward [the Father] that 
                                                 
103
 Ratzinger, Retrieving the Tradition, supra note 100 at 444. 
104
 Id. at 444. 
105
 Id.  Ratzinger emphasizes the novelty and value of this Christian 
contribution to human thought: “Again we encounter the Christian 
newness of the personalistic idea in all its sharpness and clarity.  The 
contribution offered by faith to human thought becomes especially 
clear and palpable here.  It was faith that gave birth to this idea of pure 
act, of pure relativity, which does not lie on the level of substance and 
does not touch or divide substance; and it was faith that thereby 
brought the personal phenomenon into view.” Id. at 445 (emphasis in 
original). 
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does not delimit a precinct of what is merely and properly 
its own.”
106
  Ratzinger also sees other Scriptural themes as 
reinforcing the idea of person or relation as encompassing 
“openness,” specifically, the theology of mission and the 
doctrine of the Logos.  In both the Old and New 
Testaments, the emissary is one with the sender.  Christ is 
the genuine emissary who is in his entire nature “the one 
sent.”  As “the one sent” Jesus stands in complete relativity 
of existence towards the one who sent him.  Thus, the 
“content of Jesus’ existence is ‘being from someone and 
toward someone,’ the absolute openness of existence 
without any reservation of what is merely and properly 
one’s own.”
107
  The doctrine of the Logos is consistent.  
The term Logos has rich significance in terms of eternal 
rationality.  But, in addition, Ratzinger points out that the 
Logos, as Word, “is essentially from someone else and 




Moreover, Ratzinger points out that Scripture itself 
suggests that this idea of person should be transferred to 
humans.  Jesus tells his disciples that “Without me you can 
do nothing” (John 15:5), and prays that “they may be one 
as we are one” (John 17:11).
109
  The idea of emissary, 
similarly, is transferred to the disciples when Jesus states, 
“As the Father has sent me, so I am sending you” (John 
20:21).   Ratzinger thus notes: 
                                                 
106
 Id. at 445. 
107




 Ratzinger thus notes: “It is thus part of the existence even of the 
disciples that man does not posit the reservation of what is merely and 
properly his own, does not strive to form the substance of the closed 
self, but enters into pure relativity toward the other and toward God.  It 
is in this way that he truly come to himself and into the fullness of his 
own, because he enters into unity with the one to whom he is related.” 
Id. at 445. 
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I believe a profound 
illumination of God as well as 
man occurs here, the decisive 
illumination of what person 
must mean in terms of 
Scripture: not a substance that 
closes itself in itself, but the 
phenomenon of complete 
relativity, which is, of course, 
realized in its entirety only in 
the one who is God, but which 
indicates the direction of all 
personal being.”
110
   
 
Theological and philosophical reflection on the knowledge 
of God as the Trinity, as three persons in one being, thus 
provides a solid foundation for the idea that “relativity, 
being turned toward other” is a distinct aspect of the human 
person and thus of human existence.   
In Retrieving the Tradition, Ratzinger also discusses 
how reflection on knowledge of Christ reinforces this 
vision of the human person.  In trying to grasp the meaning 
of Christ, theologians again focused on the word persona.  
The formula is as follows:  Christ has two natures—a 
divine and human nature—but only one divine person.  
Ratzinger notes that, as to the meaning of “person” 
reflected in this formula, the early theologians worked out 
what the person is not, but did not clarify with the same 
precision what the concept means positively.  In the many 
battles over the question of “who and what is this Christ,” it 
was clarified that the formula and its use of the phrase 
“divine person” does not in any way indicate that anything 
was lacking in the humanity of Christ.
111
  Therefore, the 
phrase “divine person” cannot be thought of as indicating 
                                                 
110
 Id. (emphasis in original). 
111
 Id. at 448. 
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that the reality of person, the reality of relativity, does not 
reach Jesus’s humanity.  Rather, the concept of person is an 
essential aspect of the entire existence of Jesus, his divinity 
and humanity.  Beyond this, however, Ratzinger only 
identifies “hints that point out the direction” for 
Christological and, in turn, anthropological reflection.  Yet 
these hints are powerful and well grounded. 
Ratzinger points out that Boethius’s concept of 
person, which prevailed in Western philosophy as “the 
individual substance of a rational nature,” is erroneous and 
unhelpful in the context of the Trinity and Christology 
because it puts the idea of “person” on the level of 
substance.
112
  Reflection on God as three persons has 
placed “person” in an arena of being distinct from both 
substance and accident or matter.  Further, person is an 
aspect of the spirit, and in Jesus, would be an aspect of his 
divinity and humanity.  In humanity, this spirit is 
embodied. 
Ratzinger then engages in philosophical reflection 
on the nature of spirit to make a key point about the human 
person.  First, in contrast to matter that “is what is,” the 
spirit is that “which is not only there, but is itself in 
transcending itself, in looking toward the other and in 
looking back upon itself.”
113
  Because openness—
relatedness to the whole—is thus the essence of spirit, it is 
in reaching beyond itself, by being with other, that spirit 
comes to itself.  Second, spirit is that being which is able to 
think about itself, about being in general, and about the 
wholly other, namely, the transcendent God.  Indeed, 
Ratzinger points out that the ability to reflect on the 
concept of God is the mark that truly distinguishes the 
                                                 
112
 Id. at 448.  (In other contexts, Boethius’s concept can provide a 
springboard for reflection about the concept of person.  See, e.g.,  John 
Paul II’s work on the acting-person.) 
113
 Id. at 451 (quoting HEDWIG CONRAD-MARTIUS, DAS SEIN 133 ( 
1957)). 
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human spirit from other forms of consciousness found in 
animals.
114
  Third, the other through which the spirit 
ultimately comes to itself must be God.  He concludes that 
if the person is itself the more it is with the other, “then the 
person is all the more itself the more it is with the wholly 
other, with God.”
115
  Or, stated another way:  the “human 
person is the event or being of relativity” and the “more the 
person’s relativity aims totally and directly at its final goal, 
at transcendence, the more the person is itself.”
116
 
Integrating this point with knowledge of Christ, 
Ratzinger sees two main ideas emerge.  In Christ, “being 
with other” is radically realized.  Relativity toward other is 
always the foundation of his consciousness and existence.  
But this does not cancel out the “being with” that is 
inherent to his human nature.  “In Christ, in the man who is 
completely with God, human existence is not canceled, but 
comes to its highest possibility, which consists in 
transcending itself into the absolute and in the integration 
of its own relativity into the absoluteness of divine love.”
117
  
Ratzinger’s first point is that this implies that the human 
person in history is “being on the way” towards integration 
into divine love.
118
   
His second point flows from the fact that knowledge 
of Christ “adds the idea of ‘we’ to the idea of ‘I’ and 
‘you.’”  Ratzinger notes that Scripture depicts Christ as the 
“all-encompassing space in which the ‘we’ of human 
beings gathers on the way to the Father.”
119
  Therefore, 
Christ, the one divine person, is the “we” into which Love, 
the Holy Spirit, gathers humanity.  Similarly, Scripture 
                                                 
114
 Id. at 451. 
115






 Id.  Ratzinger does not emphasize the point in this article, but this 
fact is also the reason why, or the mechanism through which, the 
persons of collective humanity are able to integrate with God.   
119
 Id. at 452-53. 
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shows God as the “we” of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit.  
Thus, the dialogical principle in Christianity is not simply 
an “I-Thou” relationship.  Rather, on both sides of the 
dialogue, the “I” is integrated into the greater “we.”
120
  
Thus, the true character of dialogue with the Father—
integration of the human relativity with Divine Love—is 
properly reflected in the liturgical formula “through Christ 
in the Holy Spirit to the Father.”
121
  To Ratzinger, this 
proper understanding of the human person’s relationship 
with God totally undermines a Christian view that 
emphasizes only an individualized relationship with 
God.
122
  Individuals should strive for a deep and personally 
heartfelt relationship with God, but each person’s 
relationship with God is necessarily intertwined with and 
part of God’s relationship with humanity as a whole. 
 
2) Freedom as Transcendence towards 
Other 
 
Understanding the concept of the human person, 
and integrating it with the cornerstone idea of a personal 
God, clarifies the following:  The human being is a unity, a 
spirit-in-body.  An essential aspect of this unity is an 
existential component:  a reality encompassed by the term 
person, a component that is pure relativity that knows of 
God and is striving for integration with or union with God.  
                                                 
120
 Id. at 453. 
121
 Id.  
122
 He also notes that the typical individualized “I”–“You” perspective 
contributed to the eventual loss of the “You.” Id. at 453 (noting that in 
Kant’s transcendental philosophy the “you” is no longer found).  At the 
same time, Ratzinger acknowledges that this collective vision of 
integration or union with God was obscured by the manner in which 
both Augustine and Thomas Aquinas presented certain aspects of the 
Trinity. Id. at 454. See also id. at 449.  But, the existential approach had 
been introduced by the beginning of the Middle Ages by Richard of St. 
Victor.  See id. at 449. 
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This existential component is integral to each human being 
by virtue of being a creature of a personal God, a Logos 
that is Love, and a God whose essence of oneness includes 
a dialogical reality that is pure relativity of being turned 
toward other.  Indeed, for a Logos that is Love—a personal 
God—this reality that is pure relativity necessarily exists.  
It is the essence of Love.  And it is this Love that is an 
integral part of each human being and an inherent aspect of 
human nature.
123
  It is this Love that is the person and the 
relativity of each human.  The love or relativity within each 
human being is completed only by re-union with God.  
Union or integration occurs on the level or plane of 
relation, or Love, and union with God depends on thinking 
and acting with God.  Union or integration of this love in 
each human being with Divine Love is possible in and 
through Jesus Christ and, thus, occurs collectively with 
other human beings.    
These insights into the essence of the concept of 
person clarify the nature of sin and thus why genuine 
liberation is freedom from sin.  Man does not come to 
himself through autonomy and self-sufficiency.  Rather, the 
human person strives towards transcendence.  “It is in this 
way that he truly comes to himself and into the fullness of 
his own, because he enters into unity with the one to whom 
he is related.”
124
  This involves turning toward others.  The 
fundamental figure of human existence thus is a being 
“from,” “with,” and “for,” and sin thus consists in human 
                                                 
123
 The magisterium uses the phrase “nature of a being” to refer to what 
constitutes the being as such, with the dynamism of its tendencies 
toward its proper ends; “It is from God that natures possess what they 
are, as well as their proper ends.”  Beings are created and “impregnated 
with a significance in which man, as the image of God, is capable of 
discerning the creating hand of God.”  INTERNATIONAL THEOLOGICAL 
COMMISSION, FAITH AND INCULTURATION ch. I, #1 (1988), available 
http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/cti_documents
/rc_cti_1988_fede-inculturazione_en.html (internal quotations omitted) 
124
 Ratzinger, Retrieving the Tradition, supra note 100, at 445. 
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actions that interfere with this pattern and with union with 
God.  Further, because the person is more himself or herself 
the more the person’s relativity aims totally and directly at 
its final goal and at transcendence, freedom necessarily 
consists in liberation from sin.   
 
C. The Incarnation: Freedom as Fulfillment of 
the Divine Idea   
 
The revelation brought by Jesus Christ opened a 
whole new dimension to humanity’s knowledge of God 
and, in turn, humanity’s knowledge of man.  While this 
article has discussed much of that insight bearing on human 
freedom, Ratzinger’s writing fleshes out an even deeper 
dimension of human freedom.  A dimension grounded in 
the unity of humanity and relating to how Jesus Christ 
enables human union with God.  This perspective of human 
freedom only comes to light with the fullness of the 
message of Christ.  A fullness that is still unfolding but that 
was rendered substantially comprehensible in the first 
several centuries of Christianity by Christian philosophers 
working with the Church and from within the faith. 
In working out the implications of the doctrine of 
the Trinity, along with the implications of understanding 
the Logos as Love, the meaning of liberation from sin 
began to come to light.  Jesus brought liberation from sin.  
It is in Christ that humanity has been set free.  Freedom is 
thinking and acting with God, such that union with God 
occurs on the level or plane of relation, or Love.  But, the 
question arises:  How, more specifically, does Jesus enable 
humanity to achieve God’s objective?  Ratzinger has 
addressed this more particular aspect of the Mystery of the 
Incarnation and the Trinity. 
As explained, the doctrine of the Trinity posits God 
as three Persons in One Being.  Each Person is a reality or 
an act of relativity.  God is Father only in relation to his 
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Son, only in “being for” the other.  He is the act of giving 
himself.  Similarly, Christ is Son only in relation to Father.  
He has nothing of his own and can do nothing on his own.  
He stands in the Father and constantly is one with him.  
Son is “being from” another.  But since he also is one with 
the Father, he is a “being for.”  The Son is being “for 
others.”  This is the essence of the revelation of Jesus’s life 
and work:  the whole being of Jesus is a function of the “for 
us.”
125
  Jesus is thus absolute openness of existence, from 
and for.  This existence is a complete path and openness.  
The Holy Spirit is God facing outward, the means through 
which Jesus Christ—in all his openness and breadth and 
freedom—remains present in the history of the world.
126
  
The Holy Spirit is the gift of Love and the constituting 
principle of the new man in Christ.
127
   
Ratzinger notes in Introduction to Christianity that, 
in addition to other radical insights, the triple relativity of 
these Persons in the one Being of God brought about a 
profound break-through relating to unity and plurality in 
                                                 
125
 Ratzinger, Introduction, supra note 77, at 204.  Indeed, Christians 
understand that it is only “to him who died on the Cross, to him who 
renounced all earthly power . . . to him who laid aside the sword and . . 
. went to his death for others, to him who saw the meaning of human 
existence, not in power and self-assertion, but in existing utterly for 
others – who indeed was, as the Cross shows, existence for others – to 
him and him alone God has said “You are my son, today I have 
begotten you.” Id. at 219.  Love of God and neighbor, which devolves 
to service to others is, of course, the crux of the Jesus’s teaching.  But, 
what is important is not that Jesus left behind a body of teaching.  What 
is important is that Jesus is his teaching. Id. at 205, 226.  As explained 
by Ratzinger, “his being itself is service” and for this reason “it is 
sonship.” Id. at 226.  
126
 Id. at 332-34. 
127
 Id. at 337.  The Holy Spirit is “God’s gift to history in the 
community of those who believe in Christ,” id. at 331, a gift accessible 
largely through baptism, penance, and the Eucharist.  Id. at 336.  The 
center of the Spirit’s activity in the world is thus the Church.  Id. at  
335. 
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the philosophy of being.  To ancient thought, only unity or 
oneness could be divine, and plurality was conceived as a 
disintegration of divine.
128
  However, if the highest Being 
no longer is understood as a detached Being, existing 
closed in on himself in his oneness, divinity is not mere 
unity.  Plurality too has its inner ground in God.  “Plurality 
is not just disintegration that sets in outside the divinity. . . . 
it is not the result of the dualism of two opposing powers; it 
corresponds to the creative fullness of God, who himself 
stands above plurality and unity, encompassing both.”
129
  
Ratzinger explains that the “multi-unity that grows in love 
is a more radical, truer unity than the unity of the 
‘atom.’”
130
  Thus, the “three persons” who exist in God do 




  The idea that plurality can enhance unity makes 
comprehensible the idea of collective freedom in and 
through Jesus.  Notably, Ratzinger explains in Introduction 
to Christianity that this fuller message of Christian 
liberation from sin has been obscured in recent centuries 
due to an emphasis on “theologies of the cross” and St. 
Anselm’s “satisfaction theory.”
132
   While these theories 
have elements of truth, Ratzinger argues that a truer picture 
exists.  This picture rests more heavily on a theology of the 
Incarnation and the Logos as Love.  As explained, the 
Logos that is Love creates being that can understand itself 
and desires.  That being does understand itself and that it 
thereby comes to itself.  The Incarnation is essential to this 
objective.  For humanity, the Incarnation was a crucial step 
in the process of coming to know itself.  Further, for the 
                                                 
128
 Id. at 178. 
129




 “[P]ure oneness can only occur in the spirit and embraces the 
relatedness of love.”  Id. at 188. 
132
 Id. at 231-32. 
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Logos that is Love, the Incarnation simply is part and 
parcel of the divine Idea “man.”    
The doctrine of the Incarnation focuses on the fact 
of God’s assuming human nature: the fact that the Word 
became flesh.  Although this paper has not yet focused on 
it, one other important aspect of the philosophical and 
theological debates concerning the doctrine of the Trinity is 
the key question whether Jesus was both fully divine and 
fully human.  In fact, the issue is the most fundamental one 
because if Jesus was not fully divine and fully human, there 
would be no need to delve into the issue of what it means 
that there exist “three Persons in one Being.”  Despite the 
many theories proffered with other answers, however, 
Christian philosophers working with the Church and from 
within the faith adhered to the central conviction that 
Jesus’s two natures, human and divine, were both 
complete.  Only in this way would his mediation be true 
mediation.  If he were some type of intermediate being his 
presence would guide humanity not toward God, but away 
from God, resulting in separation rather than mediation.
133
  
As explained by Ratzinger, “[o]nly if he was really a man 
like us can he be our mediator, and only if he is really God, 
like God, does the mediation reach its goal.”
134
   
In Incarnation theologies, being mediator (or 
pathway) is an essential aspect of Christ’s liberation of 
humanity.  Ratzinger explains the theory as follows:  Jesus 
is the exemplary man, the Second Adam.
135
 The first 
Adam, the moment when God’s Idea of man first took 
shape, was but a first step in man’s process of becoming 
man.
136
  The first step involved the transition from mere 
life to mind.  The second step, accomplished in Jesus, the 
                                                 
133
 Id. at 163. 
134
 Id. at 166. 
135
 Holy Scripture refers to Jesus as the Second Adam. See id. at 236. 
136
 Ratzinger explains that, in the Bible, the word “Adam” expresses the 
unity of the whole creature “man.”  Id. at 236. 
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Second Adam, involved a more intense contact between 
humanity and God. 
 
Man came into existence out 
of the “clay” at the moment 
when a creature was no longer 
merely “there” but, over and 
above just being there and 
filling his needs, was aware of 
the whole.  But this step, 
through which logos, 
understanding, mind, first 
came into this world, is only 
completed when the Logos 
itself, the whole creative 
meaning, and man merge into 
each other.  Man’s full 
“hominization” presupposes 
God’s becoming man; only by 
this event is the Rubicon 
dividing the “animal” from the 
“logical” finally crossed for 
ever and the highest possible 
development accorded to the 
process [of humanity’s 
creation].”
137
    
 
It is in Jesus Christ, then, that humanity has reached its 
goal.
138
  It is openness to the infinite that is the true mark of 
man, and man is most complete when he is one with the 
infinite.  Jesus is “true man” because the person that is part 
and parcel of his human nature is one with God. 
                                                 
137
 Id. at 235. 
138
 As Ratzinger has stated elsewhere: “We can say that God created the 
universe in order to enter into a history of love with humankind.”  
Ratzinger, The Meaning, supra note 82, at 30. 
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 It is important to appreciate two distinct aspects of 
this Incarnation theory.  First, it is grounded in the 
understanding that there is one Divine Idea “man” that is 
fulfilled in Jesus Christ.
139
  This key point was uniformly 
held and taught by important and influential early Christian 
thinkers.
140
  Ratzinger explicitly made this point in a 1981 
Lenten homily entitled The Creation of the Human Being. 
141
  In that homily, Ratzinger explains that, in the biblical 
account of Creation, God reveals much insight about this 
Divine Idea: 
 
 Humanity is one Creation 
from God’s one Good Earth. 
 The human being comes into 
existence after God has 
breathed his breath into the 
body, when divine reality 
enters humanity—when God 
enters into his Creation. 
 Because divine reality is in 
humanity, each human being 
is known and loved by God, 
is willed, and is made in his 
image. 
                                                 
139
 Ratzinger makes this point only in passing in Ratzinger, Truth and 
Freedom, supra note 26, at 351.  
140
 See HENRI DE LUBAC, CATHOLICISM: CHRIST AND THE COMMON 
DESTINY OF MAN (Lacelot C. Sheppard & Sister Elizabeth Englund 
trans., Ignatius Press 1988) (1947) (citing and extensively quoting from 
the work of the Church Fathers and early Christian philosophers).  
Notably, Lubac’s work greatly influenced Ratzinger’s approach to faith 
and theology. 
141
 JOSEPH RATZINGER, The Creation of the Human Being, in IN THE 
BEGINNING . . .: A CATHOLIC UNDERSTANDING OF THE STORY OF 
CREATION AND THE FALL, supra note 82, at 41-58 [hereinafter 
Ratzinger, The Creation]. 
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 Each human being realizes 
the One project of God, and 
has his or her origin in the 
same Creative Idea of God. 
 To be the image of God 
implies an inherent capacity 
for relationship and capacity 
for God.  
 The distinctive mark of the 
human being is the capability 
to think and to pray; humans 
are beings of word and 
love—beings moving toward 
Another.
142
   
 
Jesus is the exemplary man or Last Adam because, in Jesus, 
the person inherent to his human nature is integrated with 
his divinity and is completely open to God.  God’s one Idea 
“man” has thus achieved the goal of being completely open 
to God. 
This tells us about God’s goal for each human 
being.  The “true man”—the man conforming with the 
Divine Idea “man”—is a person in union with God in a 
manner akin to Jesus, but in a manner that is only possible 
in and through Jesus.  And this leads to the second 
important aspect of the Incarnation theory.  It helps clarify 
how it is that Jesus Christ enables humanity to achieve 
God’s goal. 
In the article Retrieving the Tradition, Ratzinger 
points out that in integrating knowledge about the human 
person with knowledge of Christ, two main ideas emerge.  
One is the idea that the human person in history is “being 
on the way” towards fuller integration into Divine Love.  
The second idea has bearing on how Jesus enables 
                                                 
142
 Id. at 44-48.  
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humanity, as a unity, to achieve God’s goal.  Jesus Christ is 
the all-encompassing space in which the “we” of human 
beings gather on the way to the Father, into which the Holy 
Spirit, Love, gathers humanity.
143
   
The vision, then, is one in which the Holy Spirit 
(the means through which Jesus Christ remains present in 
history) is within human beings, enabling and enhancing 
the inherent human capacity to love God and the inherent 
relativity (Love) within human beings.  In turn, that Love 
within human beings is held together in unity and in the 
space, openness, or path that is Jesus Christ, thereby linking 
united human love with God’s love.   
As pointed out by Ratzinger, this vision necessarily 
implies the collective nature of man’s union with God.  
Love of God and love of neighbor are thus inherently and 
inextricably intertwined.  Within the human being there is a 
reality consisting of relativity, Love.  This relativity is 
ultimately reaching for God.  But it is affected by 
interactions with others.  Actions of “being-with” or 
“being-for” others enhances the movement towards God 
and vice versa.  The collective nature of humanity’s union 
with God means that the action of any one person affects 
the union of others with God.  Actions of “being-with” or 
“being-for” by any individual enhance the overall 
movement towards God; negative actions by any individual 
have a negative effect on the whole of humanity’s 
movement towards God. 
In humanity, then, from the beginning, heaven and 
earth touch.  In Jesus Christ the creation of humanity is 
brought to completion.  The pathway between heaven and 
earth is fully opened, and all integration or union between 
God and humanity—the one Divine Idea—will be by way 
of the divine person Jesus.  Thus, Jesus is “the way, and the 
truth, and the life" (Jn 14:6).  Jesus is the pathway that each 
                                                 
143
 See supra notes 113 to 122 and accompanying text. 
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human being must endeavor to follow during his or her 
lifetime in history.  By following Jesus Christ in one’s 
lifetime, one becomes, in reality, encompassed within 
Jesus’s one saving action.
144
  Each individual is saved only 
within the context of the whole.  Moreover, by virtue of 
being integrated with God, the plurality within the human 
unity—a multi-unity in Love—contributes to the fullness of 
the oneness of God. 
 
D.  Reprise of the Vision  
 
As demonstrated by the foregoing subsection, the 
Christian vision of freedom has layers of complexity.  The 
deeper the reflection is pushed—the more one uses human 
reasoning to assist in understanding God’s revelation—the 
more it becomes apparent that how freedom is used is 
important.  The Christian vision is based on an 
understanding of humanity and its history and destiny as 
revealed by God.  Human freedom depends on God and is 
freedom from sin.  This is so because the Creator of 
humanity is Reason and Love.  Each human being is a 
distinct being set free by the Creative Logos that is Love.  
Human life—the living out the freedom given by God—
should be a response to God.  That response is guided by 
and made possible by God, both by virtue of inherent 
capacities within the human person and by virtue of God’s 
                                                 
144
 In discussing Christian worship, which encompasses the entirety of 
one’s life, Ratzinger explains: “The fundamental principle of Christian 
worship is consequently this movement of exodus with its two-in-one 
direction toward God and fellowman.  By carrying humanity to God, 
Christ incorporates it in his salvation. . . . [H]e who was crucified has 
smelted the body of humanity into the Yes of worship.  [Christian 
sacrifice] is completely ‘anthropocentric’, entirely related to man, 
because it was radical theocentricity, delivery of the ’I‘ and therefore of 
the creature man to God. . . . The fundamental principle of sacrifice is 
not destruction but love.”  Ratzinger, Introduction, supra note 77, at 
289. 
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revelation, especially the fullness of revelation in Jesus 
Christ. 
In particular, love is a capacity, an existential 
capacity that is itself a reality.  Love is a transcendent 
character within humans designed to reach beyond self, 
especially towards God but also towards other human 
beings.  The purpose and goal of this capacity in the human 
person is re-union with God, which depends on acting in 
accord with God, which means acting in accord with the 
truth at both the individual and collective levels.  It is this 
union with the transcendent that the human spirit is striving 
for and that gives rise to the human yearning for freedom.  
It is this inherent capacity to seek God that is the truly 
distinguishing characteristic of humanity.   
Union with the Creator depends on thinking and 
acting in conformity with Eternal Reason and Love.  In 
practice, this means being receptive to God and other and 
acting in conformity with the fundamental anthropological 
pattern:  being-from, being-with, and being-for.  This is the 
meaning or intelligibility within man, and it is acting 
consistently with the meaning internal to man that 
constitutes genuine human freedom.
145
  The inviolable 
standards necessary for democratic society must be 
standards that safeguard genuine human freedom.  
Christian values provide just this type of standard.  They 
are values that have their origin from the Creator of 
humanity and the world and are fully consistent with the 
                                                 
145
 Because human freedom depends on grace, the Church and its 
sacraments, especially baptism and penance and the Eucharist, 
generally are crucial to attaining freedom.  The capacity to love God 
and remain in communion with him is dramatically enhanced by 
reception of grace through the sacraments.  For example, Ratzinger has 
described the Eucharistic community as a “holy thing” granted to the 
Church as the “real bond of unity.”  See Ratzinger, Introduction, supra 
note 77, at 334.  Further, the Church is to be understood as the “center 
of the Spirit’s activity in the world.”  Id. at 335-36.    
85
Spring 2014| Volume 9 | Issue 3 
Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 413 
 
pattern of love, the pattern of being-from, being-with, and 
being-for.   
 
V. Ordering Freedom in Accord with the Human 
Spirit and Democratic Ideals 
 
The well-reasoned alternative vision of human 
freedom presented by Ratzinger clarifies the argument that 
freedom is promoted and safeguarded only when core 
Christian moral insights provide the point of reference for 
law and justice.  As noted at the outset, Ratzinger has 
supplemented his argument with analysis of why prevalent 
political theories of the modern era have failed.  Part I of 
this article presented part of Ratzinger’s assessment of the 
shortcomings of modernity’s radical notion of human 
freedom.  This part of the article highlights another aspect 
of the assessment, namely, that modernity’s typical 
approach to freedom has missed its mark precisely because 
of its failure to be guided by the fundamental pattern of 
love imprinted within every human being.  It then briefly 
discusses certain aspects of how use of fundamental 
Christian insights can be fully consistent with key ideals 
held in a pluralistic democratic society. 
 
A. Modern Ideas of Freedom Are in Opposition 
to the Essence of the Human Person 
 
In Truth and Freedom,
146
 published in 1996, 
Ratzinger identifies fundamental elements of modern 
approaches to freedom
 147
 and shows that these elements 
                                                 
146
 Ratzinger, Truth and Freedom, supra note 26, at 337-53. 
147
 Ratzinger traces the evolution from Luther’s struggle for freedom of 
conscience in the religious sphere; to the middle phrase characterized 
by Kant’s call to use “pure reason,” and where two distinct approaches 
emerged: a natural rights orientation grounded in a metaphysical idea, 
and a radical anarchic approach wherein no right order exists in nature 
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tend to allow humans to act in opposition to the internal 
striving of the human spirit.  Ratzinger’s analysis supports 
the vision that freedom is inherently linked to truth and, 
specifically, the truth regarding the essence of human 
existence.  He shows that modernity’s anarchical 
conception of freedom cannot be correct because it allows 
humans to regard the “fundamental figure of human 
existence” as itself an attack on freedom.  
Ratzinger’s analysis is based on the principle that 
the fundamental pattern of human existence is a being 
“from,” “with,” and “for” another. 
148
  Ratzinger points out 
                                                                                                 
(arising from Rousseau’s ideas); to the later Marxist approaches.  Id. at 
340-43.  He concludes that the widespread view of freedom today is 
characterized by the individualistic ideology which was a component of 
all Enlightenment thought by anarchic tendencies (human will is the 
sole norm of human action) and by the Marxist tendency to rely on 
structures and systems to bring about justice.  Id. at 342-43.  Despite 
failures to bring about a sense of justice, Ratzinger notes that the 
radical current of Enlightenment has not lost its appeal.  Fascination for 
the grand promise of emancipation made at the inception of modernity 
remains.  Id. at 344.  To Ratzinger, then, the question “What is 
freedom?” cannot be avoided and involves issues of “what man is and 
how he can live rightly both individually and collectively.”  Id. at 338-
40, 344. 
148
 Id. at 346. Notably, the philosophical or theological basis for 
understanding human beings as “beings from, with, and for” is 
suggested only in passing in Truth and Freedom.  Ratzinger points to 
the “hidden theological core” underlying the modern, anarchic 
conception of freedom: the desire to be “like a god who depends on 
nothing and no one, whose own freedom is not restricted by that of 
another.” Id. at 347.  But he also points to the theological error.  In this 
ideology the divinity is conceived as a pure egoism, which is the 
extreme opposite of the real essence of God as revealed by God in 
Jesus Christ.  In Jesus, God has revealed himself as relational: “by his 
very nature he is entirely being-for (Father), being-from (Son), and 
being-with (Holy Spirit).” Id. at 347.  For Ratzinger, this is the reason 
why the essence of human existence follows the pattern.  Resisting the 
pattern leads to dehumanization, which will result in the destruction of 
the human being through the destruction of the truth of the human 
being.  Id. at 347. 
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that this fundamental anthropological pattern is most 
starkly presented by the unborn child.  The being of the 
unborn child is only from and through the mother and can 
survive only by physically being with the mother.  The 
“being-with” of the child prompts the being of the mother 
to become a “being for.”  Importantly, the pattern remains 
after the child is born.  The outward form of the “being-
from and -with” may change as the child matures.  The 
child nonetheless remains dependent; and although the 
mother may assign the care of the child to another, there 
remains “a ‘from’ that demands a ‘for.’”
149
  Furthermore, 
Ratzinger points out that this pattern remains even in 
adults: “Even the adult can exist only with and from 
another, and is thus continually thrown back on that being-
for which is the very thing he would like to shut out.”
150
   
                                                 
149
 Id. at 346. 
150
Id. at 346.  Notably, this important point—the all-encompassing 
nature of the “from” and “for” pattern—is illustrated more thoroughly 
by Ratzinger in other writings.  Ratzinger links the pattern to 
humanity’s corporality, i.e., his being “spirit in body.”  See Ratzinger, 
Introduction, supra note 77.  Corporality necessitates physical 
dependence on those immediately surrounding a human being 
(including both parentage and mutual daily care); but this dependence 
extends to needs of the spirit in man and, as well, extends to 
dependence on the past and future of mankind.  By way of example, he 
points to the human need for language (to which the whole of history 
has contributed); for culture (the “web of history that impinges on the 
individual through speech and social communication”); and for a future 
(“man is a being who lives for the future, who continually takes care to 
plan ahead beyond the passing moment and could no longer exist if he 
suddenly found himself without a future”).  Id. at 245-48. 
Another important insight on the human need for other was 
made by Ratzinger in a 1981 Lenten homily: “Human beings have their 
selves not only in themselves but also outside of themselves: they live 
in those whom they love and in those who love them and to whom they 
are ‘present.’” See JOSEPH RATZINGER, Sin and Salvation, in IN THE 
BEGINNING . . .: A CATHOLIC UNDERSTANDING OF THE STORY OF 
CREATION AND THE FALL, supra note 82, at 72. 
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Ratzinger then focuses on the fact that man in 
contemporary society mightily resists this fundamental 
pattern.  “[M]an quite spontaneously takes for granted the 
being-for of others in the form of today’s network of 
service systems, yet if he had his way he would prefer not 
to be forced to participate in such a “from” and “for,” but 
would like to become wholly independent, and to be able to 
do and not to do just what he pleases.”
151
  Ratzinger notes 
that it is this modern attitude or demand for freedom that is 
reflected in society’s acceptance of abortion.  “[A]bortion 
appears as a right of freedom.”  The woman “must have the 
power to make decisions about her own life, and no one 
else can – so we are told – impose from the outside any 
ultimately binding norm.”
152
  Ratzinger’s point of emphasis 
is that, from the modern perspective of freedom, requiring a 
woman to act in accord with the basic anthropologic pattern 
is perceived as an attack on freedom.
153
  This example 
supports Ratzinger’s key argument that a conception of 
freedom that demands liberation from the very essence of 
what it means to be human simply cannot be correct.  As he 
states, “exactly what sort of freedom has the right to annul 
another’s freedom as soon as it begins?”
154
 
Genuine human freedom, therefore, cannot rest on 
the individualistic model of radical autonomy and self-
sufficiency.  The complex weave of human dependencies 
does not allow this approach.  Rather, Ratzinger explains, 
“Man’s freedom is shared freedom, freedom in the conjoint 
existence of liberties that limit and thus sustain one 
                                                 
151
 Ratzinger, Truth and Freedom, supra note 26, at 346-47. 
152
 Id. at 346. 
153
 Id. at 347. 
154
 That society would allow real but secondary interests to prevail over 
the fundamental right to life also shows that modernity’s decision to 
restrict reason results in reason being used to justify the irrational.  
JOSEPH RATZINGER, CHRISTIANITY AND THE CRISIS OF CULTURES 63 
(2006).  
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  This conception of freedom thus necessarily 
requires a right or just ordering of rights and relationships: 
an “ordered communion of freedoms.”
156
  This sort of 
“right ordering” requires laws in society that are grounded 
in standards or values that foster human action consistent 
with the truth regarding the essence of human existence.  
This reference to “right ordering” in Truth and Freedom is 
very similar to a statement expressed in the Instruction on 
Christian Freedom and Liberation issued by the 
Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith: 
 
Truth and justice are therefore 
the measure of true freedom. . 
. . Far from being achieved in 
total self-sufficiency and an 
absence of relationships, 
freedom only truly exists 
where reciprocal bonds, 
governed by truth and justice, 
link people to one another.  
But for such bonds to be 
possible, each person must 




This is, then, but another way of saying that each person 
must live in conformity with the intelligibility within man, 
the pattern of “being-from,” “being-with,” and “being-for.” 
 
                                                 
155
 Ratzinger, Truth and Freedom, supra note 26, at 348. 
156
 Id. at 352. 
157
 ICFL, supra note 44, at #26.  In Truth and Freedom, Ratzinger 
shows that freedom is enhanced by heightened awareness of 
responsibility and acceptance of ever greater fraternal bonds and that 
responsibility, living in response to what the human being is in truth, 
entails being guided by the Decalogue, unfolded in rational 
understanding. Ratzinger, Truth and Freedom, supra note 26, at 349-
51.   
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B. Ordering Freedom in Love Is Consistent with 
Democratic Ideals 
 
Ratzinger’s vision for protecting freedom in society 
rests on three points.   First, freedom is safeguarded only 
when democratic government and the majority vote are 
limited by inviolable moral standards.  Second, 
safeguarding genuine freedom—freedom consistent with 
the internal yearning for the transcendent—requires that the 
inviolable standards be consistent with the intelligibility 
within man—the “being-from,” “being-with,” and “being-
for” pattern impressed on the human spirit by virtue of 
being a creature of God.  Third, core Christian insights and 
values properly used to inform the ordering of relationships 
in society can achieve this requisite conformity to Eternal 
Reason and Love.  As noted, this “right ordering” requires 
laws in society that are grounded in standards or values that 
foster human action consistent with the truth.  Further, 
although Ratzinger agrees with the idea of a secular state, 
he advocates that the State has a role in prudently fostering 
respect for those values, including expecting reverence and 
respect for God and holy things, and encouraging serious 
study of questions such as the existence of and nature of 
God.
158
  This vision remains consistent with key 
                                                 
158
 See, e.g., Ratzinger, A Christian Orientation, supra note 12, at 218-
20.  A key reason for this type of state action is the need for sufficient 
unity among the citizens regarding the values deemed inviolable.  See 
Ratzinger, Freedom and Constraint, supra note 21, at 188 
(“Ultimately, the democratic system can only function if certain 
fundamental values . . . are recognized as valid by everyone . . . an 
ethos which is jointly accepted and maintained even if its rational basis 
cannot be established absolutely and conclusively”). See also 
Ratzinger, A Christian Orientation, supra note 12, at 205 (“[Pluralist 
democracy, in itself, does not] unite[] its citizens in a fundamental 
assent to the state;” for its foundations, it depends on other powers and 
forces outside of itself); Ratzinger, Luther, supra note 21, at 131 
(noting that “a formal unity without clear content is fundamentally no 
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democratic ideals.  It is beyond the scope of this article to 
discuss this point in detail, but it is important to recognize 
that Ratzinger has addressed this concern.  
 From a practical perspective, Ratzinger recognizes 
the need to adhere to two key principles in carrying out the 
exchange between politics and faith.  First, he readily 
acknowledges the need to maintain the properly distinct 
and delimited spheres of Church and State.
159
  Ratzinger 
notes that the Christian faith brought about the secular 
state, a society in which the political realm is limited and 
provides space for freedom of conscience.
160
  The State is 
responsible for peace and justice, and governs on the basis 
                                                                                                 
unity at all; unity based on common skepticism and not knowledge is, 
in essence, based on capitulation). 
Ratzinger is clear, however, in placing the primary 
responsibility for cultivating the spiritual foundation of society on the 
Church and Christians. Id.  See also JOSEPH RATZINGER, Freedom, 
Law, and the Good, in VALUES IN A TIME OF UPHEAVAL 52 (2006) 
(emphasizing the public task of Christian churches in that they must be 
free “to address the freedom of all human beings so the moral forces of 
history may remain forces in the present”); JOSEPH RATZINGER, 
Biblical Aspects of the Question of Faith and Politics, in CHURCH, 
ECUMENISM & POLITICS: NEW ESSAYS IN ECCLESIOLOGY, supra note 
12, at 147, 151 [hereinafter Ratzinger, Biblical Aspects] (The core 
responsible political activity is to nurture public acceptance of the 
validity of morality and God’s commandments.). 
159
 See, e.g., Ratzinger, Political Stance, supra note 13, at 161-62 
(noting that “[w]here the Church itself becomes the state, freedom 
becomes lost.”  But freedom is also lost when the Church is precluded 
from being a public and publically relevant authority).  
160
 See, e.g., JOSEPH RATZINGER, Conscience in Its Age, in CHURCH, 
ECUMENISM & POLITICS: NEW ESSAYS IN ECCLESIOLOGY, supra note 
12, at 165, 174 [hereinafter Ratzinger, Conscience] (noting that, by 
altering the ancient practice of state authority over religion, Jesus set a 
limit to earthly authority and proclaimed the freedom of the person that 
transcends all political systems); Ratzinger, Biblical Aspects, supra 
note 158, at 148-49; JOSEPH RATZINGER, Searching for Peace, in 
VALUES IN A TIME OF UPHEAVAL 114 (2006). 
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  But Church and State have a common moral 
responsibility based on the essence of man and the essence 
of justice.
162
  Thus, although politics is the realm of reason, 
Ratzinger emphasizes that political reason must include 
moral reason.
163
  Further, it cannot be limited to mere 
technological and calculating reason, a reason that has cut 
off its historical roots, namely, the basic memory of 
mankind.
164
  Because of modernity’s self-imposed 
narrowing of reason, the evidential character of a 
fundamental intuition common to all the great cultures has 
been eroded, namely, the conviction regarding: 
 
[T]he doctrine of objective 
values expressed in the Being 
of the world; the belief that 
attitudes exist that correspond 
to the message of the universe 
and are true and therefore 
good, and that other attitudes 
                                                 
161
 See, e.g., JOSEPH RATZINGER, Searching for Peace, in VALUES IN A 
TIME OF UPHEAVAL 22-24 (2006).. 
162
 See, e.g., id. at 114.  Ratzinger frequently explains that the essence 
of justice depends on a universal criterion, as opposed to merely 
pragmatic criteria determined by the group or by majority vote.  See, 
e.g., Ratzinger, A Turning Point, supra note 11, at 133-37 (noting that, 
in Greek and Roman philosophy of the state, a state that constructs 
justice only on the basis of majority opinions sinks down to the level of 
the “robber band”).  
163
 See, e.g., JOSEPH RATZINGER, NEED ARTICLE NAME, in VALUES 
IN A TIME OF UPHEAVAL 24 (2006); Ratzinger, A Christian Orientation, 
supra note 12, 216-17. 
164
 See, e.g., JOSEPH RATZINGER, CHRISTIANITY AND THE CRISIS OF 
CULTURES 36-43 (2006) (explaining the confused ideology of freedom 
that has resulted from modern philosophy’s tendency to limit reason to 
what is considered objectively verifiable fact, and to see issues only in 
terms of feasibility, functionality, and effectiveness and characterizing 
such an approach to reasoning as being radically opposed to all other 
historical cultures of humanity). 
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likewise exist that are 
genuinely and always false 
because they contradict Being. 
. . . [and thus] the conviction 
that man’s Being contains an 
imperative; the conviction that 
he does not himself invent 
morality on the basis of 
calculations of expediency but 
rather finds it already present 




In governing, the State should make full use of reason’s 
capacity to discern the moral message—the intelligible 
meaning—within creation.  And, in doing so, the State 
should recognize that the discernment process is greatly 
assisted by the insights of faith.
166
    
For its part, the Church’s primary role is to 
evangelize and bring about the inner conversion of 
                                                 
165
 Ratzinger, A Turning Point, supra note 11, at 34-36 (emphasis in 
original). 
166
 Ratzinger explains that modernity’s self-limitation of reason has 
meant that what is most specific to man—moral reasoning—has been 
unjustifiably delimited to the subjective realm.  He notes that, in reality, 
reason can perceive more than quantitative facts.  Creation reveals a 
moral message that is discernible by use of reason, especially when 
assisted by faith and when it draws upon the experience of human 
existence over time.  Full use of moral reasoning is reasoning in the 
highest sense. The imposed limitation of reason to quantifiable facts 
precludes the scientific method from attaining its aim of garnering 
knowledge most in accord with reality; and, conversely, full use of 
reason’s capabilities will more readily attain knowledge in accord with 
reality.  Thus, “the great ethical insights of mankind are just as rational 
and just as true as—indeed, more true than—the experimental 
knowledge of the realm of the natural sciences and technology.  They 
are more true, because they touch more deeply the essential character 
of Being and have a more decisive significance for the humanity of 
man.”  Id. at 37-42. 
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individuals.  The political and economic running of society 
is not a direct part of the Church’s mission, but Jesus 
“entrusted to [the Church] the word of truth which is 
capable of enlightening consciences.”
167
  The power of the 
Gospel, as lived by convicted Christians, can “penetrate[] 
the human community and its history,” thereby purifying 
and sustaining a culture of life consistent with the 
Beatitudes.
168
  This includes nurturing the idea of 
conscience as recognition of man as creation, thereby 
fostering respect for the Creator in man as opposed to the 
more common notion of conscience being a wholly 
independent internal forum for deciding what is good or 
evil.
169
  But the Church in various institutional forms, and 
especially in and through the activities of individuals, can 
and also must make claims and demands on public law.
170
   
                                                 
167
 ICFL, supra note 44, at #61. 
168
 Id. at #62. See also ICATL, supra not 44, at ch. XI, #8 (“[I]t is only 
by making appeal to the ‘moral potential’ of the person and to the 
constant need for interior conversion, that social change will be brought 
about which will be truly in the service of man.  For it will only be in 
the measure that they collaborate freely in these necessary changes 
through their own initiative and in solidarity, that people, awakened to 
a sense of their responsibility, will grow in humanity.  The inversion of 
morality and structures is steeped in a materialist anthropology which is 
incompatible with the dignity of mankind”). 
169
 See Ratzinger, Conscience, supra note 160, at 169-70 (quoting 
Reinhold Schneider: “Conscience is knowledge of responsibility for the 
whole of creation and before him who has made it.”).  Ratzinger agrees 
that a person must follow a clear verdict of conscience, but stresses that 
this must be understood in conjunction with the reality that conscience 
cannot be identified with a person’s subjective certainty about himself 
and his moral conduct (this would in fact enslave persons by making 
them dependent on prevailing opinions of the day), and also that 
conscience can err.  See JOSEPH RATZINGER, If You Want Peace. . . , in 
VALUES IN A TIME OF UPHEAVAL 75-100 (2006). 
170
 See Ratzinger, Political Stance, supra note 13, at 163 (noting that 
“the Church cannot simply retreat into the private sphere”).  In 
addition, the Church has societal function.  As explained by Ratzinger 
in Introduction to Christianity, the Church and being Christian relate to 
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In making demands on the public law, however, 
Ratzinger emphasizes the need to focus on essential core 
values bearing on freedom.  This is the second key 
principle to keep in mind in carrying out the exchange 
between politics and faith.  It is an important way of 
preventing overreaching that would upset a proper Church-
State balance.  At times Ratzinger points to certain core 
essentials, namely, human dignity and human rights 
grounded in man as the image of God; marriage, and 
family, grounded in the truth of the human person; and 
reverence for God and to that which is holy to other 
persons.
171
  More often, Ratzinger points to the Decalogue 
as a starting point, because it constitutes a “sublime 
expression” of moral reason and, as such, coincides in 
many ways with the great ethical traditions of other 
religions.
172
  To Ratzinger, respect for the Creator in man 
entails living “as an answer – as a response to what we are 
in truth.”
173
  And the Decalogue, with its origin from the 
Creator, is a “self-presentation and self-exhibition of God,” 
and thus a “luminous manifestation of his truth.”
174
  
Notably, he stresses the need to continually unfold the 
meaning of the Decalogue, recognizing that coming to 
appreciate the whole of the truth requires an active process 
in which “reason’s entire quest for the criteria of our 
                                                                                                 
the fact that each human must work out his freedom within the 
“framework of the already existing whole of human life that stamps and 
molds him;” their purpose is “to save history as history and to break 
through or transform the collective grid that forms the site of human 
existence.”  Ratzinger, Introduction, supra note 77, 247-48. 
171
 See, e.g., JOSEPH RATZINGER, Europe’s Identity, in VALUES IN A 
TIME OF UPHEAVAL 147-49 (2006). 
172
 See JOSEPH RATZINGER, To Change or Preserve, in VALUES IN A 
TIME OF UPHEAVAL 29 (2006).  
173
 See Ratzinger, Truth and Freedom, supra note 26, at 349-51. 
174
 Id.  
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responsibility truly comes into its own.”
175
  To Ratzinger, 
this is simply part and parcel of Christianity’s synthesis of 
faith and reason: reason needs faith, but faith also, precisely 
as faith, must work in conjunction with reason.
176
     
Ratzinger also is convinced that judicious use of 
core Christian insights and values to inform the ordering of 
relationships in society helps maintain full consistency with 
notions of tolerance.  His reasoning on this issue has two 
aspects to it.  First, Ratzinger has explained that use of 
Christian insights as the inviolable point of reference for 
law and justice in society should not be considered an 
unjust imposition of values.  The insights reflect the 
intelligibility in things or the meaning or truth in Creation.  
And, as explained by Ratzinger, there is in man—at the 
ontological level—an expectation of sorts, a primal 
knowledge or remembrance of the good and true that needs 
help from without to become aware of its own self.
177
  This 
is the ontological level of the human conscience.  He 
explains:  
 
This anamnesis of our origin, 
resulting from the fact that our 
being is constitutively in 
keeping with God, is not a 
                                                 
175
 Id. (noting that freedom is enhanced by heightened awareness of 
responsibility—living in response to what the human being is in truth—
which entails being guided by the Decalogue, unfolded in rational 
understanding). 
176
 Ratzinger has explained the relationship between faith and reason as 
follows: “[F]aith demands and reveals reason, understands itself as the 
environment of reason, so that faith is not correct if the insights to 
which it leads are not at least rudimentarily reasonable, while on the 
other hand reason cuts the ground from beneath its feet if it does away 
with faith.”  Ratzinger, Political Stance, supra note 13, at 158. 
177
 JOSEPH RATZINGER, If You Want Peace: Conscience and Truth, in 
VALUES IN A TIME OF UPHEAVAL 90-95 (2006) (explaining the classical 
concept of synderesis as anamnesis of the Creator existing at the 
ontological level of conscience). 
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knowledge articulated in 
concepts, a treasure store of 
retrievable contents.  It is an 
inner sense, a capacity for 
recognition, in such a way that 
the one addressed recognizes 
in himself an echo of what is 
said to him.  If he does not 
hide from his own self, he 
comes to the insight: this is 
the goal toward which my 
whole being tends, this is 
where I want to go.  This 
anamnesis of the Creator, 
which is identical with the 
foundations of our existence, 
is the reason that mission is 
both possible and justified.
178
   
 
This primal knowledge, of course, can become distorted or 
greatly weakened by culture.  Nonetheless, when the 
Church or others present and explain Christian values, it 
can spark recognition.  This is not an imposition, but, 
rather, there is a fusion that activates the capacity to receive 
the truth.
179
   
Second, because Christian insights and values are 
grounded in Love, their use as the inviolable reference 
should not lead to inappropriate intolerance for other 
perspectives.  Rather, as explained by Ratzinger, the surest 
guarantee of tolerance is the identity of Truth and Love.  
On the one hand this means that, in an appropriate praxis of 
freedom, the evangelical mission of the Church and 
Christians will be carried out with Love, which necessarily 
implies respect for religious liberty freedom in civil 
                                                 
178
 Id. at 92. 
179
 Id. at 92-94.  
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  On a deeper level, however, the identity of 
Truth and Love suggests that typical notions of tolerance 
reflect confusion about the meaning of genuine human 
freedom.  The typical idea of tolerance is that it is the 
attitude of respect for the views of others that safeguards 
freedom.
181
  From the Christian perspective of human 
freedom, it is the use of core Christian values or insights as 
a point of reference for law and justice that is itself the 
safeguard for freedom.  Tolerance is simply the appropriate 
attitude to have since matters of conscience should not be 
coerced.  This is a subtle but real distinction.  The 
persuasiveness of Ratzinger’s view—as to both aspects of 
notions of tolerance—is tied to careful and prudent use of 
essential core values.    
                                                 
180
 See JOSEPH RATZINGER, TRUTH AND TOLERANCE: CHRISTIAN 
BELIEF AND WORLD RELIGIONS 231 (Henry Taylor trans., Ignatius 
Press 1st Am. ed. 2004). See also Letter from Benedict XVI, Supreme 
Pontiff, to the Bishops, Priests, and Deacons; Men and Women 
Religious; and all the Lay Faithful on Christian Love,  (June 29, 2009) 
(on file with author), available at 
http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/benedict_xvi/encyclicals/documents
/hf_ben-xvi_enc_20090629_caritas-in-veritate_en.html, at #2 (noting 
that “[t]ruth needs to be sought, found and expressed with the 
‘economy’ of charity, but charity in its turn needs to be understood, 
confirmed and practiced in the light of the truth”). See also Declaration 
on Religious Freedom  (DIGNITATIS HUMANAE): On the Right of the 
Person and of Communities to Social and Civil Freedom in Matters 
Religious), promulgated by Pope Paul VI, December 7, 1965 (available 
at 
http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/docume
nts/vat-ii_decl_19651207_dignitatis-humanae_en.html) (last accessed 
4/28/2014). 
181
 For example, in a law review article calling for the abandonment of 
the neutrality principle, Dean Steven Smith explains that the 
“restoration of tolerance” as a “respectable attitude” is justified.  He 
explains that tolerance – respect for the views of those who disagree 
with the substantive values selected by society – will protect their 
liberty.  See Steven D. Smith, The Restoration of Tolerance, 78 Calif. 
L. Rev. 305 (1990). 
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Ratzinger has thus addressed the major concerns 
that relate to use of core Christian insights as the inviolable 
standard in a pluralistic democratic society.  The Christian 
vision, when fully and properly understood, remains 




A key purpose of this article has been to explain, in 
a comprehensive way, a well-reasoned alternative 
perspective of human freedom that brings to light the fact 
that the doctrine of neutrality presents a real obstacle to 
freedom in democratic society.  A sound argument exists to 
support the claim that liberty and justice in society depend 
on state recognition of, and prudent use of, core Christian 
values in lawmaking and policy-making.
182
   A strong case 
has been made that judgments concerning the ends in life 
worthy of pursuit are not solely subjective.  Rather, 
freedom is an integral aspect of the human person, and, 
thus, how freedom is used matters.  The heart of the 
message is that Christian values have their origin from the 
transcendent and, more specifically, from the Creator of 
humanity and the world.  As such, these values are 
necessarily consistent with the meaning or intelligibility in 
creation and will thereby promote genuine human freedom.  
Personal choices about how to live do matter, and it should 
be permissible for the State—through prudent adherence to 
core values—to foster a culture in which persons can more 
readily live in a genuinely human way.   
                                                 
182
 It is appropriate to reiterate that this would not necessarily mean a 
return to state practices struck down by the Court due to Establishment 
Clause concerns.  Past reliance on Christian values in fashioning laws 
may not always have been “prudent” and may have involved values 
beyond the realm appropriately considered “core values.”  Cf. 
Ratzinger, A Christian Orientation, supra note 12, at 212 (noting that 
Christians have at times in the past expected too much from the 
“earthly city”).  
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From this alternative perspective, the essence of 
human freedom is being receptive to God the Creator, and 
acting consistent with the pattern impressed on the human 
spirit by virtue of being a creature of God.
183
  This view of 
freedom is of course intimately bound-up with belief in 
God.  But the counter-perspective—the view associated 
with the radial philosophy of freedom and, ultimately, the 
principle of liberal neutrality—similarly has a theological 
basis, namely, the rejection of belief in God the Creator.
184
  
A rejection that is played out by the banishment of ideas 
related to religion and morality to the subjective realm.
185
   
Indeed, in Christianity and the Crisis of Cultures, Ratzinger 
emphasized that the ultimate divide in contemporary 
society rests on the question of the existence of God:    
  
The real antagonism typical of 
today’s world is not that 
between diverse religious 
cultures; rather, it is the 
antagonism between the 
                                                 
183
 Indeed, Ratzinger has stated that “[i]f there is no longer any 
obligation to which [man] can and must respond in freedom, then there 
is no longer any realm of freedom at all.”  Ratzinger, A Turning Point, 
supra note 11, at 41. 
184
 Ratzinger has explained that behind the radical philosophy of 
freedom “there stands a programme which must ultimately be labeled 
theological: God is no longer recognized as a reality standing over 
against man, but instead man may himself or herself become what he or 
she imagines a divinity would be if it existed. . . .”  Ratzinger, Freedom 
and Liberation, supra note 24, at 260.  
185
 See, e.g., Ratzinger, A Turning Point, supra note 11, at 33-41 
(noting that the consequence of materialism and the narrowing of 
reason is that “[m]orality, just like religion, now belongs to the realm of 
the subjective.  If it is subjective, then it is something posited by man.  
It does not precede vis-à-vis us: we precede it and fashion it.  This 
movement of [separating the world of feelings and the world of facts] . 
. . essentially knows no limits. . . . Calculation rules, and power rules.  
Morality has surrendered.”). 
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radical emancipation of man 
from God, from the roots of 
life, on the one hand, and the 
great religious cultures, on the 
other.  If we come to 
experience a clash of cultures . 
. . . [it] will be between this 
radical emancipation of man 
and the great historical 
cultures.  Accordingly, [the 
strategy of using constitutions 
to keep God out of the public 
realm] is not the expression of 
tolerance that wishes to 
protect the non-theistic 
religions and the dignity of 
atheists and agnostics; rather, 
it is the expression of a 
consciousness that would like 
to see God eradicated once 
and for all from the public life 
of humanity and shut up in the 
subjective sphere of cultural 
residues from the past.  In this 
way relativism, which is the 
starting point of the whole 
process, becomes a 
dogmatism that believes itself 
in possession of the definitive 
knowledge of human reason, 
with the right to consider 
everything else merely as a 
stage in human history that is 
basically obsolete and 
deserves to be relativized.  In 
reality, this means that we 
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have need of roots if we are to 
survive and that we must not 
lose sight of God if we do not 
want human dignity to 
disappear.
186
     
 
This is strong language from a respected political thinker, 
and the relativism of which he speaks is simply another 
way of discussing neutrality.  In the Crisis of Cultures and 
other writings, Ratzinger has addressed the reasonableness 
of belief in creation
187
 and the reasonableness of faith.
188
  
                                                 
186
 JOSEPH RATZINGER, CHRISTIANITY AND THE CRISIS OF CULTURES 44 
(2006) (The phrase “the strategy of using constitutions to keep God out 
of the public realm” was substituted for the phrase “the refusal to refer 
to God in the Constitution,” in which Ratzinger was referring to the 
European constitution).   
187
 For example, Ratzinger has explained that belief in Creation is 
reasonable, and, further, that “even from the perspective of the data of 
the natural sciences it is the ‘better hypothesis,’ offering a fuller and 
better explanation than any of the other theories.”  See Ratzinger, God 
the Creator, supra note 82, at 17.  In the second homily, Ratzinger 
explains that the scientific-based theories hinge on the entire ensemble 
of nature arising out of errors and dissonances and that some scientists 
acknowledge the absurdness of the theories but, nonetheless, cannot 
break out of the scientific mindset because “the scientific method 
demands that a question not be permitted to which the answer would 
have to be God.”  Ratzinger, The Meaning, supra note 82, at 22-25. 
188
 In Crisis of Cultures, Ratzinger explains that science cannot prove 
that God does not exist, and, if a person searches for God, certainty can 
be reached as to God’s existence.  The assurance arises in part the way 
faith in other aspects of a technology-based society arises:  we place 
trust in others who are qualified, credible and have knowledge when 
the validity of that trust is verified in daily experiences.  A relationship 
with God always involves relationship with other humans.  Over time, 
the living encounter with others that is inherently part of faith (the 
encounter with God and other humans) leads to certainty.  Faith is 
transformed to knowledge.  “The experience builds and comes to 
possess an evidentiary character that assures us.”  JOSEPH RATZINGER, 
CHRISTIANITY AND THE CRISIS OF CULTURES 79-82, 103-110 (2006).  
Ratzinger notes that seeking knowledge of God is not irrational.   
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In light of the failures of the modern political freedom 
movements and the thorough and well-reasoned case 
supporting the prudent use of core Christian values in 
democratic society, it is reasonable to conclude that a more 
moderate use of neutrality principles will better safeguard 





























                                                                                                 
Rather, what is being sought is actually the very foundation of 
rationality.  Id. at 89-90. 
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STUDENT SHOWCASE ARTICLE 
 
Incorporating the Lonely Star:  How Puerto Rico 
Became Incorporated and Earned a Place in the 






In the prosecution of the war 
against . . . Spain by the 
people of the United States in 
the cause of liberty, justice, 
and humanity, its military 
forces have come to occupy 
the island of Puerto Rico. 
They come bearing the 
banner of freedom. . . . They 
bring you the fostering arm 
of a free people, whose 
greatest power is in its justice 
and humanity to all those 




Major General Nelson A. Miles, Commander of U.S. 
Forces in Puerto Rico, in a proclamation issued in 1898 





                                                 
1
 Mr. Santana is a third-year law student at the University of Tennessee 
College of Law and a native of Puerto Rico. He thanks his wife Kara 
for her support, and Professor Ben Barton for his encouragement and 
guidance in researching and writing this paper.    
2
 FRENCH ENSOR CHADWICK, THE RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 
AND SPAIN: THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR, Vol. II, 297 (1911). 
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On November 7, 2012, Americans all around the 
nation celebrated or bemoaned the result of the quadrennial 
presidential election.  Meanwhile, a historic vote in Puerto 
Rico to reject the existing status of the island went largely 
unnoticed in the rest of the United States.
3
  Popular 
indifference towards Puerto Rico and the other American 
territories was not always the rule.  In fact, the election of 
1900 was largely decided on the issue of what to do with 
the new American possessions,
4
 and a series of Supreme 
Court decisions, later collectively named the INSULAR 
CASES, were front and center in the national dialogue 
during the early twentieth century.
5
 
While largely unknown today, the Insular Cases are 
immensely significant because they created a dichotomy of 
                                                 
3
 When asked whether voters supported the present territorial status of 
the island, fifty-four percent of voters voted “No.” A large majority of 
registered voters, seventy-seven percent, participated in the vote. 
PUERTO RICO ELECTIONS COMMISSION, PRESENT FORM OF 




 The territories in question at the time of the 1900 election were the 
four islands ceded to the United States pursuant to the treaty ending the 
Spanish-American War—Cuba, Guam, the Philippines, and Puerto 
Rico. A Treaty of Peace between the United States and Spain, 30 Stat. 
1754.  Modern American territories include Puerto Rico, the U.S. 
Virgin Islands, Guam, American Samoa, and the Northern Mariana 
Islands. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, DEPENDENCIES AND AREAS OF 
SPECIAL SOVEREIGNTY, available at 
http://www.state.gov/s/inr/rls/10543.htm. 
5
 Although the exact list of Insular Cases is debated, for the purposes of 
this paper, the Insular Cases include: Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 
298 (1922), De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1 (1901), Goetze v. United 
States, 182 U.S. 221 (1901), Dooley v. United States, 182 U.S. 222 
(1901), Armstrong v. United States, 182 U.S. 243 (1901), Downes v. 
Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901), and Huus v. N.Y. and Porto Rico 
Steamship Co., 182 U.S. 392 (1901). 
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status—a novel concept at the time—for American 
territories under the Constitution’s Territorial Clause.
6
  
Under the Insular Cases, territories are classified as either 
incorporated or unincorporated.  Incorporated territories are 
nascent states, while unincorporated territories are subject 
to the plenary power of Congress in perpetuity unless 
Congress changes the territory’s status.
7
  This principle, 
enshrined in law by the same Fuller Court that framed the 
infamous separate-but-equal doctrine, is known as the 
territorial incorporation doctrine.   
While the public debate over whether the United 
States, a nation born of anti-colonial fever, could itself 
become an imperial power has largely subsided, its 
consequences live on today.  Although the issues raised by 
the territorial incorporation doctrine are of consequence to 
all modern American territories, most discussion of these 
issues is centered on Puerto Rico—by far the largest 
American territory, both in size and population.
8
  
The chief premise behind the doctrine of territorial 
incorporation is that, because territories are “subject to the 
sovereignty of and []owned by the United States,” they are 
not foreign in the “international sense. . . . [but are] foreign 
                                                 
6
 The Territorial Clause of the Constitution reads: “The Congress shall 
have power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations 
respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United 
States.”  U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. 
7
 The Court held that because “incorporation is not to be assumed 
without express declaration, or an implication so strong as to exclude 
any other view,” Congress did not incorporate Puerto Rico by granting 
Puerto Ricans citizenship. Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 306 
(1922). 
8
 At nearly 4 million residents, the population of Puerto Rico far 
surpasses that of the other territories.  In comparison, the next highest 
populated territory has a total population of 181,000. U.S. CENSUS 
BUREAU, ESTIMATED RESIDENT POPULATION WITH PROJECTIONS 
available at 
http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2012/tables/12s1313.pdf.   
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to the United States in a domestic sense.”
9
  In reaching this 
decision, the Court was influenced heavily by a series of 
Harvard Law Review articles, many of which were open in 
their paternalism, and sometimes contempt, for the 
inhabitants of the new possessions.
10
 
The true significance behind the doctrine of 
territorial incorporation as a constitutional principle is that 
the doctrine placed the new territories outside a traditional 
territorial transition process that was older than the 
Constitution itself.  The territory-to-state process was first 
conceived by the Congress of the Confederation of the 
United States through the Northwest Ordinance of 1787.
11
  
The ordinance itself influenced the drafting of the 
Territorial Clause of the Constitution during the 
Philadelphia Convention.  This ordinance was later 
amended to be compatible with the new Constitution by the 
First Congress of the United States and signed into law by 
George Washington in 1789.  Although the Northwest 
Ordinance was explicitly drafted to govern only the modern 
Midwest (then known as the Northwest Territory), with few 
                                                 
9
 Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 341 (1901) (White, J., concurring).  
10
 For the five contemporary articles discussing the legal disposition of 
the American possessions see Simeon E. Baldwin, The Constitutional 
Questions Incident to the Acquisition of Government by the United 
States of Island Territories, 12 HARV. L. REV. 393 (1899); C.C. 
Langdell, The Status of Our New Territories, 12 HARV. L. REV. 365 
(1899); Abbott Lawrence Lowell, The Status of Our New Possessions: 
A Third View, 13 HARV. L. REV. 155 (1899); James B. Thayer, Our 
New Possessions, 12 HARV. L. REV. 464 (1899); Carman F. Randolph, 
Constitutional Aspects of Annexation, 12 HARV. L. REV. 291 (1890). 
Mr. Baldwin, for example, did not attempt to clothe his contempt for 
the residents of the new American possessions, openly describing 
citizens of Puerto Rico as “ignorant and lawless brigands that 
infest[ed]” the island.  Baldwin, supra note 10, at 451. 
11
GRUPO DE INVESTIGADORES PUERTORRIQUEÑOS, BREAKTHROUGH 
FROM COLONIALISM, 
VOL. I., at Loc. 639 (Kindle ed. 2012) [hereinafter STATEHOOD 
STUDY]. 
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exceptions each subsequent territory followed the same 




The Northwest Ordinance transition-to-statehood 
process can be broken down into three steps.
13
  First, 
Congress appoints a governor, secretary, and judiciary to 
administer the territory.  The territorial governor and 
judiciary establish laws to govern the territory, and these 
laws are subject to congressional oversight.
14
  In phase two, 
the territory establishes a more representative form of 
government where the territorial citizens elect a house of 
representatives, while the governor and a new upper 
chamber remain appointed by Congress.
15
  This upper 
chamber, the Legislative Council, is appointed from names 
submitted by the territorial legislature.  During this stage, 
the legislature also elects a non-voting delegate to 
Congress.  The third stage requires a fully republican form 
of government and mandates admission to the union as a 
matter of right.
16
  The people of Puerto Rico expected to 
follow this process after the island came under the 
sovereignty of the United States, but to date Puerto Rico 
continues to exist not as a nation or a state, but as a territory 
or possession—a quasi-colony of the United States.
17
  
                                                 
12
 Thirty one-states joined the Union following the process set out by 
the Northwest Ordinance, the most recent being the former Territory of 
Hawaii.  In fact, only the original thirteen colonies and the states of 
Kentucky (ceded from Virginia), Vermont (independent), Maine (ceded 
from Massachusetts), West Virginia (ceded from Virginia), Texas 
(independent) and California (U.S. Military rule post-Mexican 
American War) joined the Union through a process other than that 
established by the Northwest Ordinance. STATEHOOD STUDY, supra 
note 11, at loc. 929.  
13








 EDGARDO MELÉNDEZ, PUERTO RICO’S STATEHOOD MOVEMENT, 2-12 
(Bernard K. Johnpoll ed., 1988). 
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America won Puerto Rico after a thirteen-day 
military campaign.  A force of 3,415 American soldiers 
encountered little opposition and were instead greeted by 
Puerto Ricans with cheers of: “¡Viva Puerto Rico 
[A]mericano!”
18
  Even prior to the invasion, a strong 
annexationist movement existed because the United States 
was, as it is today, the main export market for Puerto 
Rico’s goods, and also because of an attraction to 
America’s classical liberal governing philosophy.
19
  Puerto 
Rico’s pre-invasion annexationist movement actually aided 
the invasion force in selecting its initial targets and 
provided assistance to the U.S. military as it moved through 
the island.
20
  Because of the annexationist movement’s 
involvement in the invasion of Puerto Rico, expectations 
were high that the invasion would in time lead to the island 
joining the several states as a full member of the union.  
The annexationist movement transitioned to a statehood 




Among the modern political parties on the island, 
the pro-statehood New Progressive Party can trace its 
philosophical roots back to the Republican Party of Puerto 




  Early actions taken by 
the United States on the island—the passing of an Organic 
                                                 
18
 Id. at 21. 
19
 Id. at 17-18. 
20
 Id. at 20-21. 
21
 The Republican Party of Puerto Rico was founded on July 4, 1899 
and sought the “definitive and sincere annexation” of Puerto Rico to the 
United States with the goal of the island’s eventual admission as a state.  
Id. at 36. 
22
 Partido Nuevo Progresista in Spanish (PNP). The modern PNP 
organization has its technical roots in the Partido Estadista Republicano 
(PER) of the 1960’s, but the intellectual father of Puerto Rico’s 
statehood movement is José Celso Barbosa who founded the 
Republican Party of Puerto Rico in 1899.  
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 the establishment of Federal Courts in the 
island, a series of economic reforms, and later the 
wholesale grant of American citizenship to those living 
(and born thereafter) in Puerto Rico—fanned the hopes of 
annexation on the island.  The Supreme Court has 
periodically dashed those hopes ever since.
24
 
The legal issues presented by Puerto Rico and the 
other territories acquired by the United States at the turn of 
the twentieth century were novel and thus ripe for Supreme 
Court review.
25
  For the first time, the United States 
assumed sovereignty over land not only non-contiguous to 
its existing states and territories, but also over culturally 
distinct peoples with little connection to Anglo-American 
tradition.
26
  In some ways, these issues remain unresolved 
today, as the territories still exist in an ambiguous, 
perpetual, quasi-colonial status.  
At first, however, the issue of Puerto Rico’s status 
appeared more certain.  When Congress passed an organic 
act for Puerto Rico in 1900, it seemed to have placed 
Puerto Rico on the track to statehood.  The Act created a 
territorial government to succeed the military commission 
that governed the island since its invasion and created the 
office of Resident Commissioner, a non-voting delegate to 
the House of Representatives.
27
  This organic act largely 
                                                 
23
 31 Stat. 77 (1900). 
24
 Meléndez, supra note 17 at 33-34. 
25
 The imperialism debate refers generally to a national conversation 
that took place at the turn of the century, but specifically to the election 
of 1900.  DUKE UNIVERSITY PRESS, FOREIGN IN A DOMESTIC SENSE 
PUERTO RICO, AMERICAN EXPANSION AND THE CONSTITUTION 4 
(Christina Duffy Burnett & Blake Marshall eds. 2001) [Hereinafter 
Burnett]. 
26
 Although the former Mexican colonies of California, New Mexico, 
and the Republic of Texas were largely populated by distinct cultural 
and ethnic peoples, a large population of American immigrants already 
resided in these locales.  
27
 31 Stat. 77 (1900). 
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mirrored the organic acts of the other territories that 
followed the Northwest Ordinance path to statehood, and 
mostly parallels the first phase of that process.
28
 
Meanwhile, one of the main issues of the 
presidential election of 1900 was whether the Constitution 
extended in full force to the newly acquired territories.  
McKinley, an imperialist who argued that the Constitution 
did not necessarily extend to the new territories, won the 
election.  Shortly thereafter the Supreme Court adopted this 
position in the Insular Cases.
29
 
The Supreme Court announced the territorial 
incorporation doctrine in Downes v. Bidwell.
30
  The case 
centered on a shipment of oranges from Puerto Rico to 
New York.  Under the Organic Act of Puerto Rico, goods 
from Puerto Rico were subject to the same fees and duties 
as good from foreign countries, but the fees were 
discounted by eighty-five percent.
31
  Mr. Downes paid the 
import duties under protest and sued for a refund.  The 
lawsuit argued that since Puerto Rico was not a foreign 
country, the Uniformity Clause prohibited these fees.
32
  Mr. 
Downes relied on a then-recent court decision that held 
Puerto Rico and the other territories ceded to the United 
States pursuant to the Treaty of Paris had ceased to be 
foreign countries.
33
  The Court framed the issue in the case 
as whether the “revenue clauses of the Constitution extend 
of their own force to our newly acquired territories.”
34
 
Declaring without discussion that “[t]he 
Constitution itself does not answer the question,” the Court 
then crafted an extraconstitutional answer to the question 
                                                 
28
 31 Stat. 77 (1900); Statehood Study, supra note 11 at loc. 929. 
29
 Burnett, supra note 25 at 4. 
30
 Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901). 
31




 The case Mr. Downes relied upon is another one of the Insular Cases: 
De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1 (1901). 
34
 Downes, 182 U.S. at 249. 
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  The Court discussed the history of the 
Northwest Ordinance and the Territorial Clause of the 
Constitution, but focused most of its analysis distinguishing 
the Treaty of Paris from the Louisiana Purchase Treaty and 
the Joint Resolution Annexing the Republic of Hawaii.  
Interestingly, after analyzing the Louisiana Purchase and 
noting that the treaty explicitly provided that the people of 
this territory were to be guaranteed the “enjoyment of all 
the rights, advantages, and immunities of citizens of the 
United States” as soon as possible, the Court declared that 
Congress “would [n]ever assent to the annexation of 
territory upon the condition that its inhabitants, however 
foreign they may be to our [culture], shall become at once 
citizens of the United States.”
36
  Ultimately, because the 
Court was “of [the] opinion that the power to acquire 
territory by treaty implies . . . [the power] to prescribe upon 
what terms the United States will receive its inhabitants, 
and what their status shall be in . . . the ‘American 
empire,’” and because the Treaty of Paris provided “‘that 
the civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants 
[of the ceded territory] . . . shall be determined by 
Congress,’” the Court held that the uniformity clause did 
not apply to Puerto Rico and its sister insular territories.
37
 
The Court’s brief discussion of the territorial 
inhabitants’ status in the “American Empire” implied 
initially that citizenship would alter the state of affairs. 
Indeed, the Court pointed out that if citizenship were 
granted to the inhabitants of the new territories and their 
“children thereafter born, whether savages or civilized” it 
would result in “extremely serious” consequences.
38
   The 
decision was silent on what these serious consequences 
                                                 
35
 Id.  
36
 Id. at 252, 280. 
37
 Id. at 279-80. 
38
 Id. at 279. 
114
Spring 2014| Volume 9 | Issue 3 
Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 442 
 
could be, but the use of the word “savages” certainly 
provides a vivid hint.   
Although Downes seemed to settle the issue of 
whether Puerto Rico was incorporated, and the 
consequences of this unincorporated status, the issue 
recurred.  In 1915, Congress amended the Judicial Code to 
extend federal appellate jurisdiction over the Supreme 
Courts of Puerto Rico and the Territory of Hawaii.
39
  In 
1917, Congress passed the Jones–Shafroth Act, which 
granted American Citizenship to all former Spanish 
subjects and their children living in Puerto Rico.
40
  The Act 
also established the Puerto Rican Senate and split up Puerto 
Rico’s government into legislative, executive, and judicial 
branches, thus mirroring state governments.
41
  Finally, the 
Act created the Federal District Court for the District of 
Puerto Rico and placed that new court under the appellate 
jurisdiction of the First Circuit Court of Appeals.  The Act 
also made Puerto Rico subject to all federal statutes.   
Many annexationists in Puerto Rico took these 
actions to mean that Congress was moving Puerto Rico 
from the traditional “phase one” of the Northwest 
Ordinance scheme to phase two of that process.  Implicit in 
this theory was the assumption that by making Puerto 
Ricans citizens and establishing a territorial government, 
Congress had in fact incorporated Puerto Rico into the 
union.   
The Supreme Court would disappoint 
annexationists once again.  Despite the breadth of the Jones 
Act, the Court again held that Puerto Rico was an 
unincorporated territory of the United States in Balzac v. 
Porto Rico.
42
  Balzac came to the Court upon a writ of error 
                                                 
39
 38 Stat. 803 §246 (1915). 
40
 The Jones Act (39 Stat. 951) provided a mechanism for Puerto 
Ricans to reject the grant of citizenship, only 288 did so.   
41
 39 Stat. 951 (1917). 
42
 Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1922). 
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from the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico.
43
  Mr. Balzac was 
a newspaper editor facing a charge of misdemeanor 
criminal libel.  He demanded a jury trial under the Sixth 
Amendment.  The district court declined.
44
  Asserting 
constitutional error, Mr. Balzac appealed to the Puerto 
Rican Supreme Court, which affirmed the lower court’s 
decision.  The defendant then appealed to the Supreme 
Court of the United States.
45
 
The Court held that extending American citizenship 
to the residents of Puerto Rico did not incorporate Puerto 
Rico into the United States, so the Court affirmed Mr. 
Balzac’s conviction.
46
  The Court declared that the Jones 
Act did not confer upon Puerto Ricans any additional right, 
other than the right to move to the mainland with the same 
rights and responsibilities as any other citizen.
47
  More 
specifically, the Court ruled without dissent that it is not the 
status of a person that determines the applicability of 
constitutional provisions, but locality.
48
 
The Court has not discussed the territorial 
incorporation doctrine in detail since.  Instead, it has relied 
on the doctrine to extend or deny constitutional rights to the 
residents of Puerto Rico and to analyze the constitutionality 
of various provisions of a myriad of federal statutes.   
On two occasions, however, the Court cast doubt on 
the continued validity of the doctrine.  First, the Court 
noted in Reid v. Covert, a case involving military 
servicemen overseas, that the scope of the Insular Cases 
was to facilitate the temporary government of the 
territories, and thus the doctrine did not have wider 
                                                 
43




 Id.  
46
 Only fundamental rights are extended to the unincorporated 
territories, and since at the time, a right to a jury trial was not deemed a 
fundamental right, this issue was dispositive. Id. at 306. 
47
 Id. at 308. 
48
 Id. at 309. 
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  Therefore, unless a century-old exercise of 
sovereignty and rule can be regarded as temporary, the 
doctrine no longer applies.   
Likewise, in Torres v. Puerto Rico, the Court 
decided that the protections of the Fourth Amendment 
extended to Puerto Rico.
50
  Justice Brennan’s concurrence, 
joined by three other Justices, argued that the Insular Cases 
were clearly not “authority” on the question of “the 
application of the Fourth Amendment – or any other 




The Court has also noted that it “may well be that 
over time the ties between the United States and any of its 
unincorporated territories strengthen in ways that are of 
constitutional significance.”
52
  The ties between Puerto 
Rico and the United States have indeed strengthened 
significantly since the Court decided the Insular Cases.  
Today, more Puerto Ricans reside in the mainland United 
States than in Puerto Rico;
53
 there is a Supreme Court 
Justice of Puerto Rican descent;
54
 and hundreds of 
                                                 
49
 354 U.S. 1, 14 (1957). 
50
 442 U.S. 465, 471 (1979). 
51
 Id. at 475-76 (Brennan, J., concurring).  
52
 Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 758 (2008) (discussing the 
Insular Cases to determine what constitutional rights extended to 
enemy combatants held prisoner in Guantanamo Bay). 
53
 4,623,716 Puerto Ricans resided in the United States as of the 2010 
Census, while the population of Puerto Rico was 3,725,789.  Census 
Bureau, The Hispanic Population: 2010, at 3 available at 
http://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/c2010br-04.pdf (last 
visited Feb. 15, 2013); Census Bureau, 2010 Census Interactive 
Population Search, available at 
http://www.census.gov/2010census/popmap/ipmtext.php?fl=72 (last 
visited Feb. 15, 2013).  
54
 Sheryl Stolberg, Woman in the News: Sotomayor, a Trailblazer and a 
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thousands of Puerto Ricans have served with distinction in 
the United States Armed Forces since the Spanish-
American war.
55
  With Puerto Ricans in prominent and 
visible roles at all levels of American society, Puerto 
Ricans are no more foreign to the United States than are 
New Yorkers, Texans, or Hawaiians.  
 
II. Statehood Historically 
 
The Constitution mentions new states only twice.  
The text of the New States Clause, Article 3 section 4, 
protects the geographic and political integrity of existing 
states.
56
  The clause requires consent from a state’s 
legislature for any cession of territory by a state for the 
formation of a new one, or the combination of several 
states for the same purpose.
57
  By negative implication, the 
clause is the only constitutional prescription for forming a 
new state.  The clause thus vests Congress with any other 
power to admit new states.  The New States Clause was 
born out of a perceived deficiency of the Articles of 
Confederation—the controversy surrounding the authority 




                                                 
55
 Statement by Anabelle Rodriguez, Secretary of Justice for the 
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, on the Bombing on Vieques, 
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/military/jan-june01/vieques_4-
27.html (last visited Feb. 1, 2013). 
56
 The New States Clause reads: “New States may be admitted by the 
Congress into this Union; but no new States shall be formed or erected 
within the Jurisdiction of any other State; nor any State be formed by 
the Junction of two or more States, or parts of States, without the 
Consent of the Legislatures of the States concerned as well as of the 
Congress.” U.S. CONST. art. IV, §3, cl. 1. 
57
 U.S. CONST. art. IV, §3, cl. 1. 
58
 Statehood Study, supra note 11 at loc. 787. See also THE FEDERALIST 
NO. 38 (James Madison). 
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The Northwest Ordinance of 1787, dealing with the 
disposition of the western territories, is regarded as among 
the most important acts of the Congress of the 
Confederation, second only to the convening of the 
Philadelphia Convention.
59
  The creation of architecture for 
the administration and disposition of these territories was 
no small feat.  This achievement was critical to the 
formation of the union, as the unclear status of the western 
territories almost derailed the ratification of the Articles of 
Confederation.
60
  The smaller landless states feared being 
overpowered in the union by the larger states with western 
lands and refused to ratify the Articles unless the larger 
states relinquished their claim over their unsettled western 
territories.
61
  It was not until the State of Virginia, under the 
leadership of Thomas Jefferson, agreed to cede its western 
territory to the Confederacy, and the other landed states 




Having solved the problem of ratification, the 
Congress of the Confederation was immediately faced with 
the urgent matter of what to do with the ceded territory.  
The Articles of Confederation were silent on the creation 
and admission of new states, so the Congress tried to craft a 
process.
63
  Several proposals emerged.  The earliest 
proposal treated the territories as colonies of the states that 
ceded each territory.
64
  However, fear of perpetual 
                                                 
59
 The Library of Congress, Primary Documents in American History 
Northwest Ordinance, 
http://www.loc.gov/rr/program/bib/ourdocs/northwest.html (last visited 
Mar. 1, 2013). 
60
 Statehood Study, supra note 11 at loc. 497 (noting that deadlock over 
the disposition of the western lands that many states laid claims to 
delayed ratification of the Articles of Confederation).  
61
 Id.  
62
 Id.  
63
 Id. at 510. 
64
 Id. at loc. 514. 
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ownership of these territories by the Confederacy became a 
strong concern, and the idea emerged for a compact 
between the states and the Confederacy that ensured self-
governance for the territorial colonies and guaranteed their 
eventual admission into the Union.
65
  This compact came to 
being as The Resolution of 1780, and it provided that the 
territory was to be “formed into distinct republican states, 
which shall become members of the federal union, and 
have the same rights of sovereign[ty] . . . as the other 
states.”
66
  The purpose of this compact was to preserve the 
rights of the states and prevent imperialism.
67
  Thus, 
through this compact, the Congress of the Confederacy 
would assume control over the territories for the explicit 
purpose of constituting new states.   
Shortly after the Congress passed the Resolution of 
1780, Thomas Paine proposed the creation of a new state, 
the state of Vandalia, in a region that today covers modern 
West Virginia, Kentucky, and parts of Pennsylvania.
68
  
Although the state was never formed, the Paine plan 
proposed transitional steps to statehood that were 
eventually paralleled by the Northwest Ordinance.   
A few years after Paine’s proposal, several 
Continental Army veterans led by General Rufus Putnam 
proposed forming a new state in modern-day Ohio by 
granting ownership of the land to veterans of the American 
Revolution and providing the veterans with farming 




 Congress of the Confederacy of the United States, 1780 Resolution 
on Public Lands, 
http://www.minnesotalegalhistoryproject.org/assets/1780%20Resolutio
n%20on%20Public%20Lands.pdf (last visited Feb. 20, 2013). 
67
 Statehood Study, supra note 11 at loc. 514.  
68
 George H. Alden, The Evolution of the American System of forming 
and Admitting New States into the Union, 18 ANNALS OF THE 
AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE 79, 83 
(1901) (detailing the Paine Plan).  
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  In return, this military state would provide 
for the defense of the union.  Richard Bland, a delegate 
from Virginia, proposed a similar plan that would reserve 
ten percent of the lands in the new states to benefit the 
Confederacy in its efforts to provide for the defense of the 
union and other public works.
70
  Both plans failed in 
Congress. 
Although the Paine, Putnam, and Bland plans were 
unsuccessful in the creation of new states, elements of each 
plan can be found in the foundation of America’s state-
making architecture, the Northwest Ordinance.  In 1784, 
Virginia presented the Confederacy with the Deed of 
Cession for its western territories and spurred action on the 
territories’ disposition in Congress.
71
  The same year, a 
committee led by Thomas Jefferson referred a plan to the 
Congress for the creation of sixteen curiously named new 
states.
72
 Congress passed this plan into law with only minor 
amendments.  The plan provided for an initial territorial 
government at the behest of settlers or through an order of 
Congress.  Once the population of a territory reached 
twenty thousand, its citizens could call a constitutional 
convention and form a state government.  This first version 
of the Northwest Ordinance prescribed certain parameters 
for the would-be state government structures, most notably 
a guaranteed republican form of government.  This 




The 1784 ordinance was never implemented, and a 
new ordinance was passed in 1785.  The second Northwest 
                                                 
69
 Id. at 84. 
70
 Id. at 85. 
71
 Statehood Study, supra note 11, at loc.580. 
72
 Jefferson would have named the new states: Sylvania, Michigania, 
Cherronesus, Assenisippia, Metropotaima, Illinoia, Saratoga, 
Washington, Polypotamia, and Pelisipia.  
73
 Statehood Study, supra note 11, at loc. 596. 
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Ordinance is only notable because it established the basic 
survey system of townships that ensured a more orderly 
settlement of the western lands.  A shift in leadership, from 
Jefferson to Monroe, and the emergence of powerful 
prospecting companies
74
 seeking to exploit the western 
territories moved Congress to expressly repeal the 
ordinance of 1784 and enact the Northwest Ordinance of 
1787.  Thus, the Northwest Ordinance of 1787 became the 
nation’s state formation system into the twentieth century.   
As stated above, the ordinance established a three-
stage process culminating on admission to the union as a 
matter of right.  Like the ordinance of 1874, it provided that 
the new states should enter the union subject to specific 
covenants.  It is also striking that the articles of compact 
between the Confederacy and the future states contained 
provisions strikingly similar to those that would become 




The Articles of the Confederacy failed to address 
many of the challenges that faced the nascent American 
nation.  Recognizing these weaknesses, Congress called for 
a constitutional convention.  The Framers convened in 
Philadelphia in May of 1787; the result was the 
Constitution of the United States.  After agreeing on more 
pressing issues such as the necessity for a stronger national 
government, how this government would be subdivided, 
and how the states were to be represented in this new 
national body politic, the convention turned its attention to 
the mechanisms for the management of the existing western 
territories and the admission of new states.  
This discussion about admission of new states 
focused on two main points: the silence of the Articles of 
Confederation on the subject and the existing Northwest 
                                                 
74
Specifically, the Ohio and Scioto prospecting companies. 
75
Id. at loc. 670. 
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  In many ways, the two foci of discussion 
were interrelated; while the wisdom of the territorial 
scheme created by the ordinances was fairly accepted, 
authority for the system’s creation was doubtful.  The 
convention delegates were faced with the choice of 
legitimizing the territorial scheme by crafting authority for 
Congress to enact it, or to strip the national government of 
its control over the lands ceded to the federal government 
by the states.
77
  The delegation from Virginia proposed 
granting the power to admit states to the Congress and 
submitted a draft resolution to that effect for consideration 
by convention delegates.  The delegates adopted the 
Virginia resolution as a working draft for this provision.
78
 
Beginning with the Virginia proposal, the Framers 
debated whether the new states would be admitted on equal 
footing as the original states and how to protect the existing 
states from being dismembered in order to reduce their 
influence.  Eventually, the drafters decided that unequal 
membership in the union was antithetical to the post-
colonial ideals the new nation was born out of, but agreed 
that the integrity of the existing states should be 
protected.
79
  Thus, the Virginia proposal was amended so 
that consent of a state would be necessary before it could 
be divided to form a new one.  The Framers borrowed 
language from the Northwest Ordinance of 1787 and the 
Resolution of 1780 to draft what became the New States 
Clause of the Constitution.  Having established authority 
                                                 
76
THE FEDERALIST NO. 38 (James Madison) (noting that the territorial 
system was conceived “without the least color of constitutional 
authority”). Curiously, the most influential of the land ordinances, the 
Northwest Ordinance of 1787, was passed while the constitutional 
convention was in session.  
77
 C. Perry Patterson, The Relation of the Federal Government to the 
Territories and the States in Landholding, 28 TEX. L. REV. 43, 57-58 
(1949).  
78
 Statehood Study, supra note 11, at loc. 812. 
79
Id. at loc. 845. 
123
Spring 2014| Volume 9 | Issue 3 
Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 451 
 
for Congress to admit new states, the convention turned its 
attention to the disposition and governance of the territories 
and the ability of the central government to hold property.  
Through several amendments, language giving Congress 
authority to “dispose of and make all needful rules” for all 
territory and property of the United States was approved 
without amendment in the final draft of the Constitution.
80
  
The Constitution was ratified by June of 1788.  
 
a. Routes to Statehood 
 
Congress now had clear power over the disposition 
of the western territories; since ratification, thirty-one states 
have followed the process from territories organized by 
Congress under an organic act into full statehood.
81
  
Congress first exercised its new territorial authority when it 
organized the Southwest Territory, the modern state of 
Tennessee, following the three-phase model of the 
Northwest Ordinance of 1787.
82
  Shortly after the 
organization of the Southwest Territory, Congress 
reenacted the Ordinance of 1787 as the First Organic Act 
for the Northwest Territory in 1789.
83
  The rest of the states 
followed somewhat similar paths. 




                                                 
80
 The territorial clause of the constitution does not appear to have been 
hotly debated.  It reads: The Congress shall have power to dispose of 
and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or 
other property belonging to the United States; and nothing in this 
Constitution shall be so construed as to prejudice any claims of the 
United States, or of any particular state.  U.S. CONST. art. IV, §3, cl. 2. 
81
 See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
82
 Statehood Study, supra note 11 at loc. 1754.  
83
 Id. at loc. 906. 
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California, although it followed the Tennessee 
Plan
84
 to achieve statehood, is unique in that California 
transitioned from a sparsely populated former colony of 
Mexico under American military rule to a state of the union 
without ever being organized as a territory.
85
  California 
was not organized as territory because Congress could not 
decide what role slavery would play, if any, in the new 
territory.
86
  This controversy continued as Congress 
debated California’s petition for statehood.  
Representatives from southern states objected to 
California’s request for admission as a free state since there 
was no counterbalancing slave state to admit in order to 
maintain the balance of power between the free and slave 
states of the union.  Congress even discussed splitting 
California in two at the Mason-Dixon Line.
87
  Additionally, 
some members of Congress felt that allowing California to 
skip the territorial transition process would undermine the 
state-making system.
88
  Abolitionist and slave-holding 
factions eventually negotiated the Compromise of 1850, 
and California was admitted to the union as a free state.  
 
b. New Mexico 
 
                                                 
84
 The term Tennessee Plan refers to the largely self-driven process that 
Tennessee followed into statehood.  The then-Southwest territory 
organized its own legislature, called for a constitutional convention, 
and boldly declared its territorial status ended before Congress ever 
saw its petition for statehood.  The territory also elected its 
congressional delegation and sent them to Washington without 
congressional consent.  The Tennessee plan was implemented 
successfully by the states of Michigan, Iowa, California, Oregon, 
Kansas, and Alaska. Id. at loc. 1775, 1997. 
85
 Id. at loc. 6450. 
86
 Id. at loc. 6710. 
87
 Id. at loc. 6758. 
88
 Id. at loc. 6726. 
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Congress passed an organic act establishing 
territorial government for the territory of New Mexico as 
part of the compromise leading to California’s admission to 
the union in the year 1850.
89
  By the time of its 
organization, the Territory was already populous enough to 
petition for statehood, and the same year as its organization 
an unofficial convention drafted a state constitution.  This 
constitution was written both in English and Spanish and 
declared that New Mexico was a non-slaveholding state.
90
  
Because of tensions leading up to the Civil War and 
irregularities in the original state elections, this first effort 
for statehood failed. The process of establishing a state 
government would suffer fits and starts for decades.  
Efforts in Congress also suffered similar fates, with several 
bills narrowly failing, stifled by technicalities or dying at 
the conference stage.
91
  New Mexico would remain a 
territory for sixty-two years before achieving statehood.  
New Mexico finally joined the union in 1912 through the 
enabling-act route to statehood (as opposed to the 
Tennessee Plan route).  Although many internal and 
external factors led to this delay, the substantial Hispanic 
population of the territory and the territorial government’s 
adherence to Spanish as an official language in the territory 
were large factors.  In fact, the enabling-act admitting New 







The most recent addition to the community of 
states, the insular state of Hawaii, is unique in a myriad of 
ways.  Together with Alaska, it is one of only two non-
                                                 
89
 Id. at loc. 10921, 10954. 
90
 Id. at loc. 10970. 
91
 Id. at loc. 11250. 
92
 Id. at loc. 11314. 
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Hawaii’s relationship with the United States has 
been a tenuous one.  The road to statehood for Hawaii 
began with sugar.  In 1875 the Kingdom of Hawaii and the 
United States signed what today would be recognized as a 
free trade agreement.  The treaty allowed Hawaiian sugar 
and other goods to reach to American markets duty free and 
ceded territory to the U.S. Navy for what later became the 
Pearl Harbor Naval Base.
94
  The treaty was very lucrative 
to Hawaii, but its sugar production came to be dominated 
by American companies and industrialists.   
In 1890, a series of tariffs in the United States 
threatened the island’s sugar market and American sugar 
industrialists realized that the annexation of the island 
would eliminate the tariff.  These industrialists enlisted the 
United States Minister to Hawaii’s assistance, and he 
persuaded the U.S. Marine Corps to assist the industrialists 
in overthrowing the Hawaiian monarchy.
95
  The American 
businessmen then set up a provisional government in 
Hawaii to request annexation by the United States.  Despite 
President Cleveland’s calls for the monarchy’s 
reinstatement, and his characterization of the actions by 
U.S. personnel as dishonorable, the monarchy was never 
reinstated.
96
  Instead, the provisional government called a 
constitutional convention and formed the independent 
Republic of Hawaii.  The Cleveland administration 
reluctantly engaged in diplomatic relations with the new 
government.  The Hawaiian Republic negotiated a treaty of 
annexation, but it was never ratified in the U.S. Senate.  
                                                 
93
 Hawaiian is designated as a co-official language in the island along 
with English. HAW. ST. CONST. art. XV, § 4. 
94
 The treaty became known as the Reciprocity Treaty of 1875. 19 Stat. 
625 (1875). 
95
 H.R. Res 2001, 53rd Cong. (1894). 
96
 S. J. Res. 19, 103d Cong. (1993). 
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The onset of the Spanish-American war raised Hawaii’s 
profile as a base in the Pacific Campaign against Spain in 
the Philippines.  Following the process used to annex 
Texas, the United States soon annexed Hawaii as a territory 
pursuant to a joint resolution of Congress.
97
 
Unlike Texas, Hawaii was organized as a territory 
pursuant to an organic act in 1900, and Hawaii’s path to 
statehood took several decades.
98
  Congress debated the 
subject of Hawaiian statehood in 1935 and again in 1937, 
but on both occasions the bills failed amid strong 
opposition.
99
  In 1941, after the Japanese attack on Pearl 
Harbor, the territorial government ceded all independent 
authority when it declared martial law on the islands.  
Martial law ended in 1944.
100
  World War II signaled a 
break in the Hawaiian statehood movement, but after the 
war it began again in earnest.  In 1950, a Hawaiian state 
constitution was approved by more than seventy-five 
percent of voters.  This vote was followed in 1954 by a 
100,000-signature petition, reportedly weighing two 
hundred and fifty pounds.
101
  As with prior states, partisan 
negotiations stalled Hawaii’s admission.  Democrats 
ironically thought that Hawaii was a reliably Republican 
state and insisted that reliably Democrat Alaska be 
admitted first.
102
  In 1959, President Eisenhower signed the 
                                                 
97
 This resolution became known as the Newlands Resolution, after Mr. 
Francis Newland who first proposed it. 30 Stat. 750 (1898). 
98
The Hawaiian Organic Act. 31 Stat. 141 (1900). 
99
 The Honolulu Advertiser, Timeline: Hawaii's March to Statehood, 
http://the.honoluluadvertiser.com/specials/statehood/statehoodTimeline 
(last visited Feb. 28, 2013). 
100
 HawaiiHistory.org, This Day in History: Martial Law Ends, 
http://www.hawaiihistory.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=ig.page&PageID=
44 (last visited Feb. 28, 2013).  
101
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Hawaii Enablement Act and Hawaii became the last state to 
join the union.  
 
III. Political Path of Other Insular Territories of 
the United States 
 
The United States currently exercises sovereignty 
over five inhabited island chains as unincorporated 
territories: American Samoa, the Northern Mariana Islands, 
the U.S. Virgin Islands, Guam, and Puerto Rico. Each has 
its own history of American acquisition and governance.  
They will be discussed, in order, as comparison points to 
the Puerto Rican experience.  
 
a. American Samoa 
 
The islands now known as American Samoa came 
under American sovereignty through a compromise 
between Germany, England, and the United States in 
1899.
103
  At different points in the 19th Century, all three 
nations laid claim to the entire archipelago.  Since 
ratification of the Tripartite Convention, the islands have 
been governed as an unorganized territory of the United 
States.
104
  The islands were first administered by the U.S. 




b. Northern Mariana Islands 
 
                                                 
103
 This compromise is embodied in a treaty known as the Tripartite 
Convention. 31 Stat. 1878 (1900). 
104




Exec. Order No. 10264, 16 F.R. 6417 (1951) (transferring control of 
the islands known as American Samoa from the Department of the 
Navy to the Department of the Interior effective July 1951).  
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The Northern Mariana Islands are part of the same 
archipelago as the Island of Guam.  At the end of the 
Spanish-American War, Spain ceded Guam to the United 
States and sold the rest of the archipelago to Germany.
106
  
Japan invaded the islands during World War I and retained 
control until the United Nations put the islands under 
American protection after World War II.
107
  The Northern 
Mariana Islands made several attempts to reunify with 
Guam but were ultimately unsuccessful.
108
  The Northern 
Mariana Islands’ government then decided to pursue a 
closer relationship to the United States and formed a 
territorial government in 1978.
109
  It has remained in that 
role since.  
 
c. U.S. Virgin Islands 
 
The United States purchased the then-Danish West 
Indies from Denmark in 1916 for the purpose of 
constructing a naval base in the archipelago.  When both 
nations ratified the treaty, the islands became the U.S. 
Virgin Islands.
110
  Interestingly, the naval bases were built 
                                                 
106
 For the treaty selling the Northern Mariana Islands to Germany,  see 
German-Spanish Treaty of 1899, Ger.-Spain, Feb. 12 1899, Gaceta de 
Madrid [Madrid Gazette], 1 de Julio de 1899 (Spain) available at 
http://www.boe.es/datos/pdfs/BOE/1899/182/A00001-00001.pdf 
(providing for the sale of the Carolinas and Mariana Islands –with the 
exception of Guam- to Germany for 25 million Spanish Pesetas or 17 
million German Marks) (author’s translation).  
107
 University of Hawaii, Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, 
http://libweb.hawaii.edu/digicoll/ttp/ttpi.html. 
108
 The reasons for the failure of reunification attempts are outside the 
scope of this paper, but the opposition stems, at least in part, from NMI 
native cooperation with the Japanese during World War II. See also, 
Haidee V. Eugenio, NMI, Guam reunification will be up to the people, 
SAIPAN TRIBUNE, Apr. 26, 2011 available at 
http://www.saipantribune.com/newsstory.aspx?cat=1&newsID=10892. 
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 90 Stat. 263 (1976). 
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 39 Stat. 1706 (1916) 
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in Puerto Rico instead.  The U.S. Virgin Islands are 
governed as an unincorporated territory of the United States 




Guam came under U.S. jurisdiction by the Treaty of 
Paris of 1898.  President McKinley immediately placed the 
island under the control of the U.S. Navy because of its 
strategic position in the Pacific Ocean.
111
  The Navy 
controlled Guam until the Japanese Empire invaded the 
island during World War II.
112
  The Japanese Empire 
controlled the island from 1941 until 1944, when allied 
forces invaded the island and restored the Naval 
Government.
113
  Congress finally granted Guamanians 
American citizenship and a civilian government in 1950 
through an organic act.
114
  The issue of status in modern 
Guam has only been tested once in 1982, and Guamanian 
support for non-territorial options was weak.
115
  Although 
the issue of status is important to Guamanians, focus on 




e. Cuba and the Philippines 
 
                                                 
111
 Guam History and Culture, http://www.guam-
online.com/history/history.htm; Central Intelligence Agency, The 
World Factbook: Guam, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-
world-factbook/geos/gq.html. 
112




 Organic Act of Guam, Ch. 512, 64 Stat. 384 (1950). 
115
 Robert A. Underwood, Guam’s Political Status, GUAMPEDIA (Aug. 
13, 2012), http://guampedia.com/guams-political-status/ (last visited 
Mar. 20, 2013) (noting that a territorial option received fifty-one 
percent of the vote in the 1982 plebiscite, statehood received twenty 
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There are also two former U.S. Territories that 
moved on to nationhood: Cuba and the Philippines.  The 
United States exercised control over Cuba and the 
Philippines at the beginning of the twentieth century.  Like 
Puerto Rico and Guam, Spain ceded these islands to the 
United States under the Treaty of Paris.  Cuba, however, 
was never intended to remain an American possession and 
declared its independence a mere three years after the 
Treaty of Paris in 1901.
117
 
The Philippines, however, followed a rockier path 
to nationhood starting in 1896 with the Philippine 
revolution.
118
  The revolution ebbed and flowed for two 
years until the revolutionaries allied with the United States 
during the Spanish-American War.
119
  This Philippine-
Spanish conflict officially ended in 1898 when the 
Kingdom of Spain ceded the island chain to the United 
States.  The revolutionaries did not recognize American 
sovereignty over the islands and revolted in 1899.
120
  The 
United States quickly subdued the revolution.  The 
Philippines remained an unincorporated territory until the 
end of World War II.  The United States granted the 
Philippines independence through the Philippine 
Independence Act.
121
  The Act provided for a ten-year 
transition period and culminated with Philippine 
sovereignty in 1946. 
 
IV. Puerto Rico’s Path 
 
Puerto Rico is the first unincorporated territory of 
the United States and the only one of Spain’s former 
                                                 
117
 Chadwick, supra note 2 at 434-35. 
118
 August 1896:Revolt in the Philippines, PUB. BROAD.SYS., 






 Philippine Independence Act, Ch. 85, 48 Stat. 456 (1934). 
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colonies in the western hemisphere to remain a possession 
of another nation.  The relevant political history of the 
island begins with the arrival of Christopher Columbus in 
1493 and the first Spanish settlement in 1508.  Despite 
attempts by France in 1528, England in 1595, and the 
Dutch in 1625 to wrestle control of the island from the 
Spanish, the Kingdom of Spain maintained almost 
continuous control over the island for more than four 
centuries.  Early in the nineteenth century, Spain granted 
citizenship to its subjects in Puerto Rico and the island was 
represented in the Spanish Parliament through its provincial 
government pursuant to the Cadiz Constitution.
122
  Spain 
stripped this representation and provincial autonomy from 
the island when the Cadiz Constitution was revoked several 
years later.  High taxes imposed by the Spanish Crown and 
a strict policy of exile for dissenters sparked a popular 
uprising for independence known as El Grito de Lares.
123
  
The Spanish authorities subdued this rebellion, but it led 
Spain to grant Puerto Rico more control over its affairs.
124
  
In 1898, a semi-autonomous government convened in the 
island after popular elections.
125
 
This semi-autonomous government would not last 
long.  The United States included Puerto Rico as a target 
for its Caribbean intervention during the Spanish-American 
War at the behest of Puerto Rican exiles in New York.
126
  
American forces invaded the island in the summer of 
                                                 
122
 CADIZ CONST. Art. I. available at 
http://www.congreso.es/docu/constituciones/1812/ce1812_cd.pdf (last 
visited Feb. 28, 2013) (declaring that the Spanish Nation is comprised 
of Spaniards in both hemispheres) (author’s translation). 
123
 Translated to “The Lares Cry,” named after the small town in 
southern Puerto Rico where it took place. 
124
 Meléndez, supra note 17, at 16. 
125
 This authority was granted to Puerto Rico and the other Spanish 
provinces in the Carta Autonomica in 1897. Puerto Rico History, 
http://www.topuertorico.org/history4.shtml. 
126
 Meléndez, supra note 17, at 16. 
133
Spring 2014| Volume 9 | Issue 3 




  By December, the war was over and the United 
States and the Kingdom of Spain signed a treaty of peace in 
Paris.  The terms of the treaty gave control over the islands 
of Cuba, Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Philippines to the 
United States.
128
  The treaty was quickly ratified in the 
United States Senate the following year.   
Between the ratification of the treaty and the 
passage of the first organic act for the island, Puerto Rico 
was under a military government.  The military government 
was short lived, but it efficiently implemented a number of 
reforms aimed at integrating the island into the American 
way of life.
129
  Congress established a territorial 
government in 1900 through the Foraker Act.
130
  This law 
established the island’s court system, introduced a series of 
property reforms to foster the island’s sugar economy, and 
created the office of the Resident Commissioner, Puerto 
Rico’s non-voting delegate to Congress. 
The island of Puerto Rico gained more autonomy in 
the second decade of the twentieth century with the passing 
of the Jones-Shafroth Act of 1917.  The most significant 
effect of the act was the extension of citizenship to all 
Puerto Ricans living in the island and their children.
131
  The 
act also divided the territorial government into the 
traditionally American legislative-executive-judicial silos 
and mandated the popular election of the territorial 
legislature.  Under the Jones Act, the governor remained an 
appointed official.  Notably, no Puerto Rican would serve 
in the office until 1946.  The Jones Act was amended in 
1948 and Puerto Ricans for the first time had a fully 
representative local government.
132
  Elections were held 
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later that year and the first popularly elected Puerto Rican 
governor took office in 1949. 
A strong separatist movement advocated for Puerto 
Rico’s independence from the United States during the first 
third of the twentieth century but ultimately failed to gain 
popular support on the island.  By the middle of the 
century, the movement had significantly weakened.  Many 
factors led to the decline, including Puerto Rico’s inclusion 
in New Deal legislation, the island’s strong participation in 
both World Wars and the conflict in Korea, a fracturing of 
the movement, and a mass migration of Puerto Ricans to 
the continental United States.   
One of the major reasons for the separatist 
movement’s decline was that one of its most charismatic 
leaders, Luis Muñoz Marín, broke with the movement 
when he refused to support an independence bill that was 
being considered by Congress in 1936.  Shortly thereafter 
Mr. Muñoz
133
 helped found the Partido Popular 
Democratico (PPD), the island’s modern current pro-
commonwealth party.  Mr. Muñoz became the island’s first 
popularly elected governor and served in the role for four 
continuous four-year terms.   
Governor Muñoz presided over a period of rapid 
change for Puerto Rico.  On July 4, 1950, President 
Truman signed Public Law 600 and the governor’s 
administration set out to draft a constitution for Congress’ 
approval.
134
  The governor called for a constitutional 
convention and christened the convention’s new 
constitution the Estado Libre Asociado (ELA), directly 
translated as Free Associated State.  To avoid confusion 
that Puerto Rico was a state, the ELA would be referred to 
as the Commonwealth in the United States.  This Puerto 
Rican Constitution was approved with two minor 
                                                 
133
 Per Puerto Rican custom, the second last name is omitted when 
addressing a person by their last name. 
134
 Puerto Rican Federal Relations Act, ch. 446, 64 Stat. 319 (1950). 
135
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amendments in Congress the following year and took effect 
upon the results of a popular referendum approving the 
ELA on July 25, 1952.
135
  The ELA has remained largely 
unchanged, but despite attempts by Governor Muñoz to 
reduce what can be best termed as cultural erosion on the 
island, Puerto Rican society has changed significantly 
under the ELA.   
 
V. The Future for Puerto Rico 
 
The adoption of the ELA had the effect of 
cementing the political debate in the island around the issue 
of status.  Governor Muñoz’s PPD continues to advocate a 
version of the ELA, the annexationists became statehooders 
under the banner of the PNP, and what was left of the 
separatist movement became the Partido Independentista 
Puertorriqueño (PIP).  To some extent, however, each party 
seeks the same end: The resolution of the island’s political 
status once and for all. 
 
a. Continued Territorial Status – Estado Libre 
Asociado 
 
One option for Puerto Rico’s future is inaction.  As 
previously established, the Insular Cases make it possible 
for Puerto Rico to remain a territory of the United States in 
perpetuity.  Fortunately, inaction is disfavored both in 
Puerto Rico and the United States.
136
  Maintaining the ELA 
                                                 
135
 Congress approved the Puerto Rican Constitution through the 
passage of Public Law 447. Act of July 3, 1952, ch. 563, 66 Sta. 327 
(1952). 
136
 See PUERTO RICO ELECTIONS COMMISSION, supra note 3 and 
accompanying text. For the policy of the United States with reference 
to Puerto Rico’s status, see Exec. Order No. 13.183, 65 F.R. 82889 
(2000) (establishing the President’s Task Force on Puerto Rico’s Status 
with a stated goal to “help answer the questions that the people of 
Puerto Rico have asked for years regarding the options for the islands' 
136
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is also contrary to the principles of self-governance and 
self-determination that the United States is founded upon.  
Thus, final resolution of this issue is long overdue and 




Clearly, one way to resolve the island status is for 
Puerto Rico to become a free and independent nation.  
Precedent exists for this option in the experience of former 




Independence would preserve Puerto Rico’s culture 
to a greater extent than either of the other possible 
governing structures and would mean protecting the central 
role of the Spanish language in the island.  Legitimate 
concerns exist, however, about the island’s municipal debt 
and its ability to economically support itself if it were to 
gain independence.  Additionally, Puerto Ricans have come 
to take pride in and value their American citizenship, which 
would be at risk if Puerto Rico became independent.
138
  
                                                                                                 
future status”); Report by President’s Task Force on Puerto Rico’s 
Status at 10-11 (2007) available at 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/documents/2007-report-by-the-president-
task-force-on-puerto-rico-status.pdf (last visited Mar. 20, 2013) 
(recommending a mandate of periodic votes until Puerto Ricans choose 
a non-territorial option and defining the non-territorial options as 
independence or statehood). 
137
 It is important to note Cuba was treated differently in the Treaty of 
Paris and was never meant to remain under American sovereignty, the 
Philippines were granted independence in through an act of Congress. 
Philippine Independence Act, 48 Stat. 456 (1934). 
138
 There is no guarantee that Puerto Ricans in the mainland would 
retain their American citizenship if Puerto Rico became independent.  
There is precedent to the contrary. The Philippine Independence Act 
stripped all Filipinos of their American citizenship upon the island 
chain’s independence whether they were living in the United States or 
abroad. 48 Stat. 456 §14  (“Upon the final and complete withdrawal of 
137
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Furthermore, a large Puerto Rican Diaspora has 
strengthened the ties between Puerto Rico and the United 
States to such an extent that disconnecting the communities 
could have negative social and political repercussions both 
on the mainland and the island. 
139
  Finally, and perhaps as 
a result of the aforementioned factors, Puerto Rican support 
for independence is very low.  The island has voted on the 
question of status four times since the enactment of the 
ELA and the most support that independence has been able 






c. Enhanced Commonwealth 
 
The pro-commonwealth party of the island proposes 
that an enhanced or sovereign commonwealth would best 
achieve Puerto Rican sovereignty.
141
  Under the enhanced 
commonwealth, Puerto Ricans would remain American 
citizens and Puerto Rico would assume sovereignty over its 
own internal and external affairs.  The PPD’s proposal for 
an enhanced commonwealth would be based on a treaty of 
free association that would continue federal funding for 
programs on the island while reducing the federal 
administrative footprint in Puerto Rico.
142
  On the surface, 
                                                                                                 
[the United States from] the Philippine Islands the immigration laws of 
the United States. . .  shall apply to persons who were born in the 
Philippine Islands to the same extent as in the case of other foreign 
countries). 
139
 See Census Bureau, supra note 53. 
140
 Puerto Rico Elections Commission, Non-Territorial Options – 
Island Wide Results, available at 
http://div1.ceepur.org/REYDI_NocheDelEvento/index.html#en/default/
OPCIONES_NO_TERRITORIALES_ISLA.xml (last visited Feb. 1, 
2013). 
141
 Burnett, supra note 25, at 20. 
142
 Id. at 20-21. 
138
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this solution appears to be a silver bullet to solve the issue 
of Puerto Rico’s status.  The enhanced commonwealth 
would preserve the American citizenship of all Puerto 
Ricans, protect Puerto Rican culture from further cultural 
erosion, and Puerto Rico would be self-sovereign for the 
first time since before colonialism.   
The enhanced commonwealth, however, may be 
incompatible with the Constitution of the United States 
because its dual promises of sovereignty and continued 
birthright American citizenship are irreconcilable.  Further, 
it is an open question whether Congress would approve 
such a change, and why they would.  From Congress’ point 
of view, Puerto Rico would remain a relatively expensive 
proposition with less federal oversight and without an 
obvious reason why it should support a basically 
independent state. 
The PPD’s enhanced commonwealth proposal is 
very similar to a proposed commonwealth for the island of 
Guam that was debated by Congress in 1994.
143
  The Guam 
proposal would have required the mutual consent of the 
citizens Guam and of Congress before any act of Congress 
became applicable in the island.  Because the act was 
incompatible with the long-recognized supreme power of 
Congress to dispose of the territories, the Act never made it 
out of committee.  Congress’ power over the territories is 
supreme, or plenary, because the Constitution recognizes 
only States and Territories and granted authority over the 
latter to Congress.
144
  The territories are akin to 
municipalities in the states and are thus “mere 
subdivisions” of the United States.  Congress’ power over 
the territories remains “so long as they remain in a 
territorial condition.”
145
  Thus, even if Congress agreed to 
                                                 
143
 Guam Commonwealth Bill, H.R. 1521, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1993). 
144
 Nat’l Bank v. Cnty of Yankton, 101 U.S. 129, 132-33 (1880). 
145
 Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 48 (1894). 
139
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an enhanced commonwealth solution, it could change its 
mind at any time.  Only if Puerto Rico were to become 
independent, then negotiate on even ground with the United 
States for a treaty that continued federal funding in the 
island, would Congress be bound.  Again, the political 
feasibility of such a negotiation is an open question. 
The problem for the PPD’s enhanced 
commonwealth is that remaining “in a territorial condition” 
is important to the enhanced commonwealth’s second pillar 
–the preservation of American citizenship for persons born 
in the island.  The Constitution did not contain a provision 
for citizenship until the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
ratification.  The Fourteenth Amendment explicitly extends 
birthright citizenship only to those born in and “subject to 
the jurisdiction” of the United States.
146
  Thus, for the 
enhanced commonwealth’s promise of continued birthright 
citizenship to Puerto Ricans to stand constitutional scrutiny, 
Puerto Rico must remain “subject to the jurisdiction” of the 
United States.  It is clear that the ELA as it stands today is 
disfavored both by the United States and the people of 
Puerto Rico, and the enhanced commonwealth proposal is 





The only other political avenue for the final 
resolution of Puerto Rico’s status is for the island to join 
the community of states in the union.  The prospect of 
becoming a state has steadily gained support in Puerto Rico 
since the first status referendum in 1967.  Statehood 
                                                 
146
 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
140
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received 39% of the vote then, but it garnered 46.3% in 
1993, 46.5% in 1998, and 61.3% in 2012.
147
 
In the 115 years since Puerto Rico came under 
American sovereignty, Puerto Ricans have steadily 
integrated into American culture and the institutions of 
American government have grown substantially in the 
island.  The local political organization is virtually identical 
to those in the fifty states and Puerto Rico’s economy has 
fully integrated with that of the mainland United States.  
This high degree of social and political integration over the 
past century makes transition to statehood the most easily 
implemented of all the possible non-territorial options.   
Despite the fact that Puerto Ricans have been part 
of American society for over a century, there is strong 
opposition on the island and the mainland to a Puerto Rican 
state.  On the island, both the independence and 
commonwealth parties oppose statehood, articulating 
concern for the protection of Puerto Rican culture and 
identity.  These parties point out that by becoming a state, 
Puerto Rico would lose its Olympic team, the ability for 
Puerto Ricans to compete in pageants like the Miss 
Universe competition, and that Puerto Ricans would be 
forced to adopt English as their first language.  
Whether Puerto Rico would remain Spanish 
speaking is a key issue for statehood opponents on the 
island and the mainland, with island opponents fearing 
English and mainland opponents demanding it.  The 
mainland opposition also articulates economic and political 
concerns.  On the economic front, if admitted, the island 
would be the poorest state of the union.  Its per capita 
income is not even half of Mississippi’s, currently the 
nation’s poorest state, and the island’s unemployment rate 
is almost double the national measure.  Becoming a state 
                                                 
147
 For the results of the votes through 1993, see Burnett, supra note 25 
at 21.  For the results of the 2012 vote, see Non-Territorial Options, 
supra note 140. 
141
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would eliminate caps on direct aid to households in the 
island, which will dramatically increase the number of 
welfare recipients in Puerto Rico.   
The other front of opposition in the mainland is 
political.  If Puerto Rico were to be admitted to the union, it 
would be awarded five or six representatives and two 
senators in Congress.  Republicans fear that Puerto Rico 
would be a reliably Democratic state.  Large state 
delegations from states like California also fear their 
influence would be diluted by giving up a number of 
representatives in the house.  Another avenue of political 
opposition is that admission of Puerto Rico as a state may 
prompt the other insular territories to petition for statehood.   
Although the opposing arguments to Puerto Rico’s 
statehood are formidable, they are by no means ironclad.  
The island opposition on the grounds of protecting the 
cultural integrity of Puerto Ricans, while laudable, fails to 
take into account that each state of the union is culturally 
distinct from the others.  This cultural diversity existed at 
the time of the American Revolution and it remains a fact 
today.  It is true that the distinct culture of some states is 
more accentuated than others, but it would be inaccurate to 
say that Hawaiians, New Yorkers, Texans and Louisianans 
are not culturally distinct from one other.  
The issue of language, likewise, is soluble.  If 
admitted, Puerto Rico would not be the first bilingual state, 
a distinction held by New Mexico, nor would it be the only 




As for the economic questions, the effects of Puerto 
Rico’s admission to the union are difficult to predict.  It is 
very possible, if not likely, that economic activity in the 
island would increase upon its admission.
149
  Indeed, 
                                                 
148
 See supra notes 91, 93. 
149
 On a grander scale, for example, the reunification of Germany 
produced an economic boom for the unified German nation. Steven 
142
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American companies often stay away from investing in 
Puerto Rico because of its uncertain relationship with the 
United States.  Tourism would likely also increase as more 
Americans come to the realization that they can travel to 
Puerto Rico without a passport.
150
 
The political opposition to the Puerto Rico’s 
admission to the island is also founded on shaky premises.  
Puerto Ricans on the island do not currently view politics 
from a Democrat or Republican point of view.  Island 
politics have revolved around the issue of status for more 
than sixty years.  Any attempt to predict how Puerto Ricans 
will fall along party lines would be futile.  In fact, until 
2012, the two highest offices in the island—the Governor 
and Resident Commissioner—were held by a Republican 
and a Democrat.  Both men were members of Puerto Rico’s 
statehood party.   
Opposition to Puerto Rico’s statehood on the 
grounds that the other insular territories will also seek 
statehood upon Puerto Rico’s admission is unwarranted.  
First, unlike Puerto Rico, the population of the other insular 
territories is relatively small.
151
  Admitting states with such 
small populations is not likely to be desirable or feasible.  
Secondly, Puerto Rico is further along the political process 
to statehood than any of the other insular territories.  For 
example, the Department of the Interior administers all 
other insular territories while Puerto Rico is largely self-
                                                                                                 
Greenhouse, Evolution in Europe; East-West Berlin, a Boomtown in 
the Making, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 1990, at A1 (noting that an economic 
boom in Germany in the early 1990s was the direct result of German 
reunification).  
150
 Americans can already travel to the island without a passport, but it 
is not a widely known fact. Carlos Romero–Barcelo, Puerto Rico, 
U.S.A.: The Case for Statehood, 59 FOREIGN AFF. 60, 80-81 (1981). 
151
 If admitted Puerto Rico would be the 29th most populous state of 
the union.  See supra note 8 and accompanying text.  
143
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governed as a de facto state.
152
  Finally, of the other insular 
territories, only Guam has ever taken steps indicating a 
desire for eventual admission.
153
  Thus, at least for the 
moment, the people of the insular territories appear 
satisfied with their current status.   
 
VI. Puerto Rico’s Incorporation 
 
The Supreme Court once opined that “[i]t may well 
be that over time the ties between the United States and any 
of its unincorporated territories strengthen in ways that are 
of constitutional significance.”
154
  Puerto Rico has reached 
that tipping point.  In the century since the United States 
invaded the island, Puerto Ricans have risen to some of the 
highest positions in the Federal Government.  Puerto 
Ricans have served as Federal Judges, American 
Ambassadors, Generals, and Admirals.  Since 2009, with 
the confirmation of Justice Sonia Sotomayor, a Puerto 
Rican sits on the highest court of the land.   
Many Puerto Ricans, including Justice Sotomayor’s 
mother, have served in the United States military since 
1898.  In fact, if Puerto Rico were a state, it would be 




More evidence of the strengthening of ties to the 
United States is the 1966 Public Law 89-571, which made 
the Federal District Courts in Puerto Rico into Article III 
courts, an act that Congress has not taken with other 
unincorporated territories.
156
  All federal agencies treat 
Puerto Rico in the same manner they would a state.  Unless 
                                                 
152
 History of the Office of Insular Affairs, 
http://www.doi.gov/oia/about/history.cfm. 
153
 See supra note 115 and accompanying text.  
154
 Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 758. 
155
 Rodriguez, supra note 55.  
156
 80 Stat. 764 (1966). 
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otherwise specified, all civil and criminal federal laws 
apply to Puerto Rico as they do to the states.
157
  Perhaps the 
most reliable indicator of the integration of Puerto Rico 
into American society is the fact that as of the census of 







It has been more than a century since American 
forces quietly landed on a beach in southern Puerto Rico 
and were received with cheers of “Viva Puerto Rico 
Americano.”  Ninety-six years have passed since Puerto 
Ricans joined the brotherhood of citizenship with their 
continental counterparts.  Four hundred thousand Puerto 
Ricans have served in the United States military and have 
risen to the highest levels of American society.  Despite all 
of this, Puerto Ricans on the island remain sentenced to 
second-class citizenship.  This situation is patently unfair to 
Puerto Ricans on the island, who have no vote in a 
Congress with plenary power over their affairs.  The 
situation is also unfair to Americans on the mainland who 
largely subsidize Puerto Rico’s government.   
This past November, Puerto Ricans rejected the 
current territorial status of the island.  That much is clear.  
Opponents of statehood have raised questions about the 
interpretation of the statehood portion of the vote, but even 
they cannot deny that a majority of Puerto Ricans voted to 
do away with the territorial nature of their relationship with 
the United States.  Ultimately, everyone involved is best 
served by a final resolution to this question, and that can 
only come through statehood or independence.  Of those, 
statehood best respects the sacrifices made by Puerto 
                                                 
157
 48 U.S.C § 734; Memorandum on the Commonwealth of Puerto 
Rico, 57 F.R. 57093 (1992). 
158
 See supra note 53 and accompanying text.  
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Ricans in the past century and reflects the gradual but 
significant integration of the island into American society.   
The Supreme Court of the United States once 
declared that Puerto Rico was “not foreign in the 
“international sense . . . [but] foreign to the United States in 
a domestic sense.”
159
  This proclamation was arguably 
erroneous even in its time, and it definitely is today.  Puerto 
Rico and its people are no longer foreign to the United 
States in a domestic or international sense; accordingly, it 

























                                                 
159
 Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 341 (1901) (White, J., 
concurring). 
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POLICY NOTE  
 
SOME MORE FOR SAMOA: 










In the late 1960s, Leneuoti Tuaua graduated from 
college in California and applied to several government 
jobs around the state, hoping to start a career in law 
enforcement.
3
  He scored well on the entrance exams for 
the California Highway Patrol and the San Mateo County 
Sheriff’s Office.
4
  Tuaua had lived in the United States his 
entire life and had a U.S. passport, yet his applications were 
denied because he was not a citizen.  At the top of Tuaua’s 
passport, stamped in large type, read the words: “THE 
BEARER IS A UNITED STATES NATIONAL AND 
NOT A UNITED STATES CITIZEN.”
5
  Tuaua was born in 
American Samoa, a longtime U.S. territory in the South 
Pacific that consists of five volcanic islands and two coral 
atolls, and has a population of over fifty-five thousand.
6
  
Unlike Americans born in Puerto Rico, Guam, and every 
other U.S. territory, those born in American Samoa are 
                                                 
1
 SOME MORE OF SAMOA (Columbia Pictures 1941). 
2
 J.D. Candidate 2016, University of Tennessee College of Law. 
3
 Fili Sagapolutele, Am. Samoans Sue for U.S. Citizenship Based On 





 DC Circuit Appeal, WE THE PEOPLE PROJECT, 
http://www.equalrightsnow.org/tuaua_appealed_to_d_c_circuit (last 
visited Jan. 29, 2014). 
6
 Insular Area Summary for American Samoa, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 
THE INTERIOR (Apr. 2010), http://www.doi.gov/oia/islands/american-
samoa.cfm.  
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“generally considered nationals but not as citizens of the 
United States.”
7
  This status carries with it several 
difficulties, limitations, and perplexities, as well as an 




Tuaua, along with four other American Samoans 
and the Samoan Federation of America, a nonprofit 
organization that advocates for Samoans’ rights,
9
 sued the 
U.S. government in 2012, arguing that the Citizenship 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees full 
citizenship to those born in American Samoa.
10
  On June 
26, 2013, a federal district court judge in Washington, D.C. 
granted the government’s motion to dismiss, disposing of 
the suit in its earliest stages.
11
  Citing the doctrine of 
territorial incorporation from a hundred-year-old body of 
Supreme Court precedent known as the Insular Cases,
12
 the 
court noted that, for the purposes of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, American Samoans are not entitled to U.S. 
citizenship by birth.
13
  The plaintiffs have appealed the case 
to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit.
14
  Tuaua, 
the lead plaintiff, asks, “[i]f we are American Samoans, 
then why not citizens? I believe American Samoans 




                                                 
7
 12 U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVS., U.S. DEP’T OF 
HOMELAND SEC., USCIS POLICY MANUAL pt. A, ch. 2 (Mar. 11, 2014).  
8
 Tuaua FAQ, WE THE PEOPLE PROJECT, 




 Tuaua v. United States, 951 F. Supp. 2d 88. (D.D.C. 2013). 
11
 Id. at 90. 
12
 Id. at 94; see Id. n. 9 (for a full list of the Insular Cases).  
13
 Id. at 94. 
14
 DC Circuit Appeal, supra note 5. 
15
 American Samoa Lawsuit Seeks US Citizenship, BLOOMBERG 
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This note will explore the territorial incorporation 
doctrine, a judicially created doctrine under which the 
Constitution applies fully only in incorporated United 
States territories, and the reasons why it is has no legitimate 
place in Twenty-First Century American jurisprudence.   
From the outdated and xenophobic cases that support the 
doctrine, to the discriminatory practices it promotes, the 
territorial incorporation doctrine simply fails to advance 
any compelling state or federal interest.  
 
II. Development of the Law 
 
A. Historical Background 
 
American Samoa became a territory of the United 
States in 1899 after Germany and the U.S. signed the 
Tripartite Convention, agreeing to divide ownership of the 
Samoan Islands.
16
  Located in the Polynesian region of the 
southern Pacific Ocean, American Samoa’s annexation 
occurred soon after the Spanish–American War; this period 
marked the apex of America’s foray into the entrenched 
European institutions of imperialism and colonialism.
17
  
During World War II, U.S. troops in the Pacific Theatre 
used American Samoa as a major communications hub and 
naval base.
18
  Many Samoans voluntarily enlisted in the 
U.S. Marines and served on active duty until the end of the 
war.
19
  Samoans have served in the U.S. military ever since.  
Per capita, soldiers from American Samoa have died in 
Afghanistan and Iraq at a higher rate than any other U.S. 
                                                 
16
 GEORGE HERBERT RYDEN, THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE UNITED 
STATES IN RELATION TO SAMOA 574 (1933). 
17
 Joe Waldo Ellison, The Partition of Samoa: A Study in Imperialism 
and Diplomacy, 8 PAC. HIST. REV. 259, 288 (1939). 
18
 JACK C. HUDSON & KATE G. HUDSON, AMERICAN SAMOA IN WORLD 
WAR II 18 (1994), available at 
http://ashpo.com/downloads/library/7500319.pdf. 
19
 Id. at 25–27. 
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  Three of the plaintiffs in Tuaua v. 
United States are veterans.
21
  
New Zealand wrested control of Western Samoa 
from Germany during the First World War.  Following 
World War II, it became a “trust territory” of the United 
Nations before declaring independence in 1962.
22
  Today, 
the Independent State of Samoa comprises the majority of 
the island chain, with a population of nearly two hundred 
thousand.
23
  By contrast, American Samoa has seen very 
little political change over the last century and today 





B. “National” vs. “Citizen” 
 
The Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the Constitution provides that “[a]ll persons 
born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of 
the State wherein they reside.”
25
  The concept of citizenship 
by birth has its roots in the ancient Greco–Roman concept 
of jus soli: “the law of the soil,” which granted citizenship 
                                                 
20
 Kirsten Scharnberg, Where the U.S. Military is the Family Business, 





 Tuaua FAQ, supra note 8. 
22
 Stanley K. Laughlin, Jr., United States Government Policy and 
Social Stratification in American Samoa, 53 OCEANIA 29, 29–30 
(1982). 
23




 Laughlin, supra note 22, at 30. 
25
 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
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by birth within the territory of a state or city.
26
  English 
common law adopted the doctrine following the decline of 
medieval feudalism, and the U.S. kept it at common law 
until the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment codified jus 
soli in the Constitution.
27
  
Congress has defined a “national of the United 
States” as “a citizen of the United States, or . . . a person 
who, though not a citizen of the United States, owes 
permanent allegiance to the United States.”
28
  All citizens, 
then, are nationals, but not all nationals are citizens.  A 
“person born in an outlying possession of the United States 
on or after the date of formal acquisition of such 
possession” is a national, but not a citizen.
29
  Presently, 
“[t]he term ‘outlying possessions of the United States’ 
means American Samoa and Swains Island.”
30
  The only 
Americans who become noncitizen nationals by birth are 
those born in American Samoa. 
 American Samoans are not citizens of any country, 
though they still have obligations and some rights under 
American law.  Compared to other Americans, and even 
those living in other territories, Samoans often have fewer 
rights and more hardships with no apparent rhyme or 
reason.  Although nationals can generally work and reside 
anywhere in the U.S,
31
 like U.S. citizens in other territories, 
they cannot vote in federal elections and do not pay many 
                                                 
26
 Citizenship, ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA ONLINE ACADEMIC 
EDITION, 
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/118828/citizenship?ancho




 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(22) (2012). 
29
 8 U.S.C. § 1408(1) (1988). 
30
 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(29) (2012). In 1925, Congress declared U.S. 
sovereignty over Swain’s Island and made it a part of American Samoa. 
See 48 U.S.C. § 1662. 
31
 U.S. National, IMMIHELP (2014), 
http://www.immihelp.com/immigration/us-national.html.  
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  Nationals may apply for U.S. citizenship, 
but under the same rules as other permanent residents,
33
 
which requires living in a U.S. state for three months,
34
 
paying nearly seven hundred dollars in fees, and passing a 
civics exam and an English literacy test.
35
  Despite the high 
rate of military enlistment, American Samoans cannot 
become military officers unless they successfully apply for 
citizenship.
36
  Different states treat nationals inconsistently.   
Among other restrictions, many states prohibit nationals 





C. The Insular Cases and Territorial 
Incorporation 
 
After the American annexation of several overseas 
territories at the turn of the century, individuals who found 
themselves suddenly under the authority of the United 
States attempted to invoke the rights and freedoms of the 
Constitution through the American courts.  The U.S. 
Supreme Court handled these challenges in a series of 
decisions known as the Insular Cases.
38
  Whereas previous 
administrations had sought to create new states out of 
freshly acquired land, President McKinley established a 
new trend of colonialism with the intention of keeping 
these new “colonies” at arm’s length, using them primarily 
                                                 
32




 American Samoa Lawsuit Seeks US Citizenship, supra note 15. 
35
 DC Circuit Appeal, supra note 5. 
36
 Sean Morrison, Foreign in a Domestic Sense, 41 HASTINGS CONST. 




 Adriel Cepeda Derieux, A Most Insular Minority, 110 COLUM. L. 
REV. 797 (2010). 
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Following the lead of the Executive Branch, the 
Supreme Court relegated the new territories to a legal 
periphery analogous to their geographic relation to the 
American mainland by conjuring up the doctrine of 
territorial incorporation and applying it throughout the 
Insular Cases: 
 
This doctrine divided 
domestic territory -- that is, 
territory within the 
internationally recognized 
boundaries of the United 
States and subject to its 
sovereignty -- into two 
categories: those places 
“incorporated” into the 
United States and forming an 
integral part thereof 
(including the states, the 
District of Columbia, and the 
“incorporated territories”); 
and those places not 
incorporated into the United 
States, but merely 
“belonging” to it (which 






Beginning in 1901, the Insular Cases held that the full 
weight of the Constitution did not “follow[] the [American] 
                                                 
39
 Christina Duffy Burnett, Untied States, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 797, 799 
(2005). 
40
 Id. at 800. 
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 to these new, unincorporated territories, and that 
only the most basic Constitutional rights apply there.
42
  
Justifying the invention of this wholly new doctrine, the 
Court noted that one “false step at this time might be fatal 
to the development of . . . the American Empire.”
43
  The 
Court provided little guidance on how to evaluate whether 
a constitutional right is “fundamental.”
44
 
The Supreme Court specifically addressed the issue 
of citizenship regarding inhabitants of the territories in 
Downes v. Bidwell.  The Supreme Court interpreted the 
Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as a 
“limitation to persons born or naturalized in the United 
States which is not extended to persons born in any place 
‘subject to their jurisdiction.’”
45
  Citizenship, the most 
fundamental and seminal of rights, was not fundamental 
enough for the Court to apply to the territories.  Residents 
of the territories lived in a state of uncertainty as to which 
rights they had and which remained out of their grasp, 
nestled away in the incorporated and purportedly more 
civilized regions of the “American Empire.” 
Eventually, as the country shifted away from its 
imperialistic gaze, Congress began to concretely define the 
legal and political relationships between the U.S. and its 
territories through legislation on an individual basis.  Over 





 the U.S. Virgin 
Islands,
48
 and the Northern Mariana Islands,
49
 while 
                                                 
41
 Id. at 805. 
42
 Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901). 
43
 Id. at 286. 
44
 Morrison, supra note 36, at 105. 
45
 Downes, 182 U.S. at 251. 
46
 Guam Organic Act of 1950, 48 U.S.C. § 1421 (1950). 
47
 Jones–Shafroth Act, Pub. L. No. 64–36, 39 Stat. 951 (1917). 
48
 8 U.S.C. § 1406 (1952). 
49
 48 U.S.C. § 1801 (1976) (The Northern Mariana Islands gained full 
U.S. citizenship for its citizens contemporaneously with its political 
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relinquishing control of the Philippines
50
 and the Panama 
Canal Zone.
51
  Among the inhabited territories of the U.S., 
only American Samoa remained unincorporated.  Congress 
eventually passed the Immigration and Naturalization 
Act,
52
 which codified the old distinction between 
incorporated territories and unincorporated territories.  As 
the last unincorporated territory, American Samoa was the 
only place to experience a unique handicap of its residents’ 
rights as Americans through the now legislated and 






The Insular Cases were decided by many of the 
same justices who endorsed racial segregation in Plessy v. 
Ferguson only a few years before.
54
  They have invited 
comparison to Plessy ever since establishing a “doctrine of 
separate and unequal.”
55
  The high percentage of native, 
nonwhite populations in the American territories, especially 
at the turn of the century, invite these ugly associations.
56
  
As the Court in Downes put it, the territories were 
“inhabited by alien races, differing from us in religion, 
customs, laws, methods of taxation and modes of 
                                                                                                 
union with the U.S. in 1976.). See Covenant to Establish a 
Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands in Political Union 
with the United States of America § 1801 (1975), available at 
http://www.cnmilaw.org/section1801.html.  
50
 Treaty of General Relations and Protocol with the Republic of the 
Philippines, U.S.-Phil., July 4, 1946, 61 Stat. 1174. 
51
 Panama Canal Treaty of 1977, U.S.-Pan., July 22, 1977, TIAS 
10030. 
52
 See generally 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (2012). 
53
 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(22) (2012). 
54
 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
55
 Juan R. Torruella, The Insular Cases, 29 U. PA. J. INT'L L. 283, 291 
(2007). 
56
 Id. at 289. 
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  Tellingly, the opinion in Downes heavily 
quotes Dred Scott v. Sandford.
58
  Through this unflattering 
historical lens, it becomes clearer how the Supreme Court 
could have found that citizenship is not a fundamental right 
under the Constitution.  Fundamentality, they may have 
privately reasoned, depending on factors more transparent 
than the content of one’s character.  McKinley’s original 
goal of colonial exploitation rang true.  The U.S. was not 
interested in the people, only the land. 
Rather than being actively based on institutional 
racism today, the anomaly of American Samoa’s status as 
the last unincorporated territory without citizenship by 
birthright appears to have no specific justification.  A rule 
this obscure, perplexing, and technical should require a 
compelling reason for its existence.  Neither the court in 
Tuaua nor Congress managed to pinpoint any distinct 
characteristics of American Samoa that would vindicate or 
even attempt to explain the arbitrary nature of its unique, 
unincorporated status today.  With no governmental interest 
replacing the original imperialistic one, the incorporation 
doctrine has no purpose yet still exists.  It is at best a 
vestigial reminder of America’s imperialistic past and at 




The landscape of the Constitution has changed 
drastically over the last century, due more to its 
interpretation by the Supreme Court than its subsequent 
amendments.  In the early Twentieth Century, the 
Fourteenth Amendment condoned racial segregation,
60
 but 
would not tolerate maximum hours regulations for bakers 
                                                 
57
 Downes, 182 U.S. at 287. 
58
 Id. at 250, 271, 274–76 (citing Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 
(1857)).  
59
 Downes, 182 U.S. at 283. 
60
 Plessy, 163 U.S. at 537. 
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  Many state court verdicts could be 
retried, trumped, and reversed by federal common law at a 
defendant’s whim.
62
  The Bill of Rights largely did not 
apply to the states, even regarding crucial liberties like 
protection against double jeopardy
63
 and confessions 
obtained through torture.
64
  The Supreme Court has no 
qualms with overturning old precedent where a 
fundamental right is being infringed,
65
 where years of 
experience have simply shown continuous and systematic 
unfairness,
66
 or even where the Court finds a new right to 
read into the Constitution
67
 or decides to delete a 
previously valid one.
68
  Considering these modern trends in 
constitutional law, and the rotting, cobwebbed foundation 
of the territorial incorporation doctrine, the ruling in Tuaua 
makes sense only by remembering that it was decided at the 
trial level.
69
  Trial judges typically leave the trendsetting to 
the appellate courts and often feel it beyond their authority 
to make new policy.  Whether the Circuit Court of Appeals 
for the D.C. Circuit will take on this challenge remains to 
be seen, but given the shaky ground on which the territorial 
incorporation doctrine stands, it would not be surprising to 





                                                 
61
 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
62
 Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1 (1842). 
63
 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937). 
64
 Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936). 
65
 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Gideon v. 
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
66
 See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938); Sweatt v. Painter, 
339 U.S. 629 (1950). 
67
 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).  
68
 See West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937). 
69
 Tuaua, 951 F. Supp. 2d at 88. 
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The Insular Cases’ doctrine of territorial 
incorporation provides a spectacularly poor justification for 
preserving the modern distinction between U.S. citizens 
and nationals by birth.  Considering the Court’s woefully 
antiquated approach to constitutional interpretation, 
especially regarding the Fourteenth Amendment, and the 
fact that the underlying original goal of facilitating 
American colonial ambition is long gone, these cases offer 
little persuasive support once put in context.  The 
difference now only applies to the residents of one tiny 
island chain in the Southern Hemisphere, following a 
protracted period of arbitrary congressional cherry picking 
of rights for other territories, evidences the perennial dearth 
of common sense surrounding this issue.  Under the current 
dichotomy one might need to amend the Declaration of 
Independence to read “all men are created equal unless they 
are created in American Samoa.”
70
  Without a legitimate 
state interest this construction moves from the troubling to 
the absurd.  Uniformity of American citizenship by itself 
would make practical sense on its face, eliminating the 
second-class stigma associated with hailing from one 
particular U.S. territory while simplifying a needlessly 
complex issue.  Accomplishing this goal through the 
mechanism of the Fourteenth Amendment, by way of the 
courts, would offer more consistency, not only with the 
application of the law, but also with its interpretation.  
The simple answer is, in this case, the correct one.  
Being in the United States should mean just that, with no 
need for an asterisk.  `As a vestige from a cavalier and 
discriminatory part of the nation’s past, the doctrine of 
territorial incorporation squarely belongs in the dustbin of 
                                                 
70
 Morrison, supra note 36, at 146. 
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 Tuaua, 951 F. Supp. 2d at 88. 
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POLICY NOTE   
 
SELLING ITS SOUL: AN ANALYSIS OF A FOR-
PROFIT CORPORATION’S  







I. Introduction  
 
Is it possible to consider the principles and morals 
upon which a business entity is built as separate from the 
individual shareholders that form the business entity—do 
they make up a “soul”?  
While the question above, on its face, rings more of 
philosophy than law and policy, there is currently a 
substantial question of law that is strikingly similar, if not 
the same, yielded by the contraception mandate of the 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (“PPACA”).   
In brief, the PPACA, among other things, requires all 
health insurance policies, including those policies made 
available to subscribers through a privately held 
corporation, to provide contraceptive and preventative care 
for women.
2
   Rooted in the fundamental religious beliefs 
they hold, many Americans find this so-called 
“contraceptive mandate” abhorrent.
3
  Certainly, no one 
would question that it is those Americans’ right to speak 
and act in accordance with that belief.  However, the more 
                                                 
1
 J.D. Candidate 2016, University of Tennessee College of Law.  
2
 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 
Stat. 119 sec. 1001(a)(5), 42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg–13(a)(4) (2013). 
3
 Jack Kerwick, Backlash Against Obamacare Contraceptive Mandate, 
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complex question arises when dealing with the privately 
held for-profit corporation.  Specifically, assuming a 
private corporation’s fundamental principles on which it 
was built are in direct conflict with the entire notion of 
contraceptive care, what is the extent of Congress’s ability 
to require the corporation to make insurance available 
covering contraceptive care?  
In this policy note, I will address the many 
considerations surrounding a corporation’s legal and moral 
autonomy.   The general threshold question is this: to what 
extent is a for-profit corporation afforded religion and 
speech protections separately and distinctly from its 
shareholders?
4
  I intend this note to serve as a guide 
through the myriad complicated considerations implicated 
by this issue; in addition, I conclude that there is both 
objective value in and legal authority supporting the 
protection of a corporation’s right to act in accordance with 
its religious affiliation.   I will show that a corporation has a 
“soul” of its own—an individual and distinct set of 
principles that should be valued and protected. 
 
II. The Development of the Law: The PPACA and 
“Preventative Health Services” 
  
The PPACA mandates that “preventative health 
services” be included in healthcare plans without any cost 
sharing.
5
  Congress did not initially define “preventative 
health services” and instead authorized the Department of 
Health and Human Services (“DHHS”) to promulgate rules 
to this effect.
6
  DHHS issued a preliminary rule that defined 
the religious employer exception narrowly and included 
                                                 
4
 John K. DiMugno, The Affordable Care Act’s Contraceptive 
Coverage Mandate, 25 No. 1 CAL. INS. L. & REG. REP. 1 (2013).  
5
 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 
2713, 124 Stat. 119 (2010).  
6
 3 RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS AND THE LAW § 13:51 (2013). 
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contraception in the definition of “preventative health 
service.”
7
  In order to qualify for the “religious employer 
exception,” an organization is required to (1) have the 
inculcation of religious values as its purpose; (2) primarily 
employ persons who share its religious views; (3) primarily 
serve persons who share its religious views; and (4) be a 
nonprofit organization.
8
  Accordingly, this exemption did 
not exempt many religious employers, such as Catholic 
healthcare providers, from being required to offer 
contraception as part of the routine coverage policies they 
offered.
9
  Because the Catholic Church forbids 
contraception, those non-exempt Catholic organizations 
would be forced to either violate their Catholic principles 
or violate the newly enacted law.
10
  Although the DHHS 
attempted to resolve the issue by delaying the date on 
which religious-affiliated nonprofits were required to 
comply with the law by one year and ordered the insurance 
companies of those religious employers to pay for the 
contraception, rather than the employers directly, the 
primary dispute remained: specifically, the Catholic Church 
wanted absolutely no affiliation with the provision of 
contraceptives.
11
   
                                                 
7
 Coverage of Preventive Health Services, 45 C.F.R. § 147.130(a)(iv) 
(2013). 
8
 Id.  
9
 3 RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 6. 
10





 See 45 C.F.R. § 147.130; 3 Religious Organizations and the Law § 
13:51 (citing White House Misrepresents Its Own Contraceptive 
Mandate, United States Conference of Catholic Bishops (Feb. 3, 2012), 
http://www.usccb.org/news/2012/12-020.cfm. Additionally, the 
exemption clause was again amended and expanded to define “religious 
employers” only as those that are considered nonprofit religious houses 
of worship and religious orders as defined by the IRS.  The amended 
contraception mandate, while expanded to include more groups and 
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 Additionally, many other nonprofits and for-profits 
corporations have remained unwilling to breach their 
fundamental principles by providing insurance coverage for 
contraceptives.  The crux of this conflict is primarily rooted 
in the interplay between the federal act giving individuals 
statutory claims where the government “substantially 
burdens” her freedom to exercise her religion and case law 
which identifies corporations as individuals. 
 
III. Substantive Law at Issue 
 
A. Religious Freedom Restoration Act  
 
The Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”) 
of 1993 was a response to the holding of the Supreme 
Court in Employment Div. v. Smith. 
12
  In Smith, the Court 
held that the dispositive issue in evaluating the 
constitutionality of a law under the First Amendment is not 
whether a law suppressed an individual’s religious 
practices.
13
  Rather, the Court held that, so long as the law 
was otherwise “neutral” and “generally applicable” to all 
individuals, the secondary effect of whether the law 
suppressed the religious practices of some is irrelevant.
14
  
In effect, the Court removed the sometimes ambiguous 
                                                                                                 
organization, still did not provide an exemption to other non-profits, 
and more extensively, for-profit corporations that asserted religious 
reasons for exemption.  The amended contraception mandate was 
finalized on June 28, 2013.  However, the mandate’s final version did 
little to mitigate the increased litigation from those still outside of the 
exemption. See generally DiMugno, supra note 4.  
12
 Codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (Supp. V 1993); Emp’t 
Div., Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 885 (1990); see 
Douglas Laycock & Oliver S. Thomas, Interpreting the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act, 73 TEX. L. REV. 209, 210 (1994).  
13
 Smith, 494 U.S. at 885. 
14
 Id at 878-81, 876. 
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weighing between two equally valid considerations: a 
compelling government interest and the right an American 
enjoys to practice his or her religion freely.
15
  
Congress acted swiftly through its enactment of the 
RFRA, which was not only intended to replace the Smith 
standard with the compelling interest test, shifting the 
burden of proof to the government, but also to provide 
statutory claims and defenses for an individual where a law 
“substantially burdens” his or her freedom to exercise his 
or her religion.
16
  The RFRA provides that the 
government’s burden is met if it demonstrates that the law 
or policy is “(1) in a furtherance of a compelling 
governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means 
of furthering that compelling governmental interest.”
17
  
Notably, sub-section (c) provides that “[a] person 
whose religious exercise has been burdened in violation of 
this section may assert that violation as a claim or defense 
in a judicial proceeding and obtain appropriate relief 
against a government.”
18
  To date, the federal circuit courts 
have held that subsection (c)’s use of “person” is 
ambiguous and therefore, the potential application of 
subsection (c) to different organizations and corporations is 
a matter of statutory interpretation.
19
  There is a circuit split 
                                                 
15
 Id at 879. 
16
 The RFRA provides that the “[g]overnment shall not substantially 
burden a person’s exercise of religion even if the burden results from a 
rule of general applicability[ ]” (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a)); see 
Klemka v. Nichols, 943 F. Supp. 470, 474 (M.D. Pa. 1996) (citing 
Rodriguez v. City of Chicago, No.95C5371, 1996 WL 22964, at *4 
(N.D. Ill. Jan. 12, 1996)).  
17
 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(b) (emphasis added). 
18
 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(c). 
19
 Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1129 (10th 
Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 678 (2013). 
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as to which entities may bring a claim, and, of those, which 





B. First Amendment and Citizens United  
 
For-profit corporations raising claims based on the 
RFRA find support in the landmark Supreme Court holding 
in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission,
21
 which 
held that corporations enjoy First Amendment 
protections.
22
  The petitioner, Citizens United, sought 
injunctive relief from anticipated civil and criminal 
penalties that would be imposed on it following the release 
of a political documentary within thirty days of the 2008 
Democratic primary elections.
23
  The Court specifically 
held that the First Amendment applies to corporations and 
it “does not permit Congress to make categorical 
distinctions based on corporate identity” concerning 
freedom of speech.
24
  Further, it held that “[n]o sufficient 
governmental interest justifies limits on political speech of 
non-profit or for-profit corporations.”
25
  Citizens United’s 




 See generally Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 
310 (2010).   
22
 Id. at 886, 917. 
23
 Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 723 F.3d 1114; Korte v. Sebelius, 735 
F.3d 654 (7th Cir. 2013); Gilardi v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human 
Servs., 733 F.3d 1208 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (citing Citizens United, 558 
U.S. 310).  
24
 The First Amendment does not permit Congress to make categorical 
distinctions based on the corporate identity of the speaker and the 
content of the political speech. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 364 (citing 
First Nat. Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 778, n. 14 (1978)). 
25
 Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 315. The sweeping implications of the 
holding that a corporation has its own identity that is separate from an 
individual citizen cannot be understated. When analyzing whether a 
section of the Bipartisan Reform Act restricting corporate speech was 
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sweeping implication is simply this: “[t]he First 
Amendment protects speech and the speaker, and the ideas 
that flow from each,” regardless of whether the speaker is a 




IV. Action to the Courts  
 
A. Non-Profit Dismissals 
 
Two types of lawsuits have been filed in response to 
the contraception: those brought by nonprofit religious 
employers like the Catholic dioceses, and those brought by 
for-profit companies owned by religious individuals who 
disagree with the use of contraception.
27
  Many of the 
claims brought by nonprofit organizations have been 





                                                                                                 
unconstitutional, the Court noted that if the Act were imposed on an 
individual citizen the government’s “time, place, and manner” 
argument would not be accepted, but instead be seen as a government 
action to silence suspect voices.  Id. at 339. 
26
 Id. at 341.  
27
 HHS Mandate Central, THE BECKET FUND fOR RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, 
http://www.becketfund.org/hhsinformationcentral/, (last visited Jan. 28, 
2014).  Specifically, there have been a total of 91 cases filed by over 
300 plaintiffs, including 46 cases brought by for-profit companies and 
45 cases brought by non-profit organizations.  Additionally, there have 
been 2 class action cases brought.  Of those cases adjudicated on the 
merits, 33 injunctions have been granted and 6 denied in cases filed by 
for-profit companies, and 19 injunctions have been granted and 1 
denied in cases filed by non-profit organizations. See HHS Mandate 
Central, THE BECKET FUND FOR RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, 
http://www.becketfund.org/hhsinformationcentral/ (last visited Jan. 28, 
2014). 
28
 DiMugno, supra note 4.  (Noting the reason behind many of these 
dismissals was that the DHHS was still finalizing its rules.) See 
Catholic Diocese of Nashville v. Sebelius, 2012 WL 5879796 (M.D. 
Tenn. 2012). 
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B. For-Profit Litigation and Circuit Court Splits  
 
Cases brought by for-profit corporations generally 
do not share the same procedural impediments as their 
nonprofit counterparts
29
 and have reached the United States 
Courts of Appeal on the merits.
30
  Currently, there is a split 
between five Circuit Courts on whether for-profit 
corporations and their owners are able to bring First 
Amendment RFRA claims.
31
  The Seventh and Tenth 
Circuits have held that for-profit corporations and their 
owners have legitimate RFRA claims.
32
  The D.C. Circuit 
Court rejected the corporate claim, but recognized the 
individual claim.
33
  Finally, the Third and Sixth Circuits 




1. Seventh and Tenth Circuit Courts 
 
In Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc v. Sebelius, Hobby 
Lobby, a for-profit corporation, and its individual owners 
filed for injunctive relief claiming that the contraception 
mandate for employers violated their religious freedoms by 
compelling them to fund insurance coverage for “drugs or 
devices they consider to induce abortions.”
35
  In defense of 
                                                 
29
 Id. at 1325. 
30
 Id. at 1326. 
31
 Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 723 F.3d 1114; Korte, 735 F.3d 654, 665; 
Gilardi, 733 F.3d 1208; Autocam Corp. v. Sebelius, 730 F.3d 618 (6th 
Cir. 2013); Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec'y of U.S. Dep't of 
Health & Human Servs., 724 F.3d 377 (3d Cir. 2013) cert. granted, 134 
S. Ct. 678 (U.S. 2013). 
32
 Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 723 F.3d 1114; Korte, 735 F.3d 654, 665. 
33
 Gilardi, 733 F.3d at 1216.  
34
 Autocam Corp., 730 F.3d 618; Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp., 
724 F.3d 377. 
35
 Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 723 F.3d at 1141. What is problematic 
about this quote is that it is from the synopsis and this exact quote is 
not found within the case.  The RE or stack checker should have found 
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the PPACA, the Attorney General argued that for-profit 
corporations are not considered “persons” under the RFRA 
because, among other things, Congress did not specifically 
include for-profit corporations as an entity offered rights 
and protections under the RFRA.
36
  Because Congress did 
not specifically define the term “person,” the United States 
contended that the Tenth Circuit should adopted the 




The Tenth Circuit agreed that because Congress 
provided no definition for “person” within the RFRA, it left 
such definition to the discretion of the court.
38
  However, 
the Tenth Circuit turned to the Dictionary Act, in which a 
corporation is included in the definition of a “person.”
39
  
Rejecting the government’s argument, the Tenth Circuit 
held that although other statutes do not include a 
corporation within the definition of a “person,” the court is 
not afforded the power to figuratively cut-and-paste 
definitions from statute to statute.
40
  Accordingly, where 
                                                                                                 
where this was discussed in the case and made the appropriate citation, 
and then changed the language to paraphrase the same point. 
36
 Id. at 1128.  
37
 Id. at 1130 (citing The Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., 
(1964); The Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et 
seq., (2009); the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C.A. § 
203 (2006)). (The United States argues that for-profit corporations are 
not recognized as persons? under these Acts and thus should not be 
given that status under the RFRA). 
38
 Id. at 1129. 
39
 Id.  
40
 Id. at 1130. (Rather than implying that similar narrowing 
constructions should be imported into statutes that do not contain such 
language, they imply Congress is quite capable of narrowing the scope 
of a statutory entitlement or affording a type of statutory exemption 
when it wants to. The corollary to this rule, of course, is that when the 
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In Korte v. Sebelius, the Seventh Circuit addressed 
the same issue.
42
  Like the Tenth Circuit, the Seventh 
Circuit held that corporations and individual owners might 
be successful on the merits of their cases.
43
  However, the 
Seventh Circuit’s analysis differed slightly from that of the 
Tenth Circuit.  Specifically, the Seventh Circuit held that 
“nothing in the Court’s general jurisprudence of corporate 





2. D.C. Circuit Court 
 
In Gilardi v. U.S. Department of Health & Human 
Services, the D.C. Circuit recognized that individual 
corporate owners might have RFRC standing.  However, 
the D.C. Circuit split from the Tenth and Seventh Circuits 
in its holding that a corporation itself does not have 
standing to bring a claim under a RFRA.
45
  The court 
looked to the “nature and history” surrounding the passage 
of the RFRA.
46
  The court held that the cases that 
                                                                                                 
exemptions are not present, it is not that they are “carried forward” but 
rather that they do not apply). 
41
 Id. at 1129 (In addition, the Supreme Court has affirmed the RFRA 
rights of corporate claimants, notwithstanding the claimants' decision to 
use the corporate form. See O Centro Espirita Beneficiente Uniao do 
Vegetal v. Ashcroft, 389 F.3d 973, 973 (10th Cir. 2004) (en banc), 
aff'd, 546 U.S. 418, 126 S.Ct. 1211, 163 L.Ed.2d 1017 (2006) 
(affirming a RFRA claim brought by “a New Mexico corporation on its 
own behalf”). 
42
 Korte, 735 F.3d at 664. 
43
 Id. at 665.  
44
 Id. at 681. 
45
 Gilardi, 733 F.3d at 1215.  
46
 Id. at 1214. 
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influenced the RFRA’s formation concerned individual 
rights, not corporate rights, and therefore they concluded 
that the RFRA does not apply to for-profit corporations.
47
  
Furthermore, the court held that “there is no basis for 
concluding that a secular organization can exercise 
religion.”
48
  Therefore, in effect, the D.C. Circuit held that 
it is simply not possible to infringe upon a secular 
corporation’s freedom to exercise religion, as the 
corporation is not considered a  “person” under the RFRA.  
The court notes that they are satisfied that the shareholders 
have been “‘injured in a way that is separate and distinct 




3. Sixth and Third Circuit Courts  
 
In Autocam Corporation v. Sebelius, Autocam 
Corporation and Autocam Medical, high-volume 
manufacturing corporations owned by a single Catholic 
family, brought RFRA claims seeking injunctive relief 
from the contraception mandate.  The Sixth Circuit held 
that Autocam was barred from bringing an RFRA claim 
because it was not considered a “person” under the RFRA 
and that the shareholders were barred because of the 
shareholder-standing rule.
50
  The court held that the 
plaintiff’s reliance on Citizens United was “unavailing” 
because the Free Exercise Clause and the Free Speech 
Clause have historically been interpreted in different 
ways.
51
  The Court held that while Citizen United identified 
a number of cases where it recognized that corporations 
enjoyed rights under the First Amendment, because these 
cases only concerned freedom of speech, the Court could 
                                                 
47
 Id.  
48
 Id. at 1215. 
49
 Id.  
50
 Autocam Corp., 730 F.3d at 623, 626.  
51
 Id. at 628.   
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 Likewise, in Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. 
Secretary of U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, 
the Third Circuit held that for-profit secular corporations 
could not assert claims under the RFRA because they were 
incapable of engaging in religious exercise.
53
  It held that 
there is no authority applying the Free Exercise Clause of 
the First Amendment to secular for-profit organizations in 
the same way as the Free Speech Clause.
54
  The court held 
that the proximity of the two clauses does not imply that all 
First Amendment rights are afforded to for-profit secular 
corporations.
55
   
 
V. The Future for For-Profit Corporations   
 
While the RFRA protects religious organizations 
and individuals’ religious freedoms from substantially 
burdensome government laws, the courts are addressing for 
the first time whether for-profit corporations are considered 
“persons” who have the ability and right to exercise 
religious freedoms.
56
  Citizen United provides a compelling 
argument, implying that because corporations have a 
distinct voice and enjoy Freedom of Speech rights under 
the First Amendment, those business entities are also 
entitled to Religious Exercise rights as well.
57
 
                                                 
52
 Id.  
53
 Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp., 724 F.3d at 381. 
54
 Id. at 385-86.  The stack checker noted that this passage concerned 
the incorporation of the Free Exercise Clause and not really the direct 
application of the FEC to for-profit corporations.  I wasn’t sure exactly 
how to fix this. 
55
 Id. at 387.  
56
 Mark L. Rienzi, God and the Profits: Is There Religious Liberty for 
Moneymakers?, 21 GEO. MASON L. REV. 59, 61 (2013). 
57
Id. at 98.   
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The primary conflict between the circuit courts 
presents a more complex issue than the right to invoke the 
religious protection of the First Amendment.  Rather, this 
issue arguably requires the reevaluation of a corporation’s 




In March of 2014, the Supreme Court will have the 
opportunity to address this seemingly philosophical issue 
concerning the identity of the for-profit corporation.
59
  
However, the answer lies behind statutory analysis of the 
RFRA and previous Supreme Court decisions concerning 
corporate rights.
60
  While analyzing the Circuit courts’ 
holdings may provide insight into how the Supreme Court 
will rule concerning for-profit corporations’ identities and 
First Amendment protections, the future of for-profit, 
privately owned corporations is unclear.  
 The idea of “corporate personhood” is not a modern 
idea, but a historical practice that has evolved with our 
country’s democracy.
61
  In today’s modern economy, a 
business entity can, undoubtedly, have an identity that 
includes specific goals, motives, and morals.
62
  
Additionally, courts have recognized a business entity’s 
ability to act in accordance with certain established 
                                                 
58
 See generally DiMugno, supra note 4.  
59
Lyle Denniston, Court to Rule on Birth-Control Mandate 




 Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 723 F.3d at 1129; Korte, 735 F.3d at 681. 
61
 John B. Stanton, Keeping the Faith: How Courts Should Determine 
"Sincerely-Held Religious Belief" in Free Exercise of Religion Claims 
by for-Profit Companies, 59 LOY. L. REV. 723, 748 (2013). 
62
 Id. at 756 (citing Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 
(1983); Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 
546 U.S. 418 (2006)).  
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  What, then, creates the distinction between 
nonprofit and for-profit entities so as to deny for-profit 
corporations the ability to adhere to the same goals, 
motives, and morals?   
As the Tenth Circuit held, there is both objective 
value in protecting a corporation’s right to act in 
accordance with the religious affiliations upon which it was 
built, as well as legal authority to support such protection.
64
  
The Tenth Circuit held in Hobby Lobby that Hobby Lobby 
considered itself a “faith-based” corporation.
65
  The court 
noted that nonprofits have historically been afforded the 
right to act in accordance with a “faith-based” identity in 
the market place.
66
  In comparison, for-profit corporations 
have a voice that is protected by the First Amendment; 
furthermore, they are required to adhere to specific moral 
and social standards that are in place to benefit and protect 
the general public.
67
  Thus, disallowing a corporation’s 
clear faith-based identity would contradict those moral 
expectations that we as a society impose on corporations, 
and the US Supreme Court has allowed to flourish.  
Accordingly, and in the case of the PPACA, a for-profit 
corporation should be afforded the right to act in 
accordance with a faith-based identity, just as it has been 






                                                 
63
 THE BECKET FUND, Statutes of Non Profit Cases, (2013), 
http://www.becketfund.org/hhsinformationcentral/#tab1.  
64
 Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 723 F.3d at 1129. 
65
 Id. at 1131.  
66
 Id.   
67
 Steven J. Willis, Corporations, Taxes, and Religion: The Hobby 
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The United States prides itself on its diversity of 
views, cultures, and religions.  However, respecting and 
protecting the right to speak and act in accordance with 
those beliefs has been of the utmost importance throughout 
the nation’s history.
69
  The federal government is now 
attempting to alter the definition of for-profit corporations 
in our country by disallowing them to act upon any other 
motivation than monetary ends.  Allowing a for-profit 
corporation to be forthcoming with its foundational 
principles not only reveals its greater purpose, but also puts 
the general public on notice of that purpose while allowing 
the correct implementation of the contraception mandate.  
Rather than restricting the ability of a for-profit corporation 
to act as moral entity, the Supreme Court should consider 
the sincerity of the corporation’s foundational principles.  
By analyzing the sincerity of a for-profit corporation’s 
motivation to adhere to specific principles, the government 
is both recognizing the identity and protecting the rights of 















                                                 
69
 William N. Eskridge, Jr, Some Effects of Identity-Based Social 
Movements on Constitutional Law in the Twentieth Century, 100 MICH. 
L. REV. 2062, 2064 (2002). 
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